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about Living Parental liver Donation - Mare Knibbe 6 mei 200 _______ --' 
1. De periode waarin ouders levende donor levertransplantatie voor hun kind overwegen 
is te kenschetsen als een overgangsperiode, waarin ze moeten leren leven met nieuwe 
onzekerheden en risico's. (dit proefschrift) 
2. De aandacht van een ouder voor de risico's en voordelen van levende leverdonatie 
kan begrepen warden als onderdeel van de specifieke wijze waarop hij of zij hoopt op 
een goede uitkomst voor zijn of haar kind. (dit proefschrift) 
3. Goede hoop kan omschreven warden als een evenwichtige investering van aandacht, 
inspanning, emoties en gedachten in een wenselijke en mogelijke toekomst. 
(dit proefschrift) 
4. Autonomie en informed consent zijn niet de enige ingredienten voor goede 
besluitvorming over levende donor levertransplantatie; goede hoop is ook van belang. 
(dit proefschrift) 
5. Een moreel verplichtende relatie, niet de "inherent dwingende relatie" die Forsberg et 
al. beschrijven, vormt de achtergrond van de ervaring die veel ouders hebben dat levende 
leverdonatie voor hun kind "geen kwestie van kiezen" is. (dit proefschrift) 
6. Om goede risicocommunicatie tussen ouders of ander familieleden te ondersteunen 
moeten professionals aandacht besteden aan gender gerelateerde rolpatronen in een 
familie. (dit proefschrift) 
7. De invloed van professionals op de bereidheid van ouders om leverdonor te warden 
voor hun kind, is onvermijdelijk. Het is dus beter te streven naar goede invloed op de 
besluitvorming over donorschap dan te streven naar non-directieve voorlichting. 
(dit proefschrift) 
s. "One's history as an agent is a web in which anything that is the product of the will is 
surrounded and held up and partly formed by things that are not[ ... )." (Bernard Williams 
1981, Moral Luck) 
9. "Dit is geen stelling," is een paradox. 
10. Omdat werk dat geschreven is in vrije tijd vaak van betere kwaliteit is dan werk 
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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
DOLT 
Deceased Donor Liver Transplantation 
EEZ 
Expertisecentrum Ethiek in de Zorg, Expert center for Ethics in Care 
LRKT 
Living Related Kidney Transplantation 
LRLT 
Living Related Liver Transplantation, in this thesis it refers to parent to child 
living donor liver transplantation 
Domino Transplantation 
If a post-mortem donor organ is transplanted to a patient whose primary dis­
ease allows the use of his/her therapeutically explanted organ for a consecu­
tive second transplant, then this patient is called a domino donor. A domino 
donor can be considered a living donor if this is in accordance with current 
national laws on transplantation and/or guidelines. (Eurotransplant Manual) 
A domino liver donation e.g. occurs in a patient who is suffering from a non­
cirrhotic metabolic liver disorder, e.g. Familial Amyloid Polyneuropathy (FAP) 
or Oxalosis. This compromised liver can be used for a consecutive transplan­
tation in a recipient who is chosen from the center's own waiting list. If no suit­
able recipient is available, then this organ is reported back to the ET duty desk 
for patient-specific allocation. 
The genetic enzyme defect of the liver will only become clinically apparent 
in a second recipient long after the transplantation. Therefore, patients e.g. 
with a reduced life expectancy can be chosen as a recipient for such a liver, 
as the expected time until development of clinical signs resulting from the 
compromised liver organ might extend beyond the expected life expectancy 
of the recipient. 
Extended criteria donors 
The donor pool can be enlarged by accepting donors that do not meet the 
standard criteria for acceptance, e.g. donors with fatty livers. 
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Non-heart beating donors (NHB donors) 
According to the Maastricht classification nonheartbeating donors can be 
grouped in five categories: 
I Brought in dead 
11 Unsuccessful resuscitation 
Ill Awaiting cardiac arrest 
IV Cardiac arrest after brain-stem death 
V Cardiac arrest in a hospital inpatient (new category, 2003) 
Death in the setting of NHB Ill donation is based on the occurrence of irre­
versible circulatory arrest after ventilator switch-off. A subsequent period of 
at least 5 minutes is mandatory to ascertain brain death. During this 5-minute 
"no-touch" period, no preservation or procurement activities are allowed. 
This legal requirement follows the recommendations of the U.S. Institute of 
Medicine. 
Opting in system for organ donation 
People, who want to become donor upon death, have to register their will. 
This system is also referred to as an "informed consent system". 
Opting out system for organ donation 
People are considered to be donor upon death unless they have registered 
their will not to be a donor. This system is also referred to as a "presumed 
consent" system. 
Reduced size liver transplantation 
In this procedure the liver volume of an adult donor-liver is reduced to a size 
that can be used for a pediatric recipient. 
Size-matched donor liver 
The liver-volume that a patient needs is dependent on the weight of the 
patient. Children therefore need a small liver graft for transplantation. 
Before the techniques of reduced size liver transplantation and split liver 
transplantation had been developed it was very difficult to get size-matched 
donor livers for children. 
Split liver transplantation 












In 2004, when patients in the Netherlands with an indication for liver trans­
plantation could first receive a partial liver graft from a living related donor, 
the transplant center in Groningen started a program for parent-to-child liver 
donation. In the first month of this program candidates for living donation were 
discussed in a weekly meeting with a selection of members of the liver trans­
plant team: the physician who is responsible for the donor-screening; two 
pediatricians; and a surgeon. I also attended these meetings, since I partici­
pated in a research project into the ethical aspects of living related liver trans­
plantation: LRLT*. In one of these meetings the physician told about the family 
of a boy who was waiting for a liver transplantation. This is the summary of the 
discussion in my notes: 
The father had wanted to donate. The mother had positioned herself as a 
stand-in, if the father turned out not to be a medically suitable donor, she 
would consider donation. Unfortunately, he had the wrong blood group, 
which made the situation very complex, as the physician indicates. But now 
things were going a bit too fast for her; now that his blood group appeared to 
be wrong, she was the only donor candidate left. The time pressure also 
increased because the boy's condition was rapidly deteriorating. Although 
the mother did not know yet how to think about donation, she enrolled in the 
donor screening, to find out if she was medically suitable. The physician and 
others present are hesitant to see her as a good donor-candidate; before 
accepting her they would want to have all the psychosocial aspects thoroughly 
examined. However, they decide to first examine the technical possibility. If 
there is a medico-technical contra-indication for her liver donation they don't 
have to turn this family inside out. 
When this option of living liver donation was introduced, professionals and 
relatives around a patient faced new responsibilities. Parents of young 
patients or other relatives had to consider whether to donate or wait for a 
* See glossary & abbreviations for an overview of abbreviations and explanation of medical 
terms. 
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deceased donor liver graft, whether their family could cope with an extra 
patient, and if they were willing to accept the risk. Professionals also had to 
reconsider their responsibilities. Under which circumstances could they 
account for the involvement in risking the life and health of a healthy donor? 
How should they handle different views of colleagues on the subject? How 
could they inform and talk with parents or other relatives about the option of 
living donation without pressuring them? In the views that parents and profes­
sionals developed on such questions, understandings about professional and 
family relations formed an important background. The background of moral 
understandings about parenthood, about what it means to be a good doctor, 
about good patient-doctor relationships and the values involved surround the 
course of decisions about LRLT. This thesis aims to offer a reflective, critical, 
and normative analysis of these moral understandings. 
AIMS AND QUESTIONS 
The introduction of LRLT as an available form of transplantation involved 
changing understandings about relations in families of a patient, in the trans­
plant team, and between professionals and family members. First, with the 
introduction of LRL T, professionals had to engage in new ways with the fami­
lies of their patients. Second, professionals had to cooperate with each other 
in new ways. Furthermore, family relations often seemed to be challenged or 
confirmed in decision making about LRLT. The aim of this thesis is threefold: 
1. To undertake a reflective analysis of moral understandings in decision mak­
ing about LRLT. 2. To offer a critical reflection on the moral understandings 
that guide decision making and 3. To offer normative reflection on questions 
about good moral understandings. As will be explained more extensively 
below, these different forms of analysis and reflection are intertwined, and 
they are based on qualitative research. 
To situate the Groningen LRL T program and this qualitative ethical 
research, I first have to delineate the backgrounds and contexts of the intro­
duction of LRLT in this center. I will also situate my approach with the existing 
ways of framing ethical aspects of LRLT. Below I outline the backgrounds of 
LRL T as a medical practice and the ethical frameworks that have been devel­
oped for LRL T in order to position this research and indicate how it can add to 
the existing ethical perspectives. After a discussion of backgrounds, available 
ethical frames and remaining problems, I will come back to the aims and 
questions in this thesis. 
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BACKGROUNDS OF LRLT 
International context 
Though living related liver transplantation (LRLT) was new in the two centers 
offering this option in the Netherlands, in a global perspective LRLT was not 
so new. In other countries living donor liver transplantation had been practiced 
since 1988. For this form of liver transplantation, two surgical techniques that 
had been established before are used in combination. The donor operation is 
based on techniques used for many years in liver resections for tumors, and 
on techniques developed for reduced size and split-liver transplantation. Both 
techniques were also practiced for several years. The recipient operation also 
resembles the transplantation with a reduced size or split-liver graft; in which 
the volume of a deceased donor liver is adjusted to the weight of the recipient 
or is split for transplantation into two patients. The establishment of these 
techniques for adjusting liver volume made living donor liver transplantation 
possible (Broelsch et al. 1991 ). 
Toward the end of the eighties, several liver transplant centers started 
exploring this option. In 1988 Silvano Raia performed the first living donor 
liver transplantation in Sao Paulo, Brazil. A 4-year-old patient with terminal 
liver failure received a partial liver graft from her mother. The child died six 
days after the transplantation, although the donor recovered from the opera­
tion (Raia et al. 1989). Shortly after this first attempt, a 17-month-old child 
from Japan was transplanted in Brisbane with a liver graft from the patient's 
mother. Both child and donor recovered (Strong et al. 1990). In Chicago the 
use of living donors had also been considered and discussed in the institu­
tional review board since 1986. The intention to start an LAL T program in 
Chicago was announced with a discussion of ethical aspects in the New 
England Journal of Medicine (Singer et al. 1989). The Chicago protocol and 
its views on ethical aspects was a widely known and accepted example when 
other centers started LRLT programs in the nineties (Siegler & Lantos 1992; 
Singer et al. 1989; Broelsch et al. 1991 ). 
In the nineties LRLT was offered by centers in Asia, Australia, Europe, and 
America. In Japan where, on widely held religious views, brain death criteria 
are not acceptable, it rapidly became a broadly practiced modality of liver 
transplantation. After the introduction of parent-to-child organ donation, 
Japanese centers also developed living liver donation for adult patients 
(Hashikura et al. 1994; Yamaoka et al. 1994). The donor risks in this proce­
dure are higher compared to liver donation for pediatric recipients, because 
adult recipients need a higher volume liver graft for transplantation. Whereas 
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children can be transplanted with the left or left lateral liver lobe; adult patients 
usually need the bigger right-lobe liver graft. Though parent-to-child liver 
donation found broad acceptance in many transplant centers worldwide, the 
offer of LRLT for adult patients remained more controversial, especially in 
countries with a system for postmortem donation (Cronin 2004). The Dutch 
Health Council also expressed greater reservations about LRL T for adult 
patients than for pediatric recipients (Gezondheidsraad 2003). Yet, increasing 
demand for donor livers and stagnating donation rates motivated many trans­
plant centers to offer this option for adult patients with end-stage liver disease, 
or with irresectable malignant tumors of the liver. 
When Groningen started with its LRL T program the risks of donor death 
after left lateral lobe donation were estimated to be between 0.1 and 0.2%. 
The incidence of major complications ranged from 5% to 20%, depending on 
a center's experience (Samstein & Emond 2001 ). For LRLT with adult recipi­
ents the estimated risks of donor death are 0.5 to 2%. Estimations of risks are 
difficult because there is no standardized assessment of donor morbidity. The 
reports of experiences in different centers are therefore difficult to compare. 
The statistics also show that donor morbidity has a strong correlation with 
center-experience (Broering 2007). Furthermore, there have been rumors 
about donor deaths that have not been officially reported (Strong 2000). 
Local context of LRLT in Groningen 
LRL T had been offered 'routinely' in many transplant centres world-wide since 
1989, yet in 2004 it was adopted as a new procedure in Groningen. Though 
the novelty of LRLT was only local, its novelty was of central significance in the 
processes of decision making about LRL T. To a team that was never involved 
in living donor operations, the offer of living liver donation required a change of 
moral practice and perspectives. At first they had to find out if, how, and when 
involvement in harming a healthy donor was acceptable to them, and they had 
to deal with disagreements in the team on this topic. The experience with liv­
ing donor liver transplantation elsewhere and the ethical views of peers were 
important context, but they did not take away the moral reservations that still 
existed in the team about LRL T. 
These reservations have to be understood in the context of waiting list 
problems and measures that were taken or that failed to be taken to address 
these problems. In view of the maxim of primum non nocere, the use of 
healthy persons as a liver donor was only found acceptable when everything 
had been done to solve waiting list problems in other ways. The possible ways 
of expanding the donor pool, or of making optimal use of the existing donor 
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pool, depended on steps taken in this transplant center, but also on other hos­
pitals and national politics. 
Although the Netherlands had postponed offering LRLT longer than many 
other countries, the Groningen liver transplant centre had participated in other 
international developments in the field of liver transplantation. The liver trans­
plant program started in March 1979 with the transplantation of the first adult 
patient. On the basis of its subsequent successes, the Groningen center was 
invited with three other pioneering centers (Cambridge, Hannover, and Pitts­
burgh) to participate in the NIH Consensus Development Conference on liver 
transplantation in 1981 in Washington DC USA. During this meeting the con­
sensus formed was that liver transplantation had exceeded its experimental 
phase and was an accepted treatment modality for patients with end stage 
liver diseases (National Institutes of Health Consensus Development 1983). 
In 1982 the program was extended with a pediatric branch, and to date, the 
Groningen Pediatric liver transplant program is the only center in the Nether­
lands performing such operations. During the first years of this pediatric pro­
gram, transplantations were performed exclusively with whole pediatric donor 
livers. However, such size-matched pediatric donor livers were scarce. This 
lead to an increase of waiting list mortality, especially in children. It also led to 
a deterioration of the condition of the children on the waiting list, leading to 
inferior outcomes. In a Dutch journal for healthcare two years before the LRL T 
program started, the chief surgeon sketched the history and context of the 
liver transplant program in Groningen to explain why they had to consider 
offering LRLT (Slooff 2001 ). In order to alleviate the shortage of grafts for chil­
dren, the technique of reduced-size liver transplantation was adopted in 1984. 
Adult donor livers, often the very best ones, were reduced to left or left lateral 
grafts, discarding the right part of the liver. The use of this technique was a dis­
advantage for adult patients on the waiting list. Later, split-liver transplantation 
was introduced, a technique in which both parts of the donor liver were used; 
the left side for a child and the right side for an adult patient. The introduction 
of both techniques resulted in a decline of waiting list mortality for children. 
However the problem of organ shortage was never completely resolved. 
Expanding the donor pool remained an important challenge for this centre as 
well as for liver transplant programs in the rest of the world. Non heart beating 
donation was revitalized and domino transplantations were done, yet, to no 
major effects on the shortage of grafts. Looking at living donation therefore 
was a logical action. In Groningen, however, some team members were reluc­
tant towards the development of living donation programs because it was felt 
13 
that the potential of postmortem donation was not exploited fully (Kranenburg 
1998). Some surgeons reasoned that before harming healthy persons with as 
risky an operation as living partial liver donation, all possible measures should 
be taken to fully exploit the existing postmortem donor pool. 
In addition to the strategies for expanding the donor pool, another approach to 
waiting list problems, restricting indications for liver transplantation, was often 
discussed, but never adopted. In reaction to the death of two children who in 
the same month received a liver transplantation while in a very bad condition, 
the intensive care physician asked in the weekly team meeting if the trans­
plant team should make a stricter selection of patients: 
'Now patients only receive a liver transplant when they are in a very bad 
condition. Other patients patiently wait for their turn, which only comes after 
their condition has worsened as well. Of course the idea is that everybody 
should get a chance but now everybody is victimized by this policy, 
including us.' 
The question arose whether the scarce resource of donor livers should be 
given to patients with poor chances of survival. If liver grafts were given only 
to patients in reasonable condition, with better chances of survival, those on 
the waiting list would get optimal survival benefit of the available liver grafts. 
In addition to this argument from utility, there was also political pressure to 
restrict indications for liver transplantation in order to get better results for the 
program. Such results were important for the public image of the program and 
for obtaining funds and skilled personnel. Nonetheless it was difficult to give 
such considerations a place in decision making about indication for transplan­
tation. In a discussion that was organized around this topic one of the pediatri­
cians explained; 'When holding a consultation with a patient, you can't have 
the interests of other patients in the back of your head.' In the words of another 
pediatrician: "should we have other statistical patients in the consult room, in 
addition to the concrete patient?" Pediatricians felt bound by their responsibil­
ity to individual patients; they could not consider the interests of others in the 
treatment of this patient. In this meeting it was concluded that if considerations 
of maximizing utility were to play a role in the indications for liver transplanta­
tion, they would have to be enacted by some kind of external conscience, to 
retain clarity about responsibility to individual patients. Although doubts were 
expressed about patients with complex diseases and complications, the deci­
sion to deny liver transplantation to a patient was only taken if there were strict 
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contra-indications for liver transplantation, as formulated in the literature. Not 
only was it difficult to decide on the team level that some patients would not 
get a chance of a life-saving treatment, to be effective such a restriction in 
indications for liver transplantation also required a change of policy on a 
national level. 
Thus, among the different strategies to address and cope with waiting list 
problems, the option of restricting indications was not adopted. Another much­
discussed nationwide strategy for expanding the donor pool was a change of 
the opting-in system for organ donation into an opting out system. In sum, the 
team itself had adopted a set of measures to expand the donor pool; however 
on a national level some potential ways of addressing waiting list problems 
were not realized. 
The waiting list problems and the discussions about these problems formed 
the context in which LRLT was introduced. According to part of the team, wait­
ing-list problems justified the offer of LRLT; however, some surgeons still 
questioned if the problems should be addressed with an offer of LRL T. They 
suggested using stricter criteria for indication and they argued that more politi­
cal efforts should be made to change the opting-in system for post mortem 
organ donation, in order to increase national donation rates.* 
Thus LRLT was introduced in spite of different views on the ethical accept­
ability of offering this procedure in this center. 
Change 
When the LRL T program started, the team had to find a way of dealing with 
such an innovation involving moral reservations. In a discussion of transplant 
medicine and therapeutic innovations in the eighties, the surgeon F.D. Moore 
stated that the ethics of therapeutic innovation depends on three conditions: 
1) the strength of scientific background; 2) 'field-strength': the required experi­
ence and technical skills of a team performing a new procedure; and 3) the 
ethical climate in an institution (Moore 1988). In this transplant centre the first 
two conditions were not an issue: the required technical skills had been prac­
ticed before in partial liver transplantation and conventional liver resection. As 
for the third condition, the introduction of LRLT required changes in attitudes, 
* With the current Dutch Law for Organ donation (WOD) people have to take active steps to 
register their will to be donor upon death. Since many Dutch do not register their will, patient 
and medical organizations argue for an opting-out system; a system that is also known in 
Spain and Belgium; you are considered to be organ donor unless you have opted out. 
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relations, and moral views; it required an ethical climate that could go through 
these changes. This could involve many things like room for exchanging 
views, rearticulating professional roles and relations, mutual understanding 
and tolerance between different perspectives involved; and openness to revi­
sion of moral views. At the start of the LRL T program it was not clear how such 
a transition in ethical climate would go. The liver transplant team had to find a 
way to offer LRL T in the specific circumstances in this team, with its inherited 
moral views and its Dutch political and juridical context. 
Because of moral reservations and the changes in ethical climate that intro­
ducing LRLT required, the Expert Center for Ethics in Care (EEZ) was 
involved in the first years of the LRLT program. Together with Els Maeckel­
berghe, a member of the EEZ (and my copromotor) we facilitated several dis­
cussions on ethical questions in the team, and my qualitative ethical research 
was conducted from within the EEZ. The research took a focus on the new 
forms of engagement between professionals and families that the introduction 
of LRLT brought about. 
New forms of engagement 
When LRL T was introduced (in spite of different interpretations of context and 
remaining moral reservations) the transplant team and the families of patients 
became engaged with each other in new ways. The institutions of healthcare 
and family have always interacted with a certain amount of friction, as Hilde 
and James Lindeman Nelson describe (Lindemann Nelson 1995). However, 
in the combination of pediatric medicine and living donation, doctors and 
nurses become even more intricately involved in family patterns. The willing­
ness of the transplant team to undertake LRL T depended in part on the willing­
ness of parents or other potential donors to donate. In the course of the explo­
rations of this option, the motives for donation and the context in which they 
arose were examined and tested by professionals. Professionals from diverse 
disciplines, with different relations to donor, patient, and family, reviewed a 
donors' motives, attitudes, social network, and the families economic and 
employment situation. A very thorough donor screening, including medical 
and psychosocial aspects, was considered important; however, the motiva­
tional or attitudinal aspects in situations of parents with a very ill child were dif­
ficult to judge. The interactions and relations between parents, child, and pro­
fessional caregivers had to be reinterpreted in the light of living donation; 
however, it was not always clear how to do this. It was not easy to tell if a 
potential donor really wanted to donate, or whether she simply could not 
refuse when the team offered this option. 
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In short, LRL T was introduced in spite of moral reservations, under pressure 
of scarcity of donor livers and in a liver transplant team with different views on 
how this shortage should be solved. This was the context in which profession­
als and parents had to find out if LRLT was a good and realistic option for their 
child. The interactions and relations around patient and potential donor were 
very important in the exploration of the option of living donation; however, they 
too were difficult to grasp and evaluate. Below I outline the existing ethical 
framework for LRLT. While this normative framework shaped moral under­
standings of professionals about LRLT, it does not support critical reflection on 
these understandings and their significance in LRLT-practice. It guides the 
application of generally accepted principles of medical ethics, without explor­
ing their relation to other moral concerns that are not backed up by the princi­
ples of medical ethics. 
B RO A D LY S H A R E D  E T H I C A L  F R A M E WO R KS 
O F  P A R E N T-TO-C H I L D  L I V I N G  R E LAT E D  L I V E R  
T R A N S P L A N T A T I O N  
The most widely known and extensive discussion of ethical aspects of LRL T 
comes from ethicists and physicians involved in the LRLT program in Chicago 
(Broelsch et al. 1991; Siegler 1992; Siegler & Lantos 1992; Singer et al. 1989; 
Singer et al. 1990; Whitington et al. 1991; Whitington 1996). The terms in 
which they identify ethical aspects of this procedure, in particular concerns of 
nonmaleficence and autonomy, were also used by professionals in the trans­
plant center I studied to express their reserves. 
The views developed in Chicago can be summarized as a scheme of mutu­
ally related bioethical principles that should be balanced in specific relations 
and circumstances. I first summarize the principles and their relations very 
roughly and subsequently indicate how their application is discussed in the 
context of LRLT: 
• When donor-risks are very low and recipients have great potential 
benefit from living donor liver transplantation, the principle of 'do no 
harm' can be overruled by the principle of beneficence. 
• The autonomy of a donor's decision to donate is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the ethical acceptability of LRLT. 
• Donor autonomy should be constrained by the medical obligation to 
do no harm, which can only be overruled by considerations of 
beneficence. 
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In the application of bioethical principles to LRL T, professional responsibilities 
in relation to patient, donor and family form an important context. To indicate 
how donor risks can be weighed against recipient benefits, Whitington states 
that ethical acceptability is not solely a matter of the quality of the individual 
doctor-patient relationship; medical professionals should consider their 
responsibility to the whole family (Whitington 1991 ). Health professionals 
have a responsibility for the welfare of a patient as well as a patient's family. 
LRLT is justified when the health benefit for a recipient is expected to be of 
psycho-social benefit for the whole family, including the donor. In reaction to 
this view, Spital stated that it is only the psycho-social donor-benefit that justi­
fies LRL T. The psychosocial benefit that a donor has from the continued rela­
tion with a loved one should be the justification for accepting a living liver 
donor (Spital 2004). 
Considerations of autonomy too take on greater complexity in the context 
of LRL T. The Chicago physicians Mark Siegler and John Lantos give their 
views on donor-autonomy and informed consent in reaction to a decision of 
the ethics-committee in Sao Paulo to accept an unrelated volunteer as a liver 
donor (Segre 1992; Siegler & Lantos 1992). In a Sao Paulo case, Silvano Raia 
et al. could not find a suitable donor in the family, so they accepted a healthy 
unrelated volunteer as a liver donor for a 19-month year old girl (Raia et al. 
1989). The ethics committee had formed a positive opinion about this proce­
dure, on the basis of considerations of autonomy (Segre 1992). They stated 
that the individual considering living donation should have the controlling deci­
sion. According to the committee, the views of third parties about the reasons 
for donation (gratitude, financial interests or strong family bonds) should be of 
secondary moral importance. Siegler and Lantos, however, write that the 
ethics committee had based their approval of the procedure on an 'extreme 
and inappropriate reliance on donor autonomy' (Siegler & Lantos 1992). 
Repeating their earlier argument, they stated that the central ethical question 
is whether the doctor is right to allow donation in light of the fact that there is 
no such thing as a right to donate (Singer et al. 1989). Doctors should balance 
donor risks and recipient benefits and they should only agree if the donor risks 
are extremely low when weighed against recipient benefits. Siegler and Lan­
tos also disagree that motives for donation are irrelevant. As opposed to 
Segre et al., who claim that judgments of third parties about donor-motives 
have less relevance, the Chicago physicians recommend psychiatric or psy­
chological evaluation of donors and their motives, to determine if an informed 
consent is truly voluntary. 
According to Siegler and Lantos the potential for coercion should be a key 
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element in the evaluation of informed consent. They distinguish three possible 
forms of coercion: First, a donor's feeling of guilt when faced with the possible 
death of the patient can be a form of internal psychological coercion, although 
these motives can often hardly be distinguished from laudable motivations 
such as love and loyalty. They consider such internal coercion acceptable 
because in their view, 'the need to balance selfishness and altruism is a uni­
versal feature of an individual's relationship with his or her family' (Siegler & 
Lantos 1992). A greater threat to a donor's autonomy is thought to come from 
a second possible source of pressures, namely family pressures or pressures 
from the transplant team. Transplant teams should try to minimize these exter­
nal forms of coercion. Third, according to Siegler and Lantos, the legalization 
of financial incentives to donate could coerce people to become donor and 
ought to be opposed. 
R E LA T I O N S  I N  T H E  C H ICAGO FRA M E W O R K  
Relations and interactions involved in  LRLT are understood and placed in  spe­
cific schemes in the above-described ethical framework. In this framework, 
the family relations around donor and recipient are a potential source of coer­
cion as well as a motivating factor. Furthermore relations between donor and 
professionals are potentially coercive; however, these relations can also 
serve to protect donors from pressuring or coercive factors. Relations are thus 
captured in a scheme of factors that are either undermining or supportive of 
donor autonomy. In this scheme, it is difficult to examine the ambiguities sur­
rounding questions about donor autonomy. Why, for example, is guilt placed 
on the coercive side of the spectrum in spite of its closeness to "laudable 
motives" for donation? And what is the relation between internal and external 
coercion? 
Perhaps the so-called gift-exchange which has been employed since the 
1970s is in a better position to grasp the complex relational webs and the 
ambiguities of freedom, generosity and obligation. Renee Fox and Judith 
Swazey, the most prominent proponents of this view, write that although giv­
ing and receiving have a "voluntary disguise," they are often binding (Fox & 
Swazey 1974). The mere existence of transplantation as a life-saving treat­
ment puts people who are close to a transplant patient in the position to save 
someone by donating. The offer of LRLT to parents underscores the norma­
tive expectations toward parents that they make sacrifices for their children. In 
these positions donation can only be refused at high costs. When the opportu-
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nity for giving occurs, a refusal to give, receive or repay can generate open or 
hidden conflicts, feelings of guilt or of being rejected. On the other side, 
acceptance of this irreciprocable gift can also cause serious tensions. Never­
theless, many donors and recipients managed to transcend these potential 
tensions and conflicts. In this gift-exchange view the crucial question is not 
whether a decision is free; it is rather how to enter carefully into the exchange, 
through interpretation and mediation of the relations involved. 
In most ethical discussions about LRLT, there is no mention of gift exchange, 
its relational webs and social dynamics. In the above-outlined ethical reflec­
tions on LRLT relations are mainly treated as a given context of application, 
not something needing interpretation and mediation. Yet the ethical principles 
of nonmaleficence, beneficence and respect for autonomy are not applied to 
"bare facts" of the reality of doctors, potential donors and families, they are 
applied to narratively constructed understandings about the practice of LAL T 
and its participants. (Chambers 1999) Moral understandings about LRLT are 
made up of intertwined narratives of identities (of parenthood or what it means 
to be a doctor), relations (family relations or doctor patient relations) and val­
ues (autonomy, hope, or trust). This thesis examines the moral understand­
ings about LRL T. 
Autonomy and informed consent about liver donation remain complex 
issues because they seem to have a difficult fit with the relational context. 
There is a fissure between the informed consent norms for LRLT and experi­
ences in practice. Several empirical studies about donor decision making indi­
cate that donation is not seen as a matter of choice, and that many kidney and 
liver donors hardly think about the risk information that was given (Fellner & 
Marshall 1968; Fellner & Marshall 1970; Franklin & Crombie 2003; Crowly­
Matoka 2004; Forsberg et al. 2004). Some ethicists try to bridge this gap by 
examining and reformulating conceptions of agency that are implicit in com­
mon models of autonomy and informed and voluntary consent (Crouch & 
Elliot 1999; Spital 2005). Crouch and Elliot propose a relational notion of 
moral agency to come to a more realistic understanding of donor autonomy 
and informed consent. They point out that the idea that intimate family rela­
tions and conscience can be coercive is inspired by an over-individualistic 
notion of moral agency. They give a general revaluation of relations in donor 
autonomy; however, they do not examine the specific character of family or 
transplant relations to understand which kind of relations are supportive of 
autonomous agency and which aren't. 
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T H E O R E T I C A L  A P P ROACH 
In this sketch of the introduction of LRLT in the international and the Dutch 
context, I identified two problems. The first is that the move to LRL T required a 
transition in ethical climate that could enable processes of collaborative deci­
sion making with diverging and sometimes conflicting moral perspectives. The 
second is that it was difficult to understand and evaluate the morally relevant 
features of the new kind of relations and involvement between family mem­
bers and professionals that the offer of LRL T brings about. 
The answer to the problem of the team - an ethical climate that enables col­
laborative decision making - is not formed in this thesis but emerged in prac­
tice. To assist the team in addressing this problem, several discussion meet­
ings were organized and facilitated together with my co-promoter Els 
Maeckelberghe. This problem and the way it was addressed in the team 
formed the context of my research. It is also described in chapter two. 
The aim of this thesis is to offer a reflective, critical, and normative analysis 
of the moral understandings that surround the practice of LRL T. These moral 
understandings present themselves as narrative understandings. This view 
on morality and narratively constructed moral understandings is very much 
inspired by the theoretical views of Margaret Urban Walker. In her book Moral 
Understandings Margaret Walker presents a view on morality as a 'socially 
embodied medium of mutual understanding and negotiation between people 
of their responsibility for things open to human care and response' 
(M.U.Walker 1998). In that sense, the practice of LRLT itself should be seen 
as a moral practice. In LRLT as a socially embedded moral practice, people 
show what they value by making and holding each other responsible for cer­
tain things. Interactions, in which we make and hold each other or ourselves 
responsible, are guided by implicit or explicit moral, narratively constructed, 
understandings about who we and others are, about our relations, and values. 
To function, for example, as the parent of a patient in a transplant center, one 
has to have some understandings about one's own roles and those of others 
involved. Ideally these understandings are shared and endorsed by those 
involved in collaboratively formed patient care; however different positions 
and perspectives in a practice also produce divergent or even conflicting 
views of what happens in this practice and why it happens. 
To avoid confusion about notions of responsibility, I do have to specify how 
I followed the processes in which responsibilities with regard to LRL T crystal­
lized. In philosophy, the concept of responsibility is often understood in rela-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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tion to metaphysical questions about freedom and determinism, or in reflec­
tions on the human condition or moral agency. In this thesis, by contrast, 
responsibilities are seen as the outcome of collaborative and interpretive 
processes. 
Starting from a specific understanding of their commitments and concerns 
parents and professionals explore whether, given the circumstances, possible 
developments, and opportunities, LRLT is part of their responsibility. Parents 
and professionals have specific historically developed but not always clearly 
outlined areas of responsibility. Parents are commonly expected to educate 
and care for their children, but this implies a number of different practices; 
making a safe home, preparing food, giving emotional support, teaching disci­
pline or tolerance, seeking medical support etc. Pediatricians, surgeons, and 
other supporting professionals are expected to offer the best available treat­
ments for children with a chronic or life-threatening disease, and to support 
the family in caring for these children. 
In the processes I followed, parents and professionals tried to find out 
whether living liver donation, or operating living liver donors fell in these areas 
of responsibility or whether they were in conflict with them. In my research I 
was not so much interested in the outcome of these processes as in the 
processes themselves; how circumstances and people's place in them were 
understood or changed; how parents and professionals came to their under­
standings of these circumstances, how they conceived of and invited possible 
and desirable outcomes. These processes had interpretive and collaborative 
dimensions. The interactions and division of labor between parents and pro­
fessionals in the care for their child can be seen as a collaborative dimension 
of these processes. The interpretive processes, in which the collaborations 
were negotiated, were steered by narratives about parenthood, doctors, rela­
tionships, and values like autonomy, trust, or hope. 
Having defined morality as a family of practices in which people hold them 
selves and each other responsible for certain things, Walker distinguishes 
three tasks of ethics and moral philosophy: reflective analysis, critical reflec­
tion and fully normative reflection. Reflective analysis aims at mapping what 
people do and how they understand what they are doing, in terms of their 
identity, relations and values. Critical reflection takes a step further, it asks to 
what extend the understandings of different parties about interactions are 
shared, if people really understand what is going on or whether their perspec­
tive is based on deception, or confusion. Critical reflection also aims at exam­
ining the authority of different values, like autonomy or considerations about 
parent-child relations. Do they hold up to critical examination? Reflective 
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analysis and critical reflection in this thesis are based on a qualitative empiri­
cal study, the methods of which will be described below. A third level of reflec­
tion distinguished by Walker is ful ly normative reflection. Normative reflection 
aims to find out whether the moral understandings in a practice are really 
good, compared to other understandings one can imagine. Below I outline 
the design of the qualitative study, subsequently I' l l indicate how different 
levels of analysis and reflection were used in this thesis. 
M E T HO D S  
To give the interpersonal aspects o f  LAL T practices a central place in  the 
study-design, respondents were asked to participate not individually  but 
together. Parents who had been donors or potential donors were asked to 
participate together. In addition, observations at team meetings provided the 
opportunity to follow what happened among professionals involved, while 
observations in the outpatient pediatric clinic fol lowed interactions among 
parents, children, and professionals. 
Interviews 
At a minimum of four months after the transplantation of their child, parents 
who had been screened for liver donation and their partners were asked 
whether they were interested in participating in this study. Twelve families 
were included, involving 22 parents, 2 uncles, and one aunt opting for dona­
tion. In four children LRLT was performed and a further eight children were 
transplanted with a deceased donor liver (DOLT). Two families had been 
referred to Hamburg for LRLT after an initial screening, because they came to 
the liver transplant center in Groningen before the LAL T program had started. 
To explore the significance of living related donation in families, a rather 
open, semi-structured interview style was adopted.* Respondents were asked 
to tel l  in their own words about the time leading up to transplantation, and their 
thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and decisions about living donation. The struc­
ture was given by the introduction and a few interview topics that had to be 
covered: experiences of hospital encounters; dealing with different sources of 
information; decision making about LRLT; risk perceptions; (changing) per­
ceptions of the patient's condition; (changing) attitudes toward living donation; 
* Semi-structured interviews can be any form of interview between completely open-ended 
and completely structured. My interviews were closer to the open-ended side of the spectrum . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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and responding to others' views about donation. The introduction to the inter­
views was important to create an understanding of the social setting of the 
interview. As interviewer, I emphasized to respondents (mostly two per inter­
view) that I wanted to learn from their story and perspectives because LAL T 
was new in this country, and I told them that their names would not appear in 
publications about this research. Furthermore, in the interviews with parents 
of patients I made it clear that although the study was about living donation, I 
wanted to hear the whole story from the moment that parents noticed their 
child was ill. The idea was that this would give parents more space to situate 
the topic of living donation in a context as they experienced it. During the inter­
view most questions were oriented at understanding the internal (in-)coher­
ences in stories. With these questions I aimed to stimulate respondents to 
give and clarify their account in their own terms. At some moments I intro­
duced concerns of the transplant team about living donation and informed 
consent to get a better picture of how respondents related to these concerns. 
The interviews were designed to generate narrative material that could be 
used to form a better understanding of the moral practice of LRL T. By means 
of the combined-interview format as well as the topics I invited respondents to 
tell about their experiences in relation to others. Asking direct questions about 
relations seemed out of place in an interview in which threats to their child and 
the efforts to avert these threats were vividly recalled. However, the topics in 
the interview scheme mentioned above encouraged parents to situate their 
story in different relationships. When recalling conversations about the dis­
ease of their child or about living donation parents explained their attitudes, 
thoughts, and feelings in relation to others involved. 
The interview material gathered was constructed in the small social setting 
of parents (donors or donor candidates and partners) and interviewer. The 
color of what was told should be interpreted in this social setting; the inter­
views did not yield highly personal but interpersonal stories. Since the charac­
ter of the social setting in different interviews varied, the narrative forms used 
by respondents were also very different. Depending on their understanding 
about me and my research some respondents took on the role of co­
researchers; examining their own experiences for me, others tried rather to 
convince me, and through me a broader public, of the complexity of LRLT or of 
the value that LRLT had for them. Stories also had different 'levels of organi­
zation'. Some respondents had clearly spoken or written about their experi­
ences before: their accounts were more polished and had probably been 
formed in relation with different audiences. For others it was the first time they 
sat down to recall events and talk about the time before transplantation. Their 
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stories were more structured by the memories evoked in the course of the 
interview. This diversity in interviews would pose a problem if the aim of the 
study were to get a general picture of experiences, motives, or relations as 
they really were. However, as I will explain more extensively in the section on 
reflective analysis, the interviews were designed to explore different ways of 
interpreting and framing participants' reflections on what happens in LRL T. 
The fact that interviews were held retrospectively makes them liable to a 
specific bias. Respondents might uphold a certain positive or critical image of 
the decision-making process. The reason to make use of retrospective inter­
views was primarily a moral one; we did not want the interviews to interfere in 
the decision-making process. In order to enhance a careful interpretation of 
interview material, interviews were designed to come to replication and trian­
gulation. Triangulation usually indicates the use of different procedures of 
data collection (like interviews and observations) to get a picture of a specific 
topic. However triangulation can also be used in the scope of one interview, if 
the interviewer chooses different entries to introduce a subject matter (Wester 
& Peters 2004). For example: I asked explicit questions about attitudes toward 
donation in different stages of decision-making, but I also asked questions 
about conversations with professionals and family in which attitudes were 
more implicitly pictured. This form of triangulation made it possible to take 
biases into account in the interpretation of material. 
Observations 
Observations were used in addition to interviews. Observations were done for 
a period of three months in the pediatric outpatient clinic and for a longer 
period of one and a half years in the weekly meetings of the transplant team. 
In the first months there was a weekly LRL T meeting with a small group of two 
pediatricians, one surgeon and the gastroenterologist who did the donor 
screening. After these first months it was decided that LRLT cases would be 
discussed in the general team meetings. 
In the outpatient clinic I followed how patients and parents were introduced 
to the practice of liver transplantation, and to the working of the waiting list. 
Here I also observed how nurses, pediatricians, and parents fine-tuned their 
information, questions, attitudes, and resolves to each other. Furthermore I 
saw how the topic of living donation was carefully introduced, suspended, and 
reintroduced in conversations. Although my presence may have had influ­
ence, the social setting of the clinical encounter was not significantly changed 
by the presence of observers, since there are often observers, students, and 
junior doctors in a university hospital. 
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With observations in the weekly team meeting I tried to gain insight in the 
team perspectives on LAL T and the context of scarcity of donor livers in which 
it was introduced. In these meetings I followed a number of discussions about 
indications for liver transplantation and how to deal with scarcity of organs. 
Because the surgeons often had to operate on patients in an advanced stage 
of their disease, the question repeatedly arose whether they should be more 
critical about which patients should get a chance for transplantation. Given 
this lively culture of discussion it was remarkable that there was very little said 
about cases of living donation. When cases of LRLT were introduced, informa­
tion about the progress of the screening was given, but there was hardly any 
conversation about it. Perhaps discussions on this topic were avoided, 
because it was a charged topic to some, not something that could be handled 
in a weekly meeting. There had been more discussion in the small LRLT meet­
ings in the first months of the program, and in other occasional meetings I 
attended or conversations outside the weekly team meetings, perspectives on 
LRLT were expressed. Team perspectives were visible between the lines of 
observations and interviews. To obtain more explicitly voiced views on the 
subject, a focus meeting was organized with Marian Verkerk, the supervisor 
of the project (Kitzinger 1994). Focus meetings can take many different forms 
and can be used for diverse purposes in a research project as a whole. In 
general they can be characterized as a kind of group interview, in which a 
multiplicity of views, attitudes, and feelings are elicited in a group context. In 
this research the focus meeting was used as a form of triangulation. In the 
meeting the team was asked to react on the picture of their approach to LRLT, 
a picture we had developed on the basis of interviews and observations. 
Analysis 
The analytic process consisted in ordering and organizing material in such a 
way as to make it speak about the research questions. This process started 
with the interview structure, the actual interview, and the focus of the observa­
tions at team meetings. Interviews were transcribed and observations were 
written down immediately after the observed occasions. Content analysis was 
used to identify recurring themes. After this first processing of material, further 
ordering of the material did not follow a fixed set of procedures. This does not 
mean that the material can be made to say anything; the process of ordering 
requires attending to the interpretive structures and organization that are 
already there. Such structures resist certain forms of ordering while complying 
more smoothly within others. In the interviews, parents create order in the 
things that happened. Their own ways of ordering things were partly build up 
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around the organization and understandings about LRLT in the hospital. Thus 
analysis involved identifying different layers of interpretation and organization 
in the collected material. 
Ideally one would use multiple coding to minimize bias. Because this 
requires a lot of time, I did the coding and interpreting myself. However, in the 
process checks were build in for input and questions form others. The first 
content-analysis of interviews was discussed extensively with my promoter 
and copromotor. Furthermore the focus-meeting with the transplant team 
served not only as a form of triangulation (collecting different data about and 
perspectives on the same subject) it was also a member-check, did team­
members recognize the analyses we presented of there approach to LRL T. 
The participants in the focus meeting indicated they recognized the descrip­
tion that was given of the teams approach to LRL T. 
Reflective analysis 
The analysis of interpretive structures in the stories of parents or in team-dis­
cussions also involved what Walker terms as 'reflective analysis' . In reflective 
analysis the understandings about LRL T were mapped against a background 
of intertwined narratives of identity, relations, and values. Different partici­
pants in the LRLT practice had their own narratively constructed moral under­
standings about living liver donation. For example some parents indicated that 
as parent they should become liver donor because they thought that as a 
good parent one should always be ready to do anything necessary and possi­
ble for the life of their child, without reservations or even in spite of other com­
pelling considerations. The moral understandings of doctors about LRLT were 
formed in the context of specific disciplines: ideas about good pediatricians, 
good donor advocates or good surgeons differently shaped attitudes toward 
LRL T. Professional concerns about donor autonomy also surrounded decision 
making about LRLT. Medical professionals of different disciplines were wor­
ried about the consequences of the above mentioned convictions about good 
parenthood that seemed to make it difficult for parents to come to free deci­
sions. As doctors they wanted to help parents help their child but they were 
also concerned about doing harm, and they valued donor-autonomy. Although 
they presented the option to parents, they avoided picturing LRL T as clearly 
falling in the sphere of parental responsibilities. 
Critical reflection 
Critical reflection aims at examining the authority of different understandings 
about living donation. Are understandings about LRLT shared? Do common 
27 
ways of framing interactions deserve their authority? Which perspectives are 
endorsed by dominant understandings about donation and which are made 
incomprehensible or less effective? Where reflective analysis explores how 
participants in the practice of LRLT make sense of their responsibilities; criti­
cal reflection wil l  examine if moral understandings really support an adequate 
understanding of what people do in this practice. For example, dominant inter­
pretations about decision making, framed by informed consent, are con­
fronted with parents' interpretations about the hospital encounters in the time 
leading up to liver transplantation. Do informed consent models help doctors 
to make sense of attitudes toward l iving donation and the relations involved, 
or are they rather confusing or obscuring the significance of attitudes and rela­
tions? 
In critical reflection, a resistance to one of my structuring interview topics 
offered general guidance in my attention and questions. One of the things I 
asked about was decision making. This made some parents respond that they 
had little to tell me: there had been little to decide about. In many interviews, 
points or moments of decision making cannot be indicated. Decisions about 
whether or not a (probably) suitable donor would donate often seem to be 
something that happens in the course of ongoing adjustment to the progress­
ing disease of the child. The time leading up to transplantation with a living 
donor or deceased donor l iver graft can be characterized as a process of con­
sidering and fine-tuning responsibilities. Whereas decisions are often thought 
to be taken deliberately, by individuals, at fixed, organized moments in time, 
like choices (Mol 1997; Mol 1996), this characterization emphasizes that 
courses of transplantation often receive direction in constant adjustment to 
new situations and in mutual attunement between parents and professionals. 
The widespread understanding about medical decision making as an issue 
confined to informed choice is inadequate and confusing. Informed consent is 
part of the process, but decision making is also guided by other less articulate 
understandings of relations and values. In critical reflection I draw attention to 
these less articulate understandings about donor decision making, guided by 
values like hope or trust or by different views on autonomy or voluntary con­
sent. Furthermore I develop some of the less articulate understandings in 
LAL T practice. Hope, for example was an important but not very articulate 
theme in the stories of parents. By developing a better understanding of hope 
in decision making I also propose a better moral understanding of interactions 
in LRLT-practice, an understanding that can complement the more common 
moral understandings that are mediated by ideals of free choice. 
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Normative reflection 
Normative reflection according to Walker asks if the moral understandings in 
a practice are really good or better than others that might be imagined. I offer 
normative reflection on good hope, and on the question how good risk-com­
munication about living liver donation can be better understood. In relation to 
questions about the collaborative character of team decision making, volun­
tary consent, and trust, this thesis offers some groundwork for normative 
reflection. I point out in which direction these themes need further develop­
ment and propose orienting questions in order to come to better moral under­
standings about LAL T. 
These different levels of analysis and reflection were used alternately in the 
course of my research. In the following chapters the different levels of reflec­
tion are not always clearly distinct. Chapters two and three are mainly the off­
spring of reflective analysis and critical reflection. The chapters four till seven 
present more normative reflection. 
O U T L I N E  O F  T H E  T H E S I S  
Chapters two and three offer reflective analysis and critical reflection on differ­
ent contexts and processes in which responsibilities with regard to LAL T crys­
tallize. Chapter two explores the moral understandings about living liver dona­
tion in the liver transplant team. It describes the practical answer formed by 
the team to the problem posed by the introduction of LALT; that is an approach 
to LALT that enables collaborative decision making in spite of conflicting moral 
perspectives in the team. The team's approach also formed a practical answer 
to moral questions about the freedom of parents to decide about liver dona­
tion. This approach to LALT shaped the ways parents were introduced to the 
option of LAL T. Chapter three explores how moral understandings of parents 
about LALT are shaped in interactions with the team. This chapter is an (early) 
explorative paper that identifies themes that need further development in 
order to understand the dual roles of parents in LAL T. The themes that are 
proposed are: the process character of decision making, trust between par­
ents and professionals, and emotions about living liver donation. Chapter four 
places LALT in another context: that of the parents of children with liver failure. 
In their stories, hope is a central theme. Interviews testify to diverse hoping 
patterns in which parents have different styles of orienting themselves 
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towards the future and involving professionals in their hopes. They depend on 
professionals in diverse ways, each according to his or her own "economy of 
hope", and create different conditions for agency in medical decision making. 
Thoughts and attitudes towards the option of LAL T are embedded in these 
economies of hope. Responsibilities with regard to LAL T shape up in these 
mutually interfering processes of team and parents. This chapter concludes 
with a normative reflection on good hope. 
Chapters five and six deal in different ways with the engagements between 
the transplant team and families, while taking two different focal points, volun­
tary consent and donor risk communication. The interactions between poten­
tial donors and professionals are officially regulated by these informed con­
sent requirements. However, the informed consent norms and goals are 
difficult to interpret when medical decisions are also family decisions. In 
diverse studies, donors reported that donation was not a matter of choice; that 
they donated in spite of great fears; or that they had not considered the donor 
risks in their decision to donate. These experiences and attitudes raise ques­
tions about informed and voluntary consent. These chapters (five and six) pro­
pose ways of contemplating such attitudes and experiences in the complex 
collaborative settings of family and team. Chapter seven offers a general sum­
mary and conclusions. At the end of this thesis English and Dutch summaries 
are provided. 
For reasons of anonymity the names of respondents have been changed into 
fictitious names. 
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LIVIN G LIVER DONATION ; 
DOCTORS' CONCER NS ABO U T  





A B ST R ACT 
This paper explores how processes of considering living parental liver dona­
tion are structured by the Groningen liver transplant team in the first years of 
its LRLT program. LRL T was introduced in this center in spite of moral reser­
vations about this procedure that still existed in the team. Team members held 
different views on the acceptability of donor-risks and on the political context 
in which LRLT was introduced. In interactions with parents, pediatricians pro­
pose specific understandings about LRL T as a safety-net. With this under­
standing about LRLT they created room for synchronization and collaborative 




I NTROD U CTION 
The liver transplant team in Groningen started a program for LAL T in 2004. 
The introduction of the program was paralleled by research into different 
aspects of this procedure. The ethical aspects were studied within a qualita­
tive-ethical research. Descriptions we gave on the basis of qualitative 
research of the explorative character of interactions in this starting practice 
elicited many critiques, both from inside the team, and from outsiders 
(anonymous reviewers, or a public of ethicists in a conference). Team mem­
bers themselves were critical about the lack of clear decision making proce­
dures. Ethicists sometimes remarked that the team had misunderstood the 
principle of prim um non nocere or that there should be more clarity about 
what risks parents ought to take on behalf of their child. In this paper we want 
to describe and defend the approach that was taken to LAL T in the first years 
of the program. Even though there are good reasons for criticism, the 
approach did form a practical answer to two central moral concerns about 
LALT. 
One of the concerns about LAL T is that the offer can put parents in a diffi­
cult position. As several studies have pointed out; organ donation for a child 
or even another family member is rarely seen as a matter of choice. (Fors­
berg et al. 2004; Knibbe et al. 2007). Most parents will feel that a good parent 
cannot refuse to become a donor. In some reactions bioethicists stated that 
we should maybe consider that the offer of LAL T involves an appropriate 
form of moral pressure on parents. According to these bioethicists we should 
therefore try to answer the more general question what risks a parent can be 
expected to take for a child. We think however that there is no general 
answer to this question, it should rather be considered in concrete cases, 
with potential donors and other caregivers involved. When a child becomes 
critically i l l  and in need of liver transplantation, its parents and other care­
givers must redefine their responsibilities. Parents must figure out whether 
they should donate or wait for a postmortem donor graft, and whether the 
family is in a position to cope with an extra patient, namely the donor. These 
processes of considering donation are structured by the parents' encounters 
with members of the transplant team. We argue that with its approach, the 
transplant team created time and space for reflection, even if this time and 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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space was difficult to find. Thus the team offers an example of how decision­
making can be structured when decisions are not seen as choices. 
Another concern about LAL T is the fact that a healthy person is subjected 
to a major and risky operation. The usual justifications for overriding the princi­
ple of prim um non nocere do not work here; the operation is not for the health­
benefit of the donor. This makes it more difficult for surgeons to account for 
their involvement in harming the donor. Again, one could postulate a general 
principle that could account for all cases in which harm may be done to a par­
ent on behalf of a child. Such general views on the guiding principles were 
developed in the liver transplant center of Chicago. The Chicago group of 
Siegler and Broelsch has served as a worldwide accepted example with 
regard to medical as well as ethical aspects* . Nonetheless some of the med­
ical professionals that would be involved in the start of a program for LAL T 
were not convinced that it was acceptable to harm a healthy donor**. Though 
many arguments and examples have been given to support the acceptability 
of LALT as well as arguments against offering LALT in the Dutch context, it 
seems that responsibility for the harm and risks could not be taken on the 
basis of arguments and deliberative processes alone. The locally innovative 
character appeared to have a central moral significance in the modus 
operandi of the team. In these first years they had to find out if, how, and when 
involvement in harming a healthy donor could be acceptable, and they had to 
deal with disagreements on this topic. In a discussion of transplant medicine 
* When the feasibility of living liver donation had been established in 1 989, the transplant­
team in Chicago did a clinical trial, before and during which close attention was given to ethi­
cal aspects as well (Singer et al. 1 989; Broelsch et al. 1 991 ; Siegler and Lantos 1 992) . In the 
years after the Chicago-protocol was developed experiences in different centers have 
improved operation-procedures; reducing the risks of the procedure for donor as well as 
recipient. Other centers have thus provided important landmarks, experiences, viewpoints 
and guidelines with regard to LRL T. These experiences were reason for the Dutch Health 
Council to conclude that it was acceptable to start offering LRL T in the Netherlands (Gezond­
heidsraad 2003). 
** The practice of harming a healthy person who wants to donate an organ was and is wide­
spread and considered acceptable in kidney transplant centers in the Netherlands. However, 
to this team it was new, and liver donation seemed incomparable to kidney-donation mainly 
because of differences in donor-risk. The liver transplant team did not perform kidney trans­
plantations and was therefore not used to operating living donors, kidney or liver. 
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and therapeutic innovations in the eighties, the surgeon F.D. Moore stated 
that the ethics of therapeutic innovation depends on three conditions : 
(1) the strength of scientific background; (2) ''field-strength" - the experience 
and technical skills of a team required for performing a new procedure; and 
(3) the ethical climate in an institution (Moore 1 988) . We focus on the last con­
dition, as the first two were not at issue: the required technical skills had been 
practiced before in split-liver transplantation and partial liver resection.  As for 
the third condition, Moore warns especially against ulterior motives for innova­
tion, such as reputation and capital gain. However, innovative procedures can 
demand more of an "ethical climate" than the absence of hidden agendas. 
They require changes in attitudes, relations, or moral views. These alterations 
in the local moral landscape of the liver transplant center are also affected by 
national politics and legislation or lack thereof. The team's approach is only 
fully morally intelligible within these broader contexts, as we shall explain. 
We take a view on accountability for harm and risks that involves more than 
deliberative processes; it does not only involve reference to shared principles 
or norms; it also depends on collaboratively formed interpretations of concrete 
shared experiences and relations. We argue that in the first years of the LRL T 
program in Groningen experiences and relations were carefully formed, in 
order to explore moral views on living donation and possible changes of moral 
perspectives from within very specific situations. 
The theoretical background of this paper is formed by a practice-driven nat­
uralized approach to bioethics. Because LRL T is a social practice the moral 
responsibilities of the parents, the treatment team, and other involved parties 
must be articulated and negotiated within the context of the specific culture in 
which it takes place (Walker 1998). In our observations about how these 
responsibilities crystallize in the local moral landscapes of a Dutch transplant 
center; aspects of LRL T-practices that may be taken very much for granted 
elsewhere take on a different meaning. 
This paper takes a focus on one transplant team and its political context. 
Nevertheless, this focus on the local can be of interest in international discus­
sions to grasp something of the way in which broadly shared ethical precepts 
and concerns can gain significance in the context of locally shared under­
standings, assumptions, sensitivities and circumstances. Other centers in 
other countries have inherited their own moral understandings and sensitivi­
ties; however concerns about donor-autonomy, maximizing outcomes, and 
handling risks in a responsible manner are common concerns in liver trans­
plant centers. The approach to LRLT that the team took in the first years of its 
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program, offers an interesting way of addressing concerns about donor­
autonomy, an issue that has kept drawing attention of doctors, ethicists and 
social researchers worldwide. As has been observed many times; an offer of 
the option of living donation, kidney or liver, can bring potential donors in a dif­
ficult position, in which it is hard to refuse donating. With its approach to the 
subject of LRL T the team had specific ways of reducing pressures on parents 
to donate. 
This study was approved by an accredited Medical Review Ethics Commit­
tee (aMREC). 
M ET H O DS 
Subjects 
Observations and interviews were part of a research project entitled Living 
Related Donation, a Qualitative Ethical Study, which was carried out at the 
University Medical Center Groningen at the start of a Living Related Liver 
Transplantation program. Parents who came to the liver transplant center to 
have their children screened for liver transplantation were informed about all 
their options. Subsequently the child was screened and put on the national 
waiting list for a post-mortem donor liver. Parents who underwent a donor 
screening were asked, along with their partners, whether they were interested 
in participating in this study after their child had been transplanted. Twenty 
two parents, 2 donor (candidate) uncles and one aunt of 12 families were 
included. In four of the twelve families LRLT was performed. The children in 
eight families were transplanted with a deceased donor liver (DOLT). The 
inclusion in the study of families whose experiences went both ways kept the 
focus on the process of decision making. Central to this study is not the expe­
rience of donating but the decision making processes that took place before­
hand. 
Other subjects under investigation were professionals of different disci­
plines in the liver transplantation team. They were not asked to participate 
individually; rather as our aim was to get a view of the collaborative processes 
of decision-making, we observed the collective team discussions. 
Study Design 
Semi-structured interviews were done with parents after the liver transplanta­
tion of their child (LRLT or DOLT) (Bernhard 1 995). Respondents were asked 
40 
to tell in their own words about their thoughts and experiences, starting from 
the moment they noticed that their child was ill. The advantage of open or 
semi-structured interviews is that respondents, not the researchers, indicate 
what is relevant in their story and in what terms it should be told. To enable 
comparisons among the stories of parents, the interviewer used a list of top­
ics. The topics covered were: experience of encounters in the hospital with 
different professionals or other patients and their parents; dealing with differ­
ent sources of information; perceptions of risk; perceptions of the child's con­
dition; (changing) attitudes toward living donation; and dealing with views of 
others about donation. 
In order to explore the perspectives of professionals in the transplant team 
(the other subjects under investigation) , we attended the weekly team-meet­
ings (Marshall and Rossman 1989). Further observations were done in the 
outpatient pediatric clinic to explore the ways children and their parents were 
introduced into this medical practice. Finally a focus meeting was organized 
in which the team was asked to comment on our findings concerning how the 
risks and benefits of LRL T were handled and communicated. 
Data analysis and theoretical background 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and observations were written 
down immediately after the occasion at which they were gathered. Content 
analysis was used to identify recurrent themes (Bernard 1995). Further 
analysis of themes was guided by the research focus on the processes in 
which responsibilities of parents and professionals to the child and family 
crystallized. For this paper we examine one of the structuring contexts of 
these processes: the attitudes and decisions of the transplant team. Without 
careful attention to what the team was doing, the parental processes of reflec­
tion cannot be fully explained. Qualitative research methods yield strong 
internal validity; they allow for variations in different general and local charac­
teristics of organ transplantation practices that, together, shape processes of 
assigning, deflecting, and taking responsibility. The external validity; the 
degree to which results apply to parental liver donation in other centers, can 
be traced with comparative analysis of similarities and differences between 
those centers and the one in this study (Marshall & Rossman 1989). Conclu­
sions of a study like this one cannot be generally applied; however, they can 
raise questions not only about how widely shared certain moral understand­




The risks to the health and life of a healthy person involved in living liver dona­
tion have long been reason for the transplant team in Groningen to refrain 
from offering this option and invest in other ways of tackling wait-list problems. 
Part of the team had been in favor of offering living donation for some time; 
however, some of the surgeons had more reservations about living donation. 
'We prefer DDLTx and we are very conscientious about that, we first try other 
options before agreeing with LRLT.' To address wait-list problems, ways of 
expanding the donor pool without resorting to living donors had been tried 
first ; several publicity campaigns and political discussions about how best to 
increase donor registration took place. In addition, to provide organs more 
suitable for children, split-liver transplantation and reduced-size liver trans­
plantation were offered. In 2003, however, the Health Council observed that 
it was acceptable to offer LRLT for children in the Netherlands, taking into 
consideration the ample experience with LRL T in children in different centers 
worldwide and the better chances of survival for children on the liver trans­
plant waiting list when LRLT is offered alongside DOLT (Gezondheidsraad 
2003). Groningen is the only Dutch liver transplant center transplanting chil­
dren, so the team in Groningen was the only one in the position to put this 
into practice and offer LRLT for children. It was under these pressing circum­
stances that the team started offering LRL T, in spite of the moral concerns of 
part of the team about subjecting healthy individuals to a major operation. 
Under pressure of wait-list problems, peers (who offered LRL T routinely in 
other countries), and parents who wanted to pursue this option, the team 
started offering LRL T. 'Since we were the only center in the country that could 
offer LRLT for children, we had to start, partly under external pressure. It did 
not come completely from inside.' 
In the first years of its LRL T program the team approached the subject of 
living donation very carefully. Guided by the maxim of primum non nocere, 
part of the team retained its reservations about the moral acceptability of oper­
ating on living donors. One part of the surgical team in particular viewed this 
maxim as having strong normative force. As the chief surgeon explained: 'We 
have a license to kill. Every surgeon has to live with his own graveyard of 
patients who died as a result of his actions.' When the patient is actually a 
healthy person, it is even more difficult to live with involvement in harm and to 
account for risking life and health. Surgeons' concerns about the risks 
involved in living donation induced them to adopt a cautious approach to LRLT 
in the first years of the program. 
The broader cultural and political landscape, in which this transplant team 
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operates, sheds light on the hesitations of these surgeons about a procedure 
that is considered acceptable in many other transplant centers worldwide. In 
the Netherlands, the organ donation system works on an opt-in basis: Dutch 
people must take active steps if they want their organs to be transplanted 
after they have died. By contrast, in Spain, for example, organ donation works 
on an opt-out basis: the rule is that when one no longer needs one's organs, 
one has a responsibility to give them to others that can be deflected only by 
taking active steps to opt out of the system. Because in the Netherlands, the 
donation rate is one of the lowest in Europe, professionals felt that first a major 
effort should be made to increase national donation rates, and only then 
embark on an LRLT program. A backdrop of surgeons' thoughts about LRLT is 
thus formed by the attitudes of Dutch citizens, many of which do not decide or 
talk about organ donation after death, combined with the political opt-in 
approach to organ donation. 
Though part of the team had reservations about LRL T, other team members 
saw more of the benefits of LRL T; when LRL T was of potential benefit to child 
and family it seemed a good treatment option to them. How were these differ­
ent views about LRL T handled by team members in the collaborative 
processes of consultation and treatment decisions? From observations in 
weekly team meetings, outpatient clinic, and parents' reports, we can infer 
that in practice, the more conservative attitude was adopted by others in the 
team as well, in spite of the difference in views. In the first years of its LRLT 
program, the team was more inclined to offer LRLT as a backup option, treat­
ing it neither as preferable to waiting for a liver graft from a deceased donor, 
nor as a way to extend the donor pool. In the donor screening process atten­
tion was paid not only to medical risks but also psychosocial and financial 
risks to donor and family, as a study of the legal framework surrounding living 
donation had exposed several serious gaps in healthcare legislation and in 
donors' insurance coverage (Hubben 2005), which could result in consider­
able financial risk for some donors. The legal setting was thus another reason 
for the team to offer LRL T with caution. In the consultation-process, the gas­
troenterologist responsible for the donor screening offered potential donors a 
medical out: on request, he could say they found a medical contraindication 
that, although it was not worrisome, made a candidate unsuitable as a donor. 
No one in our study reported having used this option but it was offered 
nonetheless. 
In the teams' consultations with parents the risks of donation were heavily 
emphasized, while the advantages were somewhat underplayed. According 
to parents who had been in other transplant centers, they too emphasized the 
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risks of live donation, but to nothing like the same extent that Groningen did. 
In a focus meeting with the team in which we asked for comments on our 
observations, one of the pediatricians explained why they took the reserva­
tions of surgeons as point of departure, in spite of different views: 'I'm not sure 
if it matters what we [pediatricians] think. We can have our opinions, but the 
surgeons are the ones who have to do it. We have to respect their position on 
living liver donation, in order to reach the end line together.' Another pediatri­
cian explained how they took the different views of colleagues into account in 
consults with parents: 
'You are also very careful about how you talk about the advantages of LRLT 
because you want to come to joint decision making. You don't want to make 
things difficult for others [colleagues with reservations] in advance. That is 
why you bring up LRLT very carefully, to keep open the space to come to 
synchronization. [ . .. ] If you tell people that it is the best treatment option then 
colleagues will have a difficult time in confrontation with very enthusiastic 
people.' 
A hepatic care nurse added that there was another reason to deemphasize 
the advantages of living donation: 'Also we don't say that LRLT is the best 
treatment-option because that would hardly leave parents a choice.' In addi­
tion to the donor-risks, this was another concern of professionals about LRLT: 
Professionals in the transplantation team had some worries about how much 
room parents had to come to free decisions about donation. They were aware 
of the experience described by many parents, that donation for ones child is 
not a matter of free choice (Forsberg et al. 2004). At the start of the LRLT pro­
gram several professionals from different disciplines expressed their concern 
that parents would feel cornered if they were offered the option of living dona­
tion. These concerns, in combination with concerns about risks to donors, 
impelled the team to adopt a very careful approach to the subject of living 
donation. 
How was the course of LRLT decision making structured over time? When 
a pediatric patient was screened for the liver transplant wait-list, doctors and 
nurses informed parents about the option of living donation, but avoided ask­
ing them directly whether they were interested in living donation : 'We mention 
the possibility of LRLT in passing and after that we leave it hanging in the air a 
little.' The patient was then put on the wait-list, and living liver donation was 
only pursued as a parallel trajectory if parents showed sufficient interest in this 
option. As was indicated in the protocol, the initiative had to come from donor 
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candidates themselves. Pediatricians informed parents that the team pre­
ferred transplantation with a liver graft from a deceased donor. In the outpa­
tient clinic, some parents had to raise the topic repeatedly before doctors or 
nurses considered their initiative as a real wish to explore the option of dona­
tion. By organizing the information and initiatives in this way, doctors and 
nurses avoided placing parents on the horns of a dilemma. Even where there 
was no choice in the matter and living donation was the only viable option, it 
was not something that parents could passively enroll in. Parents had to take 
active steps to pursue this option. 
When parents put the topic of living donation on the table for discussion, 
pediatricians explained the advantage of living liver donation with an empha­
sis on time-frame. With a living donor it is possible to choose the best moment 
for the surgeries, when the child is still in good condition for the transplanta­
tion. One pediatrician pictured the optimal moment as an intersection in time 
of growth and the development of the disease; if the child was still very small it 
was better to wait and let it grow some more before operating; however, it was 
best to transplant the child before its condition worsened. Because both 
growth and the progress of liver disease are difficult to predict, the best timing 
for transplantation of children is usually not clear cut, and can be reconsidered 
from moment to moment. This was a consideration with which pediatricians 
created space for synchronization in the decision-making process. When a liv­
ing donor trajectory was initiated, the point about timing gave all parties 
involved - both professionals and parents - the time to consider and discuss 
from moment to moment how they felt about living donation in view of the 
child's condition and position on the waiting list. 
Although pediatricians were careful about the communication of advan­
tages, this way of discussing them was in line with generally held medical 
views on living donor liver transplantation with infant recipients. Nevertheless 
one can ask whether the team had good ways of structuring and influencing 
decisions about LAL T. 
A NEW FORM OF TRANSPLANTATION 
Before reflecting critically on that question, it is useful to consider how to 
address it. We follow Margaret Urban Walker, who proposes that the evalua­
tive standard be whether practices can account for themselves in their own 
moral terms: 'Critical reflection asks whether what is going on in actual moral 
orders makes the right kind of sense to the participants in those ways of life' 
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(Walker 1998). Reflection in this paper will be confined to team perspectives, 
for although they are not the only participants in the decision-making process 
regarding LRLT, we have explained elsewhere what kind of senses the teams' 
approach to LRLT made to the participating parents (Knibbe & Verkerk 2008). 
Here we can only give a rough summary of parents perspectives. How parents 
made sense of the teams approach to LAL T was related to the diverse ways 
they had nourished their hopes and managed to live with the uncertainties and 
threats to their child . Parents who had relied mainly on professionals to form 
their interpretations of their situation and options had seen the professional 
concerns and reservations as an expression of their medical responsibility. 
Parents who had thoroughly informed themselves; using internet and contacts 
with other parents of liver-transplant patients had asked more critical ques­
tions about the team's approach. 
What kind of sense did the approach to LRLT make to the professionals 
involved? Their attitudes were shaped by concerns about their own involve­
ment, both as individual doctors and nurses and as a team, in this newly 
evolving practice of living liver donation: Under which circumstances was the 
teams' involvement in LRLT justified? How could they offer LRL T in a way that 
put the least pressure on parents? And how could the team come to joint deci­
sion making in spite of disagreements? These were primary concerns in the 
team with regard to the introduction of LAL T. 
The approach to LRL T we described formed an answer to these concerns. 
The team's ways of organizing information and discussing risks and advan­
tages was aimed at reducing several kinds of pressures and creating space 
for mutual attunement in decisions about LRLT. With its approach the team 
tried to reduce pressure on surgeons as well as on parents, so that all parties 
could live up to their responsibilities as they themselves could endorse. 
Although the team had embarked on a LAL T program as a response to the 
pressure of wait-list problems, the changes in moral understanding that such 
a program required had to move at their own pace. The principle of non malefi­
cence, which was especially felt by surgeons, could not be made to bow to the 
pressures of the wait-list. It was not clear from the start how such changes in 
moral understanding should go, but there was concern that they should not be 
forced. 
To some extent, the team also managed to reduce pressures on parents to 
donate. An offer of LRLT for children makes parents responsible for donation. 
However, as was also indicated above, in their conversations about LAL T 
physicians and nurses prevented parents from accepting this responsibility 
too quickly. They tried to show acceptable routes around it. Pediatricians 
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emphasized the option of waiting for a DDL T and the gastroenterologist 
responsible for the donor screening was willing to say that a candidate who 
wanted to withdraw but could not openly refuse donation ,  was medically 
unsuitable as a donor. 
In some cases the team's approach to LRLT tended to have a paradoxical 
effect. The efforts to create time and space for synchronization and to reduce 
pressure on parents sometimes ended in situations that backfired on both 
professionals and parents. When the child's condition deteriorated quickly, 
decisions about LRL T also needed to speed up. LRLT then became a matter 
of higher urgency, with relatively high risk, and higher pressure all around. 
This effect undermined the idea of a careful start of the LRLT program. 
Although the team tried, often successfully, to reduce pressures on parents 
as well as surgeons, the child's condition sometimes put limits to the time and 
space they could create. 
In short, the team's approach formed a fine-grained though limited practical 
response to central concerns about the introduction of LRLT in the Nether­
lands. However, the approach was less supportive of other central concerns in 
healthcare that were not directly connected LRLT, namely the more general 
aim of offering best care for the patient. Many parents wanted to become 
donors because they wanted the best possible treatment for their child, and 
LRLT offers the advantage of flexibility so that it can be done when the child is 
in optimal condition. When LRLT is treated as a backup choice or even as a 
last resort it is less likely to maximize results for the patient, because the opti­
mal time for transplantation has already passed. 
To some readers this approach may seem very exceptional or typically 
Dutch, reflecting the famous Dutch polder-model (a consensus-model for 
decision-making) and notions of tolerance and solidarity. Without comparable 
studies in other countries, however, it is difficult to tell how exceptional it is, 
and to which extend the team's approach reflects Dutch culture. It is also pos­
sible that this approach only seems exceptional because such processes of 
mutual fine-tuning in a medical team are rarely described. Representations of 
decision-making processes in medical or ethical literature are often more 
schematic. 
Now we can return to the question whether the team's approach is a good 
one, given the team members' diverse inherited moral views and circum­
stances. Possible improvements could be aimed at offering the best possible 
medical care. Should the team structure its decision making about LRLT in a 
way that is more supportive of the best possible treatment for the patient, as 
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this is also what motivates most donor candidates? It would be a good aim 
toward which to aspire in the future; however, we think that the efforts to 
reduce pressures in the first phases of the LRLT program were very important 
even if they were not aimed at creating optimal outcomes for the patient. We 
agree with Carl Elliott, who claims, 'First, as a moral agent, the doctor must 
ask not simply whether a change in a given state of affairs would be morally 
better, as a detached observer might ask, but whether or not he should 
become the agent of that change' (Elliott 1995). To be able to address the 
question of agent-relative responsibility: whether this specific transplant team 
and its surgeons with their commitments and views should become an agent 
in a living liver donation, the above-described efforts to create time and space, 
were needed. In the care for children with a life-threatening disease, pres­
sures on all the caregivers can be very strong. Parents can feel pressured to 
donate, but the team can also be subject to pressures of the progressing dis­
ease; of parents and of their own consciences concerning surgery on a 
healthy person. The careful tentative introduction of LRLT enabled the team 
and its members to consider their involvement as agents in living donation 
from case to case and from moment to moment. 
R E FE R E N CES 
Bernard, R.H, 1995, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches, 2nd ed. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press: 208-224. 
Broelsch, C.E., P.F. Whitington, J.C. Emond, T.G. Heffron, J.R. Thistlethwaite, 
L. Stevens, J. Piper, S.H. Whitington and L. Lichtor, 1991, "Liver 
Transplantation in Children from Living Related Donors, Surgical 
Techniques and Results", Annals of Surgery 214: 428-439. 
Elliott, C., 1995, "Doing Harm - Living Organ Donors, Clinical Research and 
the 1 0Th Man", J Med Ethics 21: 91-96. 
Forsberg, A., M. Nilsson and M. Olausson, 2004, "The Essence of Living 
Parental Liver Donation-Donors' Lived Experiences of Donation to Their 
Children", Pediatric Transplantation 8: 372-380. 
Gezondheidsraad, 2003, Nieuwe wegen naar orgaandonatie, publicatie 
nr 2003/01, Den Haag: Gezondheidsraad, 153-173. 
48 
Hubben, J.H., 2005, Verzekeringstechnische en financiele randvoorwaarden 
voor levende donorlevertransplantatie bij kinderen: Betaalt de donor de 
rekening?, Groningen: UMCG (report). 
Knibbe, M.E., E.L.M. Maeckelberghe, M.A. Verkerk, 2007, "Confounders in 
Voluntary Consent about Living Parental Liver Donation: No Choice and 
Emotions", Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1 0: 433-440. 
Knibbe M. and M. Verkerk, 2008, "Economies of Hope in a Period of 
Transition; Parents in the lime Leading up to Their Child's Liver 
Transplantation," in Naturalized Bioethics. Toward Responsible Knowing 
and Practice, H. Lindemann, M. Verkerk and M. Walker (eds), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 162-181. 
Marshall, C. and G.B. Rossman, 1989, Designing Qualitative Research, 
Newbury Park: Sage Publications: 79-81. 
Moore, F.D., 1988, "Three Ethical Revolutions: ancient Assumptions 
Remodeled Under Pressure of Transplantation", Transplant Proc 20 (1 S): 
1061-1067. 
Siegler, M. and J.D. Lantos, 1992, "Ethical Justification for Living Liver 
Donation", Camb Q Healthc Ethics 1: 320-325. 
Singer, P.A., M. Siegler, P. F. Whitington, J. D. Lantos, J.C. Emond, 
J.R. Thistlethwaite, and C.E. Broelsch, 1989, "Ethics of liver transplantation 
with living donors", N Engl J Med 312: 620-2. 
Walker, M.U., 1998, Moral Understandings, a Feminist Study in Ethics, New 










THE FA M ILY AS PATIENT AND 
CAREGIVER : AD .J USTM ENT OF 
THE ETHICAL AGENDA ABOUT 




A B STRACT 
The family of a child in need of  a transplant has a double role. It has a role of 
patient on the one hand, receiving professional care, and of caregiver on the 
other hand, sharing responsibility with the medical caregivers. In order to 
reflect on the complex intertwining of responsibilities connected to this double­
role, we propose a change of the agenda of moral questions about living 
parental organ donation. The moral discussions about living donation usually 
focus on informed consent, risk-benefit ratio and voluntary choice. We do not 
deny the importance of these issues, but we shift the attention to three other, 
related moral concerns: process, trust, and emotions. These issues were 
derived from a qualitative study consisting of observations in a liver transplan­
tation team and semi-structured interviews with parents who donated or con­
sidered liver-donation to their child. 
"Organ Transplantation: Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects. Towards 
a common European policy", Weimar, W; Bos, M; Busschbach, J (eds), 
Lengerich: Pabst science publishers, p509-515. 
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I NTROD U CTION 
The family of a child in need of a transplant has a double role. It has a role of 
patient on the one hand, receiving professional care, and of caregiver on the 
other, sharing the responsibility of care with health professionals. When offer­
ing treatment for children, transplantation teams strive to offer not only what is 
best for the child, but also what is best for the family. In that sense the family is 
their patient as well. Parents, however, also carry responsibilities for the family 
of which they are part. 
In order to do justice to this double role and the complex intertwining of 
responsibilities, we propose an adjustment of the ethical agenda concerning 
family transplantation. In most ethical guidelines and discussions, the central 
moral issues are information-disclosure, voluntary consent, and risk-benefit 
ratio. We do not deny the importance of these issues, but we shift the attention 
to three other moral concerns: process, trust, and emotions. We derived these 
issues from the stories of parents about caring for a child in need of a trans­
plant. We will argue that transplant teams need to pay attention to the way 
they create and restrict moral space for parents in the process leading to 
transplantation if they are to do justice to the double-role of parents. In this 
process, parents tune their resolves about donation to attitudes in the trans­
plant team. Trust relationships, and dealing with emotions about donation are 
of central import to the quality of this process. 
This paper is based on a qualitative analysis of the observations in a liver 
transplantation team and interviews conducted over a one and a half year 
period with parents who donated, or had considered liver donation to their 
child. The observations and interviews were part of a research project entitled 
'Living Related Donation, a Qualitative-ethical study' which was carried out at 
the University Medical Centre Groningen simultaneous to the start of a 'Living 
Related Liver Transplantation (LRLT) program'. In our study we included 22 
parents, 2 uncles (opting for donation) and one aunt of 1 2  families in which the 
possibility of LRLT was examined and considered, irrespective of the outcome 
of screening and considerations. In four of the twelve families LRLT was per­
formed. The children in eight families were transplanted with a post-mortal 
donor liver (henceforth abbreviated as PML T). The inclusion of families in 
which the decision-making trajectory had different outcomes (e.g. LRLT or 
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PML T) allows for an emphasis on the moral perspectives of parents con­
fronted with the question about donation. It was not the experience of donat­
ing that was central in our study, but rather the processes of decision-making 
leading to different outcomes. 
PROCESS 
The process leading to  transplantation should be an issue on the ethical 
agenda, because, as the stories of parents make clear, it is a process in 
which parental responsibilities are reconsidered and redefined. When a child 
becomes critically ill, and in need of special care and transplantation, its par­
ents (and sometimes other family-members) have to redefine their responsi­
bilities. Parents have to figure out whether they should donate or wait, 
whether the family can cope with an extra patient, and how they personally 
feel about donation. In this process parents' perceptions of themselves and of 
what, and who is important in their life can be subject to change. We first out­
line the points of reference that parents found in the hospital, for their own 
considerations regarding LRL T; the views of professionals and other parents. 
We then offer a sketch of the considerations parents made about LRL T during 
this process. Having discussed this process we will shortly introduce two 
other issues about family transplantation for the ethical agenda ;  themes that 
are central to the quality of this process: trust and emotions. 
The hospital as a moral landscape 
The process of reconsidering parental responsibilities is governed to a great 
extent by the responses of healthcare teams to the disease of the child, their 
attitudes toward living donation, and the ways in which they discuss risk. We 
offer a short sketch of medical attitudes toward LRL T, to describe the moral 
contexts of the hospital in which parents must make choices. 
There may be several aims in mind when a transplant-team offers the 
option of living donation. These aims may diverge, depending on the avail­
ability of post mortal donor-organs. In some countries LRL T is the only practi­
cally feasible form of liver transplantation. In other countries LRLT-programs 
are launched to tackle waiting list problems. Some transplant-centers see 
LRL T as providing a potentially significant contribution to the supply of donor 
livers. For individual families in these centers the advantage of LRLT is the 
possibility of elective transplantation: the operation can be planned when the 
patient is still in good condition. 
In the transplant center where we conducted our study a LAL T program had 
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recently been started. Part of the team still had grave concerns about operat­
ing living liver-donors, because of potential risks for the donor. Other team 
members saw more of the benefits of LRL T. In spite of the different ideas of 
team members, the team generally adopted a reserved attitude toward LRLT. 
One of the surgeons said: 'We prefer transplantation with a post-mortal donor 
liver and we are very conscientious about that, we first try other options before 
agreeing with LRLT.'Thus the team is more inclined to offer LRLT as a safety­
net, not as a way to electively transplant the child. With this cautious approach 
to the introduction of LRLT the team also avoids exerting pressure on parents 
to donate. 
The attitude of the team shapes the process in which parents form their 
views about donation. Many parents in our study had expressed their will to 
donate when they first heard about this option. If the team had responded to 
the willingness of parents by taking initial steps to organize an elective trans­
plantation, the stories of parents would presumably have been different. Par­
ents who became liver donor might then have said retrospectively that they 
took a split-second decision to donate. This is the way donor-decisions were 
characterized in other studies about living donation. In the (still) often cited 
study published in 1968, Fellner and Marshall reported that the majority of the 
kidney-donors in their study had made a split-second decision to donate when 
the subject of donation was first mentioned (Fellner & Marshall 1968). In a 
more recent qualitative study about living liver donation, by Crowley-Mataka 
et al. , similar findings are presented; 'agreeing to donate was an "automatic 
leap" they made on first hearing of the possibility' (Crawly-Mataka 2004). 
However, in our study this spontaneous "readiness" to donate was not yet a 
decision, it was rather a starting point for the development of more specific 
resolves about donation, and about the circumstances in which this was to be 
done. In the stories of parents we interviewed we can recognize the way the 
liver transplant team structured the process of decision-making. In our trans­
plant center the donor screening usually starts as a careful exploration of this 
option, while stressing the possibility of waiting as long as the child is in a rea­
sonable condition. When parents were found eligible as donors, the decision 
about LRLT was not yet taken. Many parents eventually decided they would 
donate ( only) once waiting became problematic. The team thus molded the 
dynamics of the process in which parents considered their responsibilities. 
The attitudes of professionals were also points of reference in the content 
of parents' considerations. The percentages mentioned in the information 
about donor-risks are not dependent on the attitudes of professionals. How­
ever the team's reservations about LRLT do find expression in the intonation, 
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emphasis and earnestness with which risks are discussed. Some parents 
adopted the same weighty perception of risks in their considerations. In some 
cases this was of influence in their views about the circumstances in which 
they wanted to donate: did they want to donate in circumstances when the 
child was still in good condition or in more critical circumstances, when waiting 
became problematic? To some parents the perception of risks as consider­
able was also a source of fear about the operation, and about the conse­
quences of LRL T for the family. Other parents found the donor-risks small and 
acceptable, in spite of the emphasis of the team. They understood that it was 
important for the team to handle risks in a careful manner, but in their own con­
siderations the risks were less weighty. 
The attitudes of professionals form part of the moral landscape in which par­
ents redefine their own responsibilities. However the internet and the stories 
of parents with experiences in other transplant centers could become points of 
reference to parents as well. Learning about the experiences of parents with 
LRL T can be helpful as well as confusing. For some parents it was a way to 
become more familiar with the practice of LRL T. Familiarity made it easier to 
deal with the risks and burdens. Some of the stories from other families were 
upsetting, but other stories were reassuring, and thus helped parents to deal 
with their fears. 
The stories of parents from other transplant centers also helped to put pro­
fessional attitudes in perspective. Parents who sought contact with other par­
ents found out that other transplant centers have different attitudes and lighter 
ways of discussing risks. Some parents exaggerated the contrasts: 'in other 
countries LRLT is peanuts, a plumber's job!' Other parents found it more diffi­
cult to judge which view is most appropriate: 'and I find it hard to judge what is 
more realistic; the lighthearted tone of that center or the severe tone in our 
center.' 
Parents' formation of perspectives on LRLT: Dynamics 
In the transplant center in which we conducted our study, parents (not profes­
sionals) usually had to take the first step if they want to be screened for living 
donation. They had been informed about the possibility of donation before 
their child had been screened for transplantation. After their child was 
accepted on the waiting list parents could be screened if they clearly indicated 
their intention to take this step. The team did not usually ask parents if they 
wanted to donate. 
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Most parents stated that they spontaneously wished to donate if circum­
stances made donation necessary and possible: Matthew: 'we saw this as a 
chance; we wanted to use all the options we got.' However, this spontaneous 
'readiness' was not yet a concrete decision, ideas about living donation and 
good reasons and circumstances to choose this option changed in the course 
of time: Lisa: 'At first I thought, 'yes I want this", but then you get information 
and you hear what consequences donation has, and can have.' In this respect 
the spontaneity observed in our study differs from the spontaneous 'split-sec­
ond decisions' described in other studies. In the course of the parallel trajecto­
ries of waiting and preparing for possible living donor transplantation, many 
parents continued to adjust their views about living donation. The process of 
considering responsibilities differs greatly between parents. They may adjust 
their views to the condition of their child, family circumstances, professional 
views, views of their partners, new information, and stories about LRL T. 
Notwithstanding the differences between the narratives of parents, many 
stories converged on the same issue: most parents eventually saw living liver 
donation as a safety-net. They did not see refusing donation as an acceptable 
option. However waiting for a post mortal donor liver and postponement of liv­
ing donation as long as their child was not in danger, was acceptable. This 
safety-net-knowing that they were not completely dependent on the supply of 
donor livers- made waiting bearable. 
Parents' formation of perspectives on LRLT: Issues 
In the formation of perspectives, several issues were involved. In the process 
of redefining their responsibilities, parents considered the risks of donation in 
the light of their commitments, and of their coping resources. The evaluation 
of risk in this light differed enormously, ranging from irrelevant to very serious. 
The words of William's mother offer an insight into the connections between 
different issues in this process: 
' For me and my husband, the risks were a weighty factor. I for myself thought, 
well, we have another son as well. He was four at the time. And I'm just as 
much his mother as I am mother to William [the sick child]. And I realized that 
even if things would be going for the best, I would have to be fit enough to deal 
with a worrisome child. I need to be there for William 200%, to put him back on 
the rails, with medicines, school and everything. There are so many issues 
connected to living donation. If I would have been only half functioning 
because of the operation , we would not have pulled through. My husband also 
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said, "if something happens to you, I will be very sad , and left on my own with a 
worrisome child'". 
Other parents told completely different stories about their thoughts regarding 
LRLT. However, this example serves to show the relationship between per­
ception of risk (weighty), ideals of parenthood (being there 200%), resources 
for coping with problems (no-one, she seemed to suggest, was present and 
capable to take over when she needed to recover), and redefining responsibil­
ities in face of a child needing a transplant. William's mother seemed to load 
all responsibility for the wellbeing of her family on her own shoulders. Her 
ideal of attentivity - being there 200% - and the concomitant parental role 
divisions, determined partly her perception of the risk and cost of donation: the 
risks involved more than health complications: the whole family would suffer 
the implications of the intervention. Other parents had other ways of consider­
ing risks, articulating their commitments and circumscribing their responsibili­
ties. However, in the processes they described, the perception of risk, norma­
tive ideas about motherhood and fatherhood, and coping-resources were 
interdependent in similar ways. 
TRUST 
If we understand the period leading up to transplantation as a process in 
which responsibilities are reconsidered, we can see the challenge of forming 
and maintaining trust-relationships. 
In this process, families cannot merely rely on a continuity of roles and 
shared habits. The sociologist Adam Seligman describes trust as a form of 
reliance on others that is situated between two extremes; confidence on the 
one hand, based on some measures of certainty; and faith on the other hand, 
which can be completely blind, without a cognizable basis (Seligman 1 997). 
Trust is involved when relying on a person or institution involves uncertainty 
and risk, but has some basis as well. 
For parents the process leading up to transplantation, was a period of tran­
sition which involved many and great uncertainties. While caring for the child, 
parents and professionals had to re-assess the situation constantly : How long 
will the child be able to live on his or her old liver? How long will she stay in a 
condition in which she can endure the operation? Can the family cope with a 
family-liver-transplantation? What are the chances of receiving a post-mortal 
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donor liver? When is the time to donate? Under which circumstances is it bet­
ter to abandon donation? In dealing with these uncertainties, parents had to 
rely on the team, on its skilled estimations of risk and opportunity and on the 
team-specific 'norms' in handling these. 
When trusting a transplant team to guide the process leading to transplan­
tation of their child, several issues were at stake for parents. As can be 
expected the life of their child, their own wellbeing and that of the family 
emerged, but their integrity as parents was also an important issue. As 
becomes clear from our interviews and observations, parents (had to) rely on 
the judgments of professionals when considering their own responsibilities. 
Trust-relations in a hospital are usually based on the assumption that doctors 
intend to enhance the health and wellbeing of their patients. However, in the 
process of considering family-transplantation, trust-relationships are not only 
based on the protection of health-interests; the relationship with professionals 
should somehow encompass the commitments of parents as well. If parents 
can trust that the team will include in its judgments not only their interests, but 
also their commitments, this trust-relationship can enable them to respond to 
the rigorous changes in their life. 
EMOTIONS 
The prospect of living donor liver transplantation often incited strong emo­
tions. Emotions found their way into the process of considering donation in 
many different vehicles. Some parents gave free voice to their emotions with 
each other and health care professionals while others integrated them in their 
risk assessment or in religious considerations. Parents, who consciously paid 
attention to emotions and spent a lot of time talking, reported that they felt it 
important to bring their emotions out into the open. A mother explained; 'you 
want to look each other straight in the eye, whatever comes out of it.' But for 
some parents emotions were mostly confusing, and it could be hard to give 
them a place in the decision- making process. Some parents reported that 
fear about the risks of donation made it hard to stand firm on their resolves 
about donation. In one case, the fear of a mother was confusing to profession­
als as well, raising questions about her intention to donate. 
In the above described process in which parental responsibilities are recon­
sidered, emotions can be seen as signals which draw attention to problems 
that parents face. Emotions usually indicate that something important is at 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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stake. However the background to an emotion is rarely transparent. Careful 
interpretation of emotions can contribute to the quality of the decision-making 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
The moral concerns about LAL T that we wish to add to the ethical agenda 
(process, trust, and emotions) cannot be isolated from the general process of 
care and decision making. The start of the first LR LT-program in Chicago in 
1 989 was accompanied by a debate about medical responsibilities. Now that 
LAL T is an accepted practice in many countries we can shift attention to the 
ways in which particular practices of LRLT appeal to parental responsibilities. 
For families, the period of waiting for a PMLT and/or considering LALT is a 
time of transition. Parents have to reconsider their responsibilities. The moral 
perspective in which a transplantation team conceives of its own responsibili­
ties forms part of the moral landscape in which parents find their ways. 
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ECONO M IES OF H OPE 
IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION . 
PARENTS IN THE TIM E  LEADING 
U P  TO THEIR CHILD'S LIVER 
TRANS PLANTATION * 
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that was held in Groningen, May 2007, for their very useful comments 
on a first draft of this article .  
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Marian Verkerk 
A B ST RACT 
In which ways can the future that parents of liver transplant patient's hope for 
be present in hoping? And how are professionals involved in the hopes of par­
ents? In our empirical-ethical study about liver transplantation of children and 
living parental liver donation, the various answers to these questions were 
mutually related: Ways of attending to the future were geared to the way par­
ents entered relations with professional caregivers and vice versa; relations 
were geared to specific patterns of hope and inviting a future. 
In interviews with parents about the liver transplantation of their child, the 
time leading up to transplantation is depicted as a period of transition. The ill­
ness of their child and the uncertain prospects of transplantation had abruptly 
interrupted their lives. In this period they had to learn how to live with the child' 
disease and threats to its future and they had to find their way in a complex 
medical practice that was new to them. Parents testified to different ways of 
carving a route through this period of transition. In this process, hope seems 
to be a central quality. 
A focus on the futurity and social character of hoping in our study sheds 
light on some interesting variations in 'economies of hope'; the investments 
of thought, attention, imagination and feeling, and in divisions of 'hoping labor' 
between patients, parents, professionals, or other caregivers. Our respon­
dents had different ways of involving others in their hopes. We think that 
recognition of these variations in economies of hope is important if we want 
to estimate the value and vulnerabilities of specific hoping patterns. 
'Naturalized Bioethics; Toward Responsible Knowing and Practice', 
Lindemann, H., Verkerk, M. A., Walker, M.U. (eds.) Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 2008, p162-181 
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"I wonder how many miles I 've fallen by this time?" she said aloud. "I must 
be getting somewhere near the centre of the earth. Let me see: that would 
be four thousand miles down, I think -" (tor, you see, Alice had learnt several 
things of this sort in her lessons in the school-room, and though this was not 
a very good opportunity for showing off her knowledge, as there was no one 
to listen to her, still it was good practice to say it over). 
Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
When infant patients and their parents tumble into the world of liver transplan­
tation, they are not as lighthearted and curious as Alice - the hospital is not a 
Wonderland. However, they do discover, as she does, that they are leaving 
the ordinary life they shared behind. The geography lessons that Alice learned 
in school have become somewhat pointless; they do not seem to tell her 
where she is. The same happens with family habits and self-understandings 
when a child is threatened by disease and the need for liver transplantation. 
In retrospective interviews with parents about their child's liver transplanta­
tion, the time leading up to the transplantation is depicted as a period of transi­
tion. Their child's threatening disease has abruptly interrupted their lives, and 
indeed, many parents indicate that somehow their life stopped in this period: 
'Your life comes to a halt', as one of our respondents put it. In this period of 
transition, parents must reconsider their responsibilities, making up their 
minds about living-donor liver transplantation. How should they care for their 
child and family? Should they donate or wait for a donor liver? Can they 
accept their partner's decision to donate? Can they afford to wait? Can the 
family cope with an extra patient? 
In our interviews, as parents testify to different ways of carving a route 
through this period of transition, hope seems to be a central quality. With 
Margaret Urban Walker, (Walker 2006) we understand hoping to be as basic 
to human life as breathing. Hope is therefore not a state of mind that distin­
guishes this period of transition from other phases of life. Like breath, how­
ever, hope comes most forcefully to one's attention when it is in short supply: 
when an imagined future vanishes, or when 'Your life comes to a halt'. It is the 
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threat to hope, and the response of protection and nourishment that re-create 
"hoping space," that makes hope a central theme in this period of transition. 
Hope also is closely connected to agency. The connection goes both ways; 
hope cannot be understood without agency, but agency is not possible without 
hope, whether big or ordinary*. The lives of our respondents came to a halt 
when the (ordinary) hopes that they used to have for their child and family 
seemed to be closed off. To start picking up their lives again, they had to find 
new hoping space. In many ways, parents actively regulated their attitudes 
and activities to nourish and protect what hopes they had, thereby creating the 
conditions for agency. In short, hope seems to be necessary for threading or 
carving a way into the new moral landscape that parents face after their child 
has fallen ill. 
In this chapter, we first outline the period of transition in which hopes were 
lost and new hopes needed to be found and protected. Then we offer a con­
ceptual analysis of hope, rejecting several models in favor of a dynamic con­
ception that allows us to make sense of what the parents in our study were 
going through. Finally, we offer suggestions for what can contribute to good 
hoping in the period leading up to transplantation. Throughout, we use our 
observations of a liver transplantation team and the semi structured interviews 
we conducted over a one-and-a-half-year period with parents who donated or 
had considered donating a liver to their child. The observations and interviews 
are part of an ongoing research project entitled "Living Related Donation: A 
Qualitative Ethical Study," which is carried out at the University Medical Cen­
tre Groningen**. 
P E R I O D  O F  T R A N S I T I O N  
With something like amazement , many parents recall their ways of thinking 
and acting in the period leading up to transplantation. '/ lived through these 
* For a more extensive discussion of the connections between hope and agency see for 
example Victoria McGeer (McGeer, 2004). 
** In this study were included; 22 parents, 2 uncles (opting for donation) and one aunt of 1 2  
families i n  which the possibility of LRLT was examined and considered. I n  four of the twelve 
families LRLT was performed. The children in eight families were transplanted with a 
deceased donor liver (DOLT) . In this article we will focus on the theme of hope in the inter­
views with parents, and leave the topic of living donation aside. 
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two years in a daze', one mother told us. As parents try to reconstruct their 
experiences in an interview, they make clear that the illness of their child was 
unsettling but that it resettled them as well. Parents recollect having a different 
state of mind and functioning in a way that was unlike their usual ways. 
Although there is a great variety in the stories that parents tell about this 
period of transition, all parents had to deal in some way with the progression 
of the disease in their child, the uncertainty of the waiting list for donor livers, 
and the uncertain prospect of possible donation. 
To give an impression of this transitional period, we present a fragment of a 
conversation observed in the outpatient clinic. Most of the children who need 
a liver transplant are born with biliary atresia, a condition in which the ducts 
that carry bile from the liver to the gall bladder are blocked or absent, leading 
to liver damage and cirrhosis of the liver. David is such a child. At six month of 
age, he had just been referred to the Groningen transplant center because the 
doctors at his former hospital thought that he would not be able to live much 
longer on his old liver. The pediatrician explained to the parents how he saw 
the stage they were in at that moment, and he looked backward and forward 
with them at the possible developments: 
'When biliary atresia is discovered , the liver has already been damaged by the 
bile that is obstructed. A kasai operation can restore the bile flow; however, this 
solution is only temporary*. This morning we saw a twenty-year-old boy who 
lived with the kasai for a long time before he needed a liver transplant. Usually, 
though, it doesn't last that long. You are here now because the bile flow seems 
to be hampered in spite of the kasai operation. This can change; we don't 
know. To prevent more damage, diet is very important. But the changes are 
difficult to predict. And while we don't know how long things will go wel l ,  we do 
know that at a certain moment, David will need a transplant. To prepare for that 
moment, we want to screen him now for liver transplantation. Ultimately, we 
only do liver transplantation when there are no other treatment options, but to 
be ready when the time comes, David has to be on the waiting list.' 
In the time leading up to transplantation, the condition of the child and family 
was constantly viewed as something that could develop in different ways; it 
might be getting better or it might be getting worse. Generally, the expectation 
was that in the short term the condition would get worse without transplanta-
* In a kasai-operation a piece of bowel is used as a bile-duct. 
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tion. It was a period in which patients and their parents were constantly 
betwixt and between. Hope, with its ways of "dealing with temporalities," was 
a condition of carving a route through this period and meeting its challenges. 
The challenges that parents face in this transitional period can be summa­
rized as being of two kinds. First, parents had to adjust and often readjust to 
the progression of the disease in their child, and to the prospects of transplan­
tation and possible donation. Second, parents had to accustom themselves 
to a medical practice that was new to them. Within this practice, they had to 
come to shared understandings of their situation, of the disease, and of the 
treatment options for their child. 
C O N C E P T I O N S  O F  H O P E  
Hope is discussed in different ways in health care contexts. In a first way, the 
discussion about hope is connected to the giving of information and to the 
way patients handle information. Here, hope (A hopes that P) is defined in 
terms of two components: desire and subjective probability (Day 1970; 1998). 
A desires P and believes that P is to higher or lower degrees probable but not 
certain. To hope well in this view means that the beliefs are well informed and 
realistic. Especially in situations of terminal care, this gives rise to moral 
dilemmas. Should we inform the patient about the fact that she is dying and 
thereby take away all hope for survival, or should we give her hope and there­
fore not inform her about the actual state she is in? (Ruddick 1999). 
Adopting this belief-and-desire conception of hope in health care has prac­
tical implications. The emphasis on beliefs and information in discussions 
about hope often underpins a certain role division in handling hope. The focus 
is mostly on beliefs of patients or their parents and on the actions of profes­
sionals who might be able to do something about these beliefs. This focus 
gives the impression of an active party, influencing hope, and a passive party, 
the object of influences. This picture cannot do justice to the hope-related 
activity we found in the stories of parents about the time leading up to liver 
transplantation of their child. Parents actively regulated their information­
intake, attention, and thoughts regarding outcomes. 
In a second approach, hope is incorporated as part of the treatment or 
counseling of patients. On this approach, hope is connected not only to belief 
and desire but also to well-being and agency. In an example of this second 
conception developed by the oncologist Jerome Groopman (2005, xii) , hope 
generates a kind of chain reaction in patients, in which each link of the chain 
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improves the chances of healing: 'For all my patients hope, true hope, has 
proved as important as any medication I might prescribe or any procedure 
I might perform.' Groopman does, however, distinguish real hope and giving 
real hope from false hope that is based on manipulative information giving. 
The insight about the importance of hope leads Groopman on a quest to dis­
cover how to handle the hopes of patients and family, how to guide or support 
them in hoping well. Other authors have adopted a similar approach, seeing 
hope as part of the treatment of patients: 'Along with medical treatment, health 
care professionals have identified hope as a deterrent to illness and death, 
and a necessary component of healing' (Westburg and Guindon 2004, 1 ). 
Hope is also seen as something that can help patients cope with the course 
of a disease. Furthermore, patients with strong hopes are usually more coop­
erative about treatment regimens than patients with weaker hopes. 
At first sight, this conception of hope seems to be broader than the concep­
tion that is based on desire and belief. It connects hope to well-being but also 
to the agency of patients and health professionals. Hope is presented as a 
state of mind that causes or stimulates certain (more responsible) behavior. 
Professionals strive to inspire hope, in order to invite patients to act in specific 
ways. If we look at the practical use of this conception of hope, though, the 
patient still seems to be the more passive party in interactions regarding hope. 
In that respect, this conception does not differ from the first. The professional, 
being the active party, is still in the position of giving hope or taking it away. 
Because hope is good for fostering patients' involvement in their treatments, 
and because hope can make patients vulnerable, health professionals have 
to handle hopes in a careful manner. The second conception seems to sug­
gest a cause-and-effect chain of connections: actions of professionals influ­
ence hope, and hope in its turn influences the well-being and agency of 
patients. It is acknowledged that hope often results in a more active involve­
ment of patients (or parents), but the activity involved in hope itself is still 
opaque. 
In a third conception of hope, the clinical psychologist C. R. Snyder (1995; 
also Snyder et al. 2002) gives a more explicit account of the connection 
between hope and agency, defining hope as a process of thinking about one's 
goals. This process embraces two components: agency (the motivation and 
energy to move toward the goal) and pathways (the ways to achieve that 
goal). According to Snyder, hope can be seen as a cognitive appraisal of one's 
goal-related capabilities. As an example of "agentic thinking" (Snyder et al. 
2002) cite phrases that people with high hopes tend to say to themselves: 
"I can do this" and "I am not going to be stopped." Thoughts about pathways 
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are about planning, how to reach a goal, and what to take into account. This 
definition gives a more clear-cut place to the activity involved in hoping; it con­
sists of two kinds of goal-directed thinking: agency thinking and pathway 
thinking. 
The third conception, however, also has its problems when it comes to 
understanding the hopes of our respondents. The conception is too goal 
directed to come to an understanding of either the hope-related activity in the 
stories of our respondents or the significance of hope in the period of transi­
tion that is our focus. In Snyder's conception, agency is strongly linked to gain­
ing control and to chosen goals. One can wonder whether having a goal is a 
necessary condition for hope. Often hope is less ambitious and searches 
more for desired outcomes than for chosen goals. Parents in our study hoped 
that their child would come out of the transplantation in the best possible way 
or that life would be less filled with anxieties. Hoped-for outcomes are not 
always very articulate. In the transitional period, the outcomes were often 
reimagined and adjusted; they were not clearly defined from the start. As we 
argue later, this activity of reimagination itself can be understood as part of 
what it is to hope. 
The three conceptions of hope we discuss here do not help us to come to a 
satisfactory understanding of the hope-related activity in the stories of parents 
we interviewed. To enable an understanding of hope in those stories, we need 
a more dynamic conception of hope, one that allows for less ambition about 
reaching chosen goals while maintaining a sense of the involvement of 
agency in hoping. 
To develop a more dynamic notion of hope, Margaret Urban Walker (Walker 
2006, 48) proposes to describe hope as an emotional stance or a patterned 
syndrome that is 'characterized by certain desires and perceptions, but also 
by certain forms of attention, expression, feeling, and activity.' One can recog­
nize hope in oneself or in others not in single mental features but in patterns of 
these "phenomena of hope" *. As Walker writes, there is no single "recipe" of 
specific ingredients in precise proportions that constitute hope, but there are 
patterns of ingredient perceptions, expressions, feelings, and dispositions to 
think, feel, and act that are part of the repertory of hopefulness. 
In developing this conception of hope, Walker discussed four features of 
hope that make up hopes of people in different constellations and interplay. 
One feature of hope is its futurity: hope is directed at a state of affairs that has 
* Walker borrows the attention to 'phenomena of hope' from Wittgensteins Philosophical 
Investigations. 
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not yet come to pass. Hope can be oriented at a near future or a far-away 
future, but it is always forward looking. Even if I hope that things (in the past) 
went well, it will be something I will find out in the future. A second feature is 
the desirability of what is hoped for: the state of affairs that is hoped for has to 
have some value for the hoping agent. One cannot hope for an outcome that 
one does not value at all. The desirability is a feature that can give hope in a 
health care setting a specific dynamic. In health care, patients, their parents, 
or other family members often need time to learn to value the best possible 
outcomes of a treatment. Third, there has to be a "nonzero" possibility of what 
is hoped for. The hoping agent has to believe that the state of affairs she 
hopes for is at least possible. If one considers a desired future to be impossi­
ble, one will lose hope for that future, however desirable it may still be 
(although hope can still be directed at possible futures with a very low proba­
bility). Finally, Walker mentions with special emphasis the efficacy of hope: the 
dynamic tendencies of hope to steer thought, feelings, attention, speech, and 
actions. We dwell on Walker's explanations of the efficacy of hope in some­
what greater detail to come to an understanding of the agency involved in 
hoping. 
To understand what we are doing when we hope, we should look at the 
'dynamic tendencies to attend to, or be attuned to what is hoped for in a way 
that tilts or propels us toward making it so' (Walker 2006, 47). The agency 
involved in hoping consists of several exercises of thought, activity, expres­
sion, and attention. Walker (2006, 45) outlines these aspects of hoping as the 
"efficacy" of hope and states that hope's 'nature is to engage our desire and 
agency, so that in hoping, the world is, in some respect that one cares about, 
construed as open to the outcome one favors.' This characterization fits the 
diverse reports of our respondents about the ways they managed to live 
through the time leading up to transplantation. In this formulation, interpreta­
tions of the world and acting in the world are pictured as two locations on a 
continuum; beliefs about the world are actively formed and continuously 
adjusted interpretations of one's situation and its openness to a certain possi­
ble and desirable future. Interpreting one's situation is an activity that is sus­
tained by other activities as well. Activities of our respondents could involve 
seeking or avoiding contact with other parents of liver transplant patients; ask­
ing for second opinions; and surfing the Internet or staying far from it. With 
regard to regulating information, attention, and contact with others, some of 
our respondents tried to feed their imagination with hopeful scenarios, 
whereas others tried mainly to keep their imagination from straying to frighten­
ing scenarios. With these diverging activities and interpretations, parents had 
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different ways of construing a health care environment, open to good out­
comes for their child. 
EVALUATING HOPE 
How can we recognize good hoping? And how can professionals form a sup­
portive environment for the good hope of parents? In Walker's account of 
good or misplaced hope, correct beliefs are less important than the activity, 
imagination, feeling, expression, or other forms of agency that are engaged in 
hoping. Walker states that hope can be false or mistaken only if one believes 
there is a possibility where there is none. One can rarely be certain that there 
is zero possibility of attaining a desired object, however, so that leaves room 
for hope. Even if there is only the slightest possibility of realizing what one is 
hoping for, hope cannot be false. And even if hope were based on a mistaken 
belief that the impossible can happen, one should be careful about advising 
against such hope because people have a need not only of what they hope for 
but also for hope itself. Hope, we repeat, is a condition for agency. Without any 
hope, ordinary or grand, people are left with only inertness, terror, and 
despair. One could advise against certain imprudent actions inspired by hope 
but not against hope itself. 
To recognize hope that is good, given the abilities and inabilities of parents 
in this transitional period, we can evaluate the "economy of hope" - that is, the 
investment and engagement of energy, thought, attention, feeling, and activity 
made in hoping*. We can try to assess whether the energy engaged in hoping 
is well spent. We can examine, for example, how the future is imagined and 
invited in one's actions, attention, and thoughts. We can evaluate its desirabil­
ity: is the future that one hopes for and invests in really desirable and valuable, 
or is one investing in something of little value? We can check the assumed 
possibility of a desirable future or we can evaluate hope's dynamic tendencies 
- the exercises of thought, attention, and activity made in hoping. Does this 
hope elicit a good kind of activity and state of mind? Does it not lead to neglect 
of things that deserve attention? Our respondents invested their energy and 
* Victoria McGeer coined the term 'economy of hope' to refer to approaches to hope in 
which hoping well is understood as 'having the right quantity of hope'. We use the 'economy of 
hope' to refer to the (quality of) engagement and investment of energy, attention, thought and 
activity. 
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attention in different ways in their hope for good outcomes. In some cases, 
one can question the wisdom of the investments of hope they were ready to 
make. 
To outline the kinds of questions that can be posed about the economy of 
hope, we discuss the investments of hope Jonathan's parents made. 
Jonathan's parents had three children together, were divorced, and had both 
found new partners. After Jonathan was put on the waiting list for liver trans­
plantation, his parents developed different views on his illness and on living 
liver donation. When Jonathan was three, he was diagnosed with biliary 
stenosis; his bile was slowly poisoning his liver. He coped reasonably with his 
health problems until he had an esophageal bleeding at the age of eight. He 
was then put on the waiting list for a liver transplantation to avoid a second 
bleeding of the esophagus or stomach, because the doctors thought that he 
might not survive a second time. One pediatrician had pictured the risk of 
another bleeding as a time bomb; without a liver transplant, it would eventually 
happen again, but it was hard to tell when it would happen. In the interview, 
Jonathan's father reported that the heavy metaphor had alarmed him. He had 
asked for further explanation; how critical was the situation? The pediatricians 
had reassured him that Jonathan was still doing well and that he had some 
time to wait for a liver transplantation. The father agreed to wait for a 
deceased donor liver and to become a liver donor in case of emergency; he 
thought that not risking his health unless it was really necessary would be bet­
ter for the sake of his wife and three children. 
'You keep balancing, but you continue to ask yourself, is it stil l  responsible to 
wait? That is what you want to know, but they can give you no guarantees, but 
as long as they gave me the impression that we were not in an emergency 
situation, we stuck to this scenario [of waiting].' 
Jonathan's mother saw her son's situation as more urgent. She thought the 
situation could rightly be called a time bomb and reported having been on ten­
terhooks for quite a while. If the doctors had not refused her as a donor, she 
would have donated instantly. 
'Since I am forty and I have a dangerously ill child who has his whole l ife sti l l 
lying before h im, I would be very happy to donate, and if I would die for him, 
well it might be less simple than it sounds but I don't think I have a problem 
with that. ... The children will manage, they sti l l have a father, and others, they 
will be okay.' 
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Jonathan's parents invested their attention, energy, actions, and thoughts dif­
ferently ; they had different economies of hope. Jonathan's mother was ready 
to invest her life in her son to give him the best chance. She was uncondition­
ally committed to her son's well-being and could not be sidetracked by consid­
erations regarding her other children, who were doing well, or by other 
aspects of family life. She had no second thoughts about liver donation; it 
would be worthwhile if her son could have a future, with or without her. By con­
trast, Jonathan's father imagined a future that included the whole family. With 
every change in their situation, he considered what would be best for 
Jonathan as well as others involved; he talked with others about donation and 
relied on the estimates of the pediatricians about Jonathan's condition. After 
accepting the reassurance of the pediatricians, he felt less pressed by the 
danger to his son. 
Questions about good hope are connected to other values in life; answers 
depend on the kind of futures we value, on ideas about a good state of mind, 
and on involvement in situations with specific risks and uncertainties. How 
should one live with this risk and the uncertainty about its magnitude? Is it bet­
ter to accept this uncertainty as a new and ongoing part of life, as Jonathan's 
father did, or is it better to realize that normal life has stopped, and sort out 
what is most important in the future, as Jonathan's mother did? These are the 
kinds of questions that have to be discussed by those involved when evaluat­
ing economies of hope. 
The features of hope that Walker describes can help us think about good 
hope; however, they cannot be isolated when evaluating hope. When evaluat­
ing, we have to connect specific features of hope to a broader view of the 
economy of hope. A broad view of economies of hope, with variously pat­
terned features, can generate insights that are more useful in practice than 
general judgments about good and false hopes or "high and low hopes" (Sny­
der's words). Instead of judging hope to be altogether good or bad in virtue of 
one characteristic, a focus on the economy of hope can help to identify and 
respond to good and vulnerable aspects of specific hopes. 
Two F E A T U R E S  O F  H O P E  
To think further about good hoping in the period of  transition that is  our focus, 
we discuss different shapes of hope in our interviews and observations with 
parents of patients requiring liver transplants. We focus on two features of 
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hope and good hope in particular: the futurity of hope and the social character 
of hoping*. These features deserve special attention because they are related 
to the specific characteristics and challenges that constitute this transitional 
period. Remember that we sketched this period as the time in which parents 
had to learn how to live with the progression of the disease in their child and 
the uncertain prospects of transplantation, and in which parents had to accus­
tom themselves to a medical practice that was new to them. 
A focus on the futurity and social character of hoping sheds light on three 
variations in patterns of hope. First, different temporalities can be involved in 
hoping. Some parents oriented their actions and attention toward short-term 
problems of that moment; they tried not to look further than one step ahead. 
Others tried to vividly imagine good long-term outcomes of transplantation. 
Second, hopes can be directed at goals but also at vague and indeterminate 
outcomes. Third, there can be different divisions of hoping labor between 
patients, parents, professionals, or other caregivers. Our respondents had dif­
ferent ways of involving others in their hopes. We think it is important to prop­
erly recognize these differences in patterns of hope before judging specific 
economies of hope. 
Futurity 
In which ways can the future of what is hoped for be part of hoping? In many 
discussion of hope, the futurity of what is hoped for is conceptualized as the 
desired goal that lies in the future. Snyder, for example, started his research 
on hope by asking people to tell about their goal-directed thoughts. We think 
that goal-directed thought and action is only one way of hoping. A hoped-for 
future is not necessarily clearly outlined to a hoping agent. In our interviews 
we can roughly distinguish three ways of attending to the future, each of them 
part of a different economy of hope. We outline two ways of attending to the 
future and discuss a third way more extensively. 
In a first way of attending to the future, parents tried to imagine vividly what 
they hoped for. They sought contact with other parents to learn about the 
recovery of other children after transplantation and about the well-being of 
other families. They listened to stories and information selectively. As Barbara 
explained, 'No, I had little need for information; I did feel a need to talk to other 
parents, because you want to hear a lot of stories. But you just want to hear 
many many positive stories. You only want to see the positive situations.' 
* Walker does not treat its social character as one of the features of hope; however she does 
endorse its social character in her discussion of other features. 
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In this way of attending to the future, parents paid less attention to informa­
tion about risks of transplantation and donation, or to stories about patients 
who died. Parents who told about this way of dealing with information reported 
being aware of the risks, but their attention was grasped by stories, gestures, 
or expressions that could sustain their imagination of a hoped-for outcome. 
Some parents explained that it made no sense to think a lot about complica­
tions and problems of transplantation and living donation, when that was the 
only lifesaving treatment option for their child. As there was no choice to 
make, there was no reason to consider the risks carefully. 
In a second way of attending to the future, parents prepared for all possible 
scenarios to realize the best possible outcome. In this mode, parents tried to 
gather all the information they could find about disease and treatment of their 
child, in order to gain more control. Margaret reported, 'You absorb anything 
that might have something to do with it. In order not to miss anything, to avoid 
being taken by surprise. So you know what is going wrong, what you can 
expect, what is the situation at hand, and what can happen.' 
This general openness to stories and information was emotionally stressful. 
Parents who thoroughly informed themselves often stumbled upon stories 
about patients who died and about medical mistakes. However, they devel­
oped a thorough understanding of the child's disease and the transplantation 
options. As they encountered different perspectives and found information 
about other transplant centers as well, these parents were in a position to 
compare and evaluate the team's attitudes and policy regarding transplanta­
tion and living donation. In this critical position, there was more they could do 
themselves to realize a hoped-for outcome. 
A third way of attending to the future, "living day by day," is exemplified by 
David's mother Selma: 'I did not want; I could not look too far ahead. I was liv­
ing only day by day, and how David was that day, and more than that I could 
not, I couldn't use.'Our interpretation of living day by day as a way of attending 
to the future needs explanation. We interpret the way Selma lived through the 
time leading up to transplantation at greater length. To understand her way of 
attending to the future, however, we need to look at others surrounding her as 
well. 
In our discussion of the transitional period leading up to transplantation, we 
presented the pediatrician's explanation of David's disease and treatment, 
given in the first conversation that David's parents had in the transplant cen­
ter. In his explanations, the pediatrician considered different possible future 
scenarios. He focused on a timeline that in his eyes seemed practical to con­
sider. David's father, however, tried to look further ahead. He asked the pedia-
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trician to offer a picture of the future: 'We are also trying to get a picture of the 
future, like how will things go after transplantation, what can we expect? ... 
How long can you live with a liver transplant? Or is that still unknown?' The 
pediatrician expanded his comments, citing a few statistics: 
'No , we don't know exactly how long someone can live with a liver transplant 
that he received as a child. Somebody [with a liver transplant] recently turned 
twenty-five. But it remains uncertain how things wil l go. Of all the transplanted 
children, 80 to 85 percent can lead a normal life and go to school .  They all 
have to use medicines against rejection for the rest of their lives, but with that, 
they can do all the normal things.' 
At the moment of that first conversation in the transplant center, these uncer­
tain prospects of an 80 to 85 percent chance of a normal school-life with medi­
cines for the rest of their lives could seem both unbearable and hopeful. 
David's father tried to picture the best possible scenario he could hope for. To 
David's mother, it seemed impossible to look at this uncertain future. In her 
questions, Selma focused on a smaller time frame; she tried not to look further 
than one step ahead. Her questions to the pediatrician were mainly about diet, 
where to ask questions when problems would arise, and about the pain her 
son had to bear that day. Living day by day was the only way Selma could get 
through the time of waiting for her son's transplantation. 
Can we say that Selma had hope for good outcomes, if she did not try to 
picture them? The timeline that she had in mind was not that in which an ulti­
mate outcome of her hope (if she had hope) would be realized. Using Sny­
der's conception of hope, one could conclude that she did not really have 
hope, or that she only had small goals. We will not endorse these conclusions. 
With her care and practical questions, she invited outcomes that she knew 
would be better than the outcomes invited by neglect or mistakes. She knew 
this, even though she could not bear imagining what these uncertain out­
comes would look like. With her small timeline, practical questions, and 
involvement, it seems that for Selma hope started with acting toward an 
uncertain but preferable future of all possible futures, not with setting a goal or 
imagining the outlines of a future. In this she was supported by the pediatri­
cian, who did imagine the possible outcomes and could advise her on ways to 
invite a future life for her son. Her hope thus rested on her trust in the pediatri­
cian and the team he represented. 
We stated that for Selma hope started with acting toward a favored out­
come, imagined by others, not with imagining it herself. One can ask, how-
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ever, whether it is possible to hope and continue hoping without somehow 
imagining a hoped-for outcome. If we accept that hoping involves inviting a 
future state of affairs, some form of imagination of a hoped for future is a vital 
feature of hope. Maybe Selma was not forming mental pictures of the outcome 
of transplantation but imagining outcomes in other ways. Imaginations 
involved in hope can take many forms - detailed, fragmented, vague, visual­
ized, or otherwise. An example Walker uses is that of people clutching and 
pulling the railing at the racetrack as horses enter the home stretch. She sug­
gests that this gesture can be seen as embodied imagination. In the period 
leading up to transplantation, there can be imagination of a hoped-for future in 
the ways parents care for their child, perceive the child's condition, listen to 
doctors and to stories of other parents, or follow the recovery of other patients. 
One can ask if the hope of David's mother would be better or stronger if she 
did imagine the future more clearly. In answering this question, we have to 
keep in mind that in reimagining a desirable and possible future for their child 
after transplantation, parents have to confront the loss of certain possible 
futures as well. The process of reimagining an uncertain future often requires 
recognizing the loss of some hoped-for futures one had, and the risk of losing 
new hopes as well. This loss can make reimagining the future painful, as it 
was to David's father, or unbearable as it was to his mother. For Selma, relying 
on the imagination of others allowed her some time to accept this loss and to 
learn to value another possible future for her child. 
These three ways of attending to the future, exemplified by Barbara, Mar: 
garet, and Selma, contribute to different economies of hope. With their differ­
ent approaches of the future, parents spent their energy on other aspects of 
their situation. Parents who, like Margaret, prepared for all possible scenarios, 
invested energy in developing a critical stance in the process of care for their 
child, in order to get the best possible care. With their broad orientation via 
Internet, they tried to reduce their dependence on the transplant team. They 
also had to spend a lot of energy on handling the emotions inspired by the 
upsetting information they often found. In the approaches exemplified by Bar­
bara and Selma, parents depended more on the steps the doctors proposed, 
spending most of their own energy on keeping a positive frame of mind and on 
daily care. We saw that "living day by day" contributed to an economy of hope 
in which emotions about uncertain outcomes, and the loss of a future once 
hoped for, were regulated. This regulation of her emotions allowed David's 
mother to devote full attention and energy to the problems and necessary care 
of that moment. 
What can we say about good or vulnerable aspects in these different 
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economies of hope? At some moments in the interview, parents explained 
their own ways of dealing with uncertain prospects as a necessity ; something 
they could not have done otherwise, and at other moments as an approach 
that in their eyes was most sensible. Both Barbara and Margaret character­
ized their own attitudes as more level-headed, compared to attitudes of other 
parents they had met. Their specific ways of inviting a good future for their 
child fitted in with values they held in life. Margaret emphasized her autonomy, 
whereas Barbara spoke about being (emotionally) strong and positive toward 
her daughter. Apart from these connections to values, there are vulnerabilities 
as well in these different patterns of hoping. Parents who confined their atten­
tion to positive aspects or to short-term problems were more vulnerable to dis­
appointment, problems they did not prepare for, or abuse of trust. Parents who 
tried to control the care process and stay informed of everything that could be 
relevant to their situation were more vulnerable to exhaustion and friction with 
professionals. Ways of attending to the future were geared to the way parents 
entered relations with professional caregivers and vice-versa; relations were 
geared to specific patterns of hope. 
The Social Character of Hoping 
For a complete picture of economies of hope, we have to look at social con­
texts as well. The words, expressions, and attitudes of professionals in the 
transplant team were often described in detail by our respondents. They 
seemed to be important to the ways parents managed to construe their situa­
tion as open to good outcomes. In what follows, we outline the relational 
dimension of the three ways of attending to the future we have described. 
Like Barbara, Mella's parents both indicated that their attention to risks was 
limited. However, they also indicated that the decision-making process took 
place in a constellation with professionals, one of whom was perceived as 
remarkably open and concerned about risk. Mella's father recalled: 
'This doctor was really considerate and open and also harsh and clear about 
the risks [of liver-donation]. All the same, however, as a parent you are in a 
certain flow with your child and you shut certain things out. [That is, you don 't 
consider risks] Because you're the parent.' 
The impression that risks were handled and communicated with special care 
was meaningful to Mella's parents, although they distinguished their own con­
cerns in this respect from those of the team. Not risk itself, but the belief that 
the risks were handled by trustworthy professionals, was deemed relevant by 
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Mella's parents. While hearing the information related by the doctor, they 
observed the way the doctor (and with him the team) dealt with their situation. 
They tried to get a view of the moral landscapes in the medical practice they 
had entered. 
Margaret had other ways of involving professionals in her hope. In the long 
periods she had spent with her son in different hospitals, she had seen many 
professional mistakes. Her trust in professionals was placed more carefully, 
and she made a routine of checking different sources of information and sto­
ries. In this way she tried to control what happened to her son. The involve­
ment of others was conditional. Some professionals found this a very difficult 
kind of involvement. In two reflective meetings with pediatric nurses in which 
their relations to parents of patients were discussed, nurses reported they felt 
very uncertain and less capable under her controlling eyes*. From their per­
spective, according to their economy of hope, the investment of energy and 
attention was not working well with the conditional way Margaret entered rela­
tions. From Margaret's perspective, however, with the experiences she had, it 
was the best way of realizing a future for her son. 
In discussing the way David's mother invited the best possible future for her 
son, we already mentioned her reliance on professionals. Her hope and its 
investments depended completely on the relations with professionals. She not 
only relied on their interventions but also depended on health professionals to 
start imagining and valuing a possible future for her child. 
This short overview shows how parents involved professionals in their spe­
cific patterns of hope. What can professionals in a transplant team do with this 
involvement to support a good economy of hope? We think there is not one 
specific way of communicating information or of counseling that works to 
inspire a good kind of hope in all parents. Health professionals are not the 
gatekeepers of hope; they cannot regulate the hopes of parents. However, 
they can critically assess and adjust their own involvement in the hopes of 
parents. To support the hopes of parents, professionals need to clarify 
whether they can agree with and live up to the involvement that parents 
assign them in their hopes. Compared to views in which professionals are pic­
tured as gatekeepers of hope, this is a more modest professional approach. 
The critical reflection in this approach encompasses more, however, because 
* The reflection in these meetings was facilitated by the ethicists Els Maeckelberghe and 
Enne Feenstra. We thank them, and the pediatric nurses for the opportunity to observe in 
these meetings. 
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it requires sensitivity toward the hoping patterns of parents, as well as self­
reflection and team discussions. 
Assessing or adjusting professional involvement in hopes of parents entails 
negotiating mutual expectations. Professionals must be clear about their pro­
fessional norms and procedures, but they also need to be sensitive to the 
diverging ways parents involve them in their hopes. For critical reflection on 
their involvements in the hopes of parents, it is important to recognize the val­
ues and vulnerabilities that are present in different economies of hope, as we 
have pointed out. However, assessing their involvements in hopes of parents 
also requires self-reflection. In the hopes of parents, professional values and 
vulnerabilities are addressed as well. David's mother tapped the support and 
comfort-giving that for many professionals is a valuable part of their work. The 
way Barbara or Melle's parents involved professionals was flattering, under­
scoring their medical authority and resulting in a smooth and (in health care, 
highly valued} efficient cooperation. Margaret, however, made clear that some 
of the involvements professionals get to have in the hopes of parents are 
more difficult to deal with. Many nurses felt less capable in her critical pres­
ence. It can be tempting to see ways of hoping that build on professional val­
ues as better than the hopes that address professional limits or vulnerabilities 
as well. However, the more difficult involvements of professionals in hopes of 
patients, parents, or family can be seen as a good opportunity for critical self­
reflection and discussion of professional and team values. 
The time leading up to liver transplantation of a child is a period of transition, in 
which parents enter a new moral landscape with unfamiliar risks and uncer­
tainties. Hope is a central quality when it comes to facing the challenges in this 
period. We discussed the usefulness of different conceptions of hope to come 
to an understanding of our research material. In the interpretation of inter­
views about this period, hope can only be understood and appreciated if its 
dynamic tendencies are taken into account. Margaret Walker explains this 
tendency as the tendency 'to attend to or be attuned to what is hoped for in a 
way that tilts us or propels us toward making it so.' (Walker 2006, 47} While 
adjusting and readjusting to the condition of their child and the new practice 
they entered, parents actively regulated their intake of information and the 
awareness of information given. They guarded and re-created their hoping 
space in different ways, attended to the future in different ways, and, accord­
ingly, entered into relations with professionals in different ways. The stories of 
parents showed that professionals cannot be the gatekeepers of their hope, 
as is suggested in some accounts of hope in health care. The information, 
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behavior, and attitudes of professionals were important to parents to inspire 
trust; however, professionals did not control the risk awareness of parents or 
determine their hopes. Professionals can support the hopes of parents by car­
ing about their own involvement in these hopes. 
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CONFO UNDERS IN VOL U NTA R Y  
CONSENT ABO U T  LIVIN G 
PARENTAL LIVER DONATION : 




A B ST RACT 
Parents' perception of having no choice and strong emotions like fear about 
the prospect of living liver donation can lead professionals to question the vol­
untariness of their decision. We discuss the relation of these experiences (no 
choice and emotions}, as they are communicated by parents in our study, to 
the requirement of voluntariness. The perceived lack of choice, and emotions 
are two themes we found in the interviews conducted within the "Living 
Related Donation; a Qualitative-Ethical Study" research program. As a frame­
work for the interpretation of these themes we discuss views of moral agency. 
We adopt a view in which relations are seen as constitutive of moral agency. 
Judging from this view, the perceived lack of choice can best be understood 
as a sign of commitment. We argue in this article that neither seeing no 
choice, nor emotions in themselves should be seen as compromises of a vol­
untary consent. However both experiences draw attention to aspects that are 
important to come to an evaluation of consent to donation. We discuss the 
story of one mother as an exemplary case to show how both themes can inter­
twine. 
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2007, vol. 10, afl. 4, pp. 433-440. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
When parents do not perceive living donation for their child as a matter of free 
choice and strong emotions play a role in their decision, this might lead pro­
fessionals to question the voluntary consent of parents (Crowly-Matoka et al. 
2004; Forsberg et al. 2004). Fear about donation for example might be seen 
as an indication that a donor-candidate does not really back her own decision 
to donate. We will argue that seeing no choice and emotions like fear should 
not, in themselves, be seen as compromises of voluntariness. 
In the literature on Living Related Liver Transplantation (LRLT) the deci­
sion-making process is generally examined and evaluated as concerns the 
rules of informed and voluntary consent and the principle of respect for auton­
omy. Informed consent and the allied right to self-determination are consid­
ered very important in healthcare. Parents sign up to be a donor for their child 
based on relevant information. When parents see no choice, however, and 
strong emotions play a role, it can be difficult to tell whether a decision is vol­
untary. 
'At a certain point in time, Casper took a turn for the worse and I felt pressured 
,o think about Living Related ... well, we'd better give it a try ... And then, knees 
shaking, we finally decided to enter the donor screening program. We said to 
each other, 'We hope that the doctors will tell us, "You cannot enter the Living 
Related program for medical reasons." ... But I was very angry for a time. It's a 
fine thing that medical science has come so far, but to put me in a position in 
which I had to decide whether my child lives or dies .. .' 
Is Casper's mother acting voluntarily when she signs up to be screened for 
donation? Both the experience of having no choice and strong emotions about 
donation can give rise to questions about voluntariness. We will discuss the 
relation of these experiences, as they are communicated by parents in our 
study, to the requirement of voluntariness. 
Interviews were conducted within the 'Living Related Donation; a Qualita­
tive-Ethical Study' research program. These consisted of semi-structured ret­
rospective interviews, regarding living related liver donation with twenty-five 
respondents in twelve families: twenty-two parents, two uncles and one aunt. 
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In all families one parent or both parents had been screened for liver donation, 
in two families an uncle opted for donation. In four of the 12 families a LAL T 
was performed, in eight families the child had received a post mortal donor 
liver before living donation was planned. 
The material collected contains many themes. In this article we do not 
intend to give an overview of our findings, we will focus on the interpretation of 
two themes in relation to questions about voluntariness.* After a short 
overview of the perception of choice/no choice in our study-sample we dis­
cuss pictures of moral agency as frameworks for interpreting this perceived 
lack of choice. We only discuss moral agency insofar as it is relevant to come 
to an interpretation of 'no choice'. We leave other themes related to moral 
agency, consideration of risk and dealing with information aside. Subse­
quently, we will use the story of one of our respondents as an exemplary case 
in which the themes 'no choice' and strong emotions are central. 
The fact that interviews were held retrospectively makes them liable to a 
specific bias. Respondents might uphold a certain positive or critical image of 
the decision-making process. The reason to make use of retrospective inter­
views was primarily a moral one; we did not want the interviews to interfere in 
the decision-making process. In order to enhance a careful interpretation of 
interview material, interviews were designed to come to replication and trian­
gulation**. The interviewer chose different entries to introduce a subject mat­
ter. For example: she asked direct questions about attitudes toward donation 
in different stages of decision-making, but she also asked questions about 
conversations with professionals and family in which attitudes are more 
implicitly pictured. This form of triangulation made it possible to take biases 
into account in the interpretation of material. 
* Our focus on the interpretation of these two findings impels us to leave aside the important 
but more general question about when professionals have enough certainty regarding the 
consent of parents, whether it is well informed and free. 
** Although triangulation usually indicates the combination of different observation-proce­
dures, it can also be used and is very important in the scope of one interview, as is indicated 
by Fred Wester and Vincent Peters p1 93-1 94 (Wester, F. et al. 2004). 
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VOL U N TA R I N E SS I N  D E C I S I O N S  R E G A R D I N G  
A FA M I LY M A T T E R  
It is generally accepted that the informed consent procedure contributes to  a 
decision-making process that is acceptable in view of the principle of respect 
for autonomy. Autonomy in this case is understood as the right to self-determi­
nation. The guidelines for informed consent serve as a filter. If these guide­
lines are not met the right to self-determination is insufficiently guaranteed 
and the proposed treatment may not (yet) be carried out. Informed consent 
can be valid or invalid. The informed consent procedure is designed to prevent 
coerced or misinformed decisions. 
In order to know what is needed for informed consent about LRLT, profes­
sionals have to distinguish voluntary from coerced decisions in a family-con­
text. Clarity regarding this criterion when dealing with LRL T is not a simple 
matter, for it is an event in the life of a family which is usually characterized by 
strong involvement of all concerned. The child's dependence and the parent's 
duty to care for their child may at certain moments seem at odds with the con­
ditions for voluntary decision-making. 
Many parents in our interviews state that living donation for their child was 
not a matter of choice. Because of their intimate relation with the child who 
was in danger, they simply had to donate, if possible. Other authors have con­
cluded from similar findings in other studies that there is an aspect of coercion 
in the decision of parents to donate (Forsberg et al. 2004). We however will 
contend that these findings indicate that intimate family-relations are a strong 
motivating factor, not a coercive factor. 
In the figure on page 88 we present an overview of the degree to which 
respondents considered living organ donation a choice. After giving an expla­
nation about parents' perception of choice we explore interpretations of the 
relational context of seeing no choice. 
Having a choice implies there is more than one option to choose. If there is 
only one option, there is no choice. The perception of having choice or having 
chosen depends on the acceptability of the options presented. Strictly spoken, 
all parents have the option to refuse living donation, but for many parents 
refusing was not acceptable. Twelve parents did not consider refusing as an 
acceptable option. They did not consider living donation a choice, for as par­
ents they felt compelled to do any and everything they could for their child. 
Nine parents spoke about living donation as a chance and a good choice. In 
their stories, being unable to refuse was not a theme. Four of the twenty 
respondents spoke about refusing living donation as an acceptable (but in the 
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■ No choice: refusing is not considered as 
an acceptable option: 1 2  of 25 
■ Positive choice: donation was seen as a 
good option. Being unable to refuse was 
not a theme: 9 of 25 
Choice: refusing is seen as acceptable: 
4 of 25 
Figure: Perception of LRLT as a choice/ no choice 
end not favored) option. How can the perceived lack of choice be related to 
questions about voluntariness in decisions about family liver transplantation? 
Some authors see a danger of coercion in the parent-child bond. Parents 
force themselves to donate a liver based on love or sense of duty (Siegler et 
al. 1992; Singer et al. 1989). One possible form of coercion is psychological or 
internal coercion created by the donor's own feelings of guilt because the 
patient might die without donor participation (Siegler et al. 1992) . This internal 
coercion is difficult to distinguish from laudable, altruistic parental motives. 
The feeling as if there were no choice in the matter is seen as an example of 
internal coercion or coercion stemming from the parent-child relationship. 
Forsberg et al. concluded from their interviews in which this experience was 
described that, 'a more useful approach might be to confirm that the parent­
infant relationship is inherently coercive' (Forsberg et al. 2004) . 
In their critical reviews of the literature on intra-family transplants, Crouch & 
Elliott and Spital demonstrate that this interpretation is inspired by a specific 
image of the moral agent, namely that of an independent and self-interested 
person. They argue for a relational concept of moral agency in the family and 
consequently give family ties a different place in the interpretation of "having 
no choice" and voluntary consent. 
Spital puts forward that parents make decisions regarding liver donation 
based on their love for their sick child and the desire to keep him or her alive 
(Spital 2005). Such decisions are made within intimate family settings. These 
family relations should not be seen as coercive. He explains the feeling of 
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having no choice by making a distinction between coercion and coercive situ­
ations. Potential donors often find themselves in stressful or coercive situa­
tions, but this does not mean that coercion is involved: ' .. . there is an important 
difference between coercion, and coercive situation. Both conditions limit 
freedom, but only coercion eliminates autonomy' (Spital 2005). A donor is only 
coerced if someone imposes her will upon him. According to Spital, informed 
consent given in a difficult or coercive situation is not per se invalid. 
Crouch and Elliott dismiss entirely the association between parental deci­
sions about donation and coercive elements. When addressing the issue of 
good comprehension of the transplant decision-making process within the 
family, Crouch and Elliott believe that moral philosophy got us off on the wrong 
foot (Crouch et al. 1999). In moral philosophy the idea of a moral agent as 
being self-interested, independent and free from emotional bonds, commit­
ment and duties is central. As long as voluntariness is linked to this notion of 
moral agency we will not understand how parents experience deciding 
whether to donate. 
' I f  we are ever to get straight about the nature of voluntariness, we must 
recognize that moral and emotional commitments are not exceptional, are 
not constraints on freedom, but are rather a part of ordinary human life. More 
specifically, they are part of ordinary family life that we must take seriously if 
we want to understand how family members make free choices about organ 
donation' (Crouch et al. 1 999). 
Family members not only have shared interests and values, the sharing itself 
is important to them. Sharing with one another and the feeling of community 
are important. In this the interests of family members are tightly interwoven 
and it is not always possible to differentiate them. This also means that we do 
things for family members we would not do for others. Love, duty and con­
science are thus not curtailments of freedom, but rather expressions of who 
someone is. 'Neither love nor conscience constrain the mother's autonomy; 
rather, they give voice to her autonomy and say something about the kind of 
agent she is and the kind of family of which she is a member' (Crouch et al. 
1999). 
We think that parents' perception of having no choice should be understood 
as a result of commitment to their child. The findings about perceived lack of 
choice should neither be seen as signs of internal coercion as Siegler ( et al) 
point out, nor as a result of the inherent coerciveness of the parent-infant rela-
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tionship as Forsberg et al. conclude. Both of these interpretations seem to 
imply that we should generally accept or reject some forms of coercion as part 
of family- transplantation practices, leaving no room for a critical evaluation in 
specific cases. If however we understand the often perceived lack of choice 
as signs of commitment, we can start identifying the questions that seem cru­
cial in evaluating voluntariness in family-decisions. Before assessing these 
questions, we have to add a critical remark to the picture of moral agency in 
the family drawn by Spital, Crouch and Elliot. 
We agree with Crouch and Elliot that commitments are part of family life, 
and are not necessarily constraints on the autonomy. This however does not 
rule out the possibility of constraining relationships in a family. As Marilyn 
Friedman points out in a feminist discussion about relational autonomy: some 
relations are supportive of autonomy, other relations are not (Friedman 2003) . 
In order to judge freedom of consent to donation, a decision in which family 
relations are central, professionals need to get some idea of the quality of 
these family relations. 
Another aspect of a relational view of moral agency is in need of some 
specification as well. What kind of connections between relations and moral 
agency do we want to endorse if we adopt a relational view of moral agency? 
Following Friedman we can make a distinction between the more traditional 
philosophical views in which relations are seen in a causal connection to 
moral agents, and views in which relations are understood as constitutive of 
moral agency*. A causal connection between relations and moral agents is a 
connection most philosophers agree on. Moral agents have come to be what 
they are in relations to their parents or educators. This view however leaves 
the picture of moral agency that Crouch and Elliott criticize unquestioned. The 
"relational history" of moral agents is still compatible with pictures in which 
moral agency is abstracted from specific social roles and commitments. We 
adopt a view in which relations are seen as constitutive of moral agency. Rela­
tions are the background against which moral agents define their responsibili­
ties, and they are part of what is reestablished; damaged, repaired or negated 
by the way responsibilities are taken. There is no way of understanding moral 
agency of donor-candidates without some knowledge of relations to the child 
and to significant others in the process of care for the child in need of trans­
plantation. 
* c.f. Marilyn Friedman (2003) for the distinction of these two theoretical connections; causal 
and constitutive. She discusses the connections between relations and autonomy. 
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A more practical question generated by a relational view of moral agency is, 
what exactly professionals should look for in these relations. An evaluation of 
relations in the judgment about consent to donation can be highly impractical 
and intrusive. For example, healthcare professionals could look at family-rela­
tions to find out about ''who the donor-candidate really is", and whether dona­
tion is coherent with the life story of the donor-candidate. The next thing pro­
fessionals might want to know is whether the role in which donation seems to 
fit coherently is accepted freely by a parent or not. These questions might 
seem relevant if we want to understand to what extent parental liver donation 
can be free, but they are alienating in a situation in which a child's life and the 
families wellbeing are at stake. 
Judgment about the relational aspects of moral agency and freedom of 
consent should keep a focus that is limited to the situation and decisions at 
hand. When a child becomes critically ill and in need of special care and trans­
plantation, its parents and sometimes other family-members have to redefine 
their responsibilities. In this process parents' perceptions of themselves and 
their relations to family and friends can change dramatically. This process of 
parents, responding to the special caring needs of their child is the process in 
which professionals can evaluate the significance of relations for the moral 
agency of donor candidates. Does the moral agency of a donor candidate find 
articulation in her relations to significant others, or does she seem to disap­
pear in these relations? 
Spital and Crouch & Elliott thus have introduced two important premises in the 
discussion on donors' voluntary consent: people are relational moral agents 
and LRL T is a family matter in which some form of involvement of other family 
members in the decision-making processes is important. Crouch and Elliott 
warn that this involvement must not be misunderstood as signifying a lack of 
freedom and that transplant teams must take this into account in the require­
ments of informed consent. We adopt this relational view of moral agency with 
the addition that relations can be both, enhancing and restrictive of autonomy. 
In order to contribute to the donor decision-making process the interpretation 
of living donor voluntary consent must be based on a relational view of the 
moral agent. When parents state that they have no choice, they point out that 
their options are restricted by what is most important to them. These percep­
tions of parents should guide questions about autonomy and voluntary deci­
sion-making to questions about the quality of commitments and relations 
involved in the decision about parental liver donation. 
Close family-involvement and the experience of having no choice, is not 
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the only issue that poses questions about voluntariness. As parents in our 
interviews show, the prospect of living liver donation often incites strong emo­
tions. We will argue that the interpretation of these emotions is a complex but 
important component of evaluating a voluntary consent to donation. 
E M O T I O N S  POS I N G  Q U E ST I O N S  A BO U T  
VO L U N TA R I N E SS 
Emotions of parents can put professionals on different tracks when evaluating 
the voluntariness of consent. Voluntary consent requires a state of mind that 
in some way endorses the proposed living donor procedure. When parents 
show strong emotions about the decision to donate, professionals can inter­
pret this as resistance to donation and thus see reason to probe deeper into 
the voluntariness of a decision. Emotions are important landmarks in a deci­
sion-making process. However, we will point out that these landmarks are not 
unequivocal. Emotions can be given different interpretations and conse­
quently guide the steps in the decision making process in diverging directions. 
Emotions can pose questions about voluntariness, but we should beware of 
deducing direct answers from emotions about voluntariness. 
We will further explore these two experiences, having no choice and strong 
emotions, in the story of Margaret. Her story makes clear that emotions can be 
interpreted in different ways during the decision-making process. 
Margaret is the mother of two children. Her daughter is eight and her son a 
year and a half. Her son had a liver transplant a few months ago. During the 
interview he was home playing on a rug on the floor, but before the transplant 
he was in hospital for several months. His condition was so critical that he 
could not go home. Although his was an urgent case on the organ donor wait­
ing list, it took a long time before a suitable donor liver was available for him. In 
this waiting period, during which her son could have died at any time, Mar­
garet was screened for living liver donation. Her husband had offered to do 
this first, but his blood type did not match so Margaret had herself examined to 
see whether she might be able to donate a piece of her liver to her son. This 
screening process was complicated, however, by her fear of the donor opera­
tion. This fear made her decision-making more difficult and interfered with her 
contact with medical professionals. 
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Margaret: ' I t also didn't feel right because my stomach hurt when the man [the 
screening physician] showed up. That was of course because I'd registered 
and I thought I had to go through with it, but I really wasn't convinced.' 
Interviewer: 'Hmm.' 
Margaret: 'I was frightened. I was terribly scared.' 
Interviewer: 'You didn't agree on an emotional level?' 
Margaret: 'Yes, that's it! When I saw that man - brr, there he is again, 
I thought.' 
The internist responsible for donor screening noted that she was having a lot 
of trouble with the prospect of the donor operation. He asked her whether she 
really wanted to donate and did not get a clear answer. Her choice of words in 
the interview also raises doubts as to her will to donate a piece of her liver: ' ... 
but I really wasn't convinced.' As the interview continued, however, it became 
clear that although her fear did indeed get in the way, she did not want that to 
stop her. She reported that she wanted to do everything she could to save her 
child's life and that it would be awful if they were to refuse her as a donor on 
account of her fear. 
Margaret indicated that as a mother she had no choice, that this was some­
thing she had to do: 
Margaret: If you look at it rationally then of course you eventually realize: there 
is no choice. 
Interviewer: Yes, other people say the same . . .  
Margaret: It's not about people, but as a parent I think that . . .  I think that as a 
person there's a choice, but not as a parent. It's just a shame that things have 
got to be this way. 
Margaret here endorses what Crouch and Elliot explained, that feelings of 
obligation are part of ''the moral agent in the family." When the interviewer 
uses the general denominator "people," she emphasizes the relational basis 
of having no choice, by specifying that it is parents who are bound to opt for 
donation. The fact that she wants to become a donor in spite of her fear is an 
expression of who she is as a mother and of what is most important to her. Still 
the fear makes it hard to back her own decision. 
Margaret has herself screened for liver donation in spite of her fear. The 
explanation she gives resembles that of the other parents interviewed: 'as a 
parent you have to, you want to, you have no choice.' The decision is con-
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nected to who she is and wants to be, as a mother of her child. In that sense, 
she is autonomous. But when the screening proceeds Margaret looses her 
grip on herself. Her fear interferes in her relation with the gastro-enterologist, 
raises questions about her voluntariness and makes the burdensome time 
with her sick child even more stressful. 
Fear of donating is an emotion which professionals can handle in different 
manners. The ways in which emotions guide the process of deciding depend 
partly on the questions they ask about these emotions. 
When framed in the informed consent procedure, fear will prompt questions 
about the voluntary nature of donor candidature. Margaret was frightened and 
the signals she gave off raised doubts as to how prepared she really was to 
donate. From the interview, however, we might infer that her decision making 
process was probably helped more by extra attention and support than by 
skepticism about the decision itself. For Margaret, fear was not a reason to 
abandon living liver donation. In the other interviews in which fear played a 
role, and in two other studies on LRLT donor decision-making, these findings 
are confirmed (Crawly-Mataka et al. 2004; Forsberg et al. 2004). The percep­
tion of the screening experience is often marked by this fear, but it does not 
always limit willingness to donate. 
Professionals can thus see fear as a reason to question the voluntariness 
of the decision or as an occasion to give the donor candidate extra support. 
What indications can we get from emotions about voluntariness? The ques­
tion about voluntariness is a very important one to address when emotions 
show that someone is struggling with the prospect of donation. Emotions can 
have a signaling function. Nevertheless emotions by themselves don't answer 
these questions. There is no direct unmediated relation between emotion and 
the will to do something. If we want to address questions about voluntariness 
we have to ask more generally what emotions refer to. 
In the interview Margaret admitted that her fear had to do with her responsibil­
ity to her other child, a daughter also in need of special care: Margaret :  'Yes, 
that [the risk of dying] is the reason why I initially didn't want to do it because 
we also have a daughter who needs special attention. I thought then, "ok great, 
he needs a piece of liver, but my other child also needs a living mother."' 
Regarding the question as to whether the chance of complications put her off 
she reported: 
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Margaret: 'But the worst part of dying was far, far worse - not that I 'm scared of 
it, but for her [daughter]. Then he [husband] would be left behind with a child 
saved by a piece of my liver. He'll have lost his wife and friend and the children 
would then no longer have a mother .. .' 
We have indicated above that the decision to donate is strongly motivated by 
who the donor is and wants to be for the child as a mother or father. The inter­
view extracts conform to the view in which relations are seen as constitutive of 
a moral agent. Margaret here shows that this disturbing emotion, her fear, was 
also tied up with who she is for her other child and husband. 
This fear also expresses what she means and wants to mean to others. 
Once this comes to the surface, fear makes clear that not only her son, but 
also her daughter and husband are important to her. When fear is interpreted, 
the involvement of others concerned in her decision is acknowledged. 
However, as we argued before, the importance of others involved should 
not preclude a critical evaluation of relations. These relations are the context 
in which she articulates her responsibilities in the process of dealing with the 
disease of her son. The quality of these relations should be involved in the 
evaluation of consent to donation. 
This interpretation of fear does not answer questions about voluntariness, 
but it creates conditions for addressing them. When fear is given an explicit 
place and meaning, the personal significance of Margaret's decision can 
become clearer for all concerned. 
We argued that emotions should be taken seriously in questions about volun­
tariness. Emotions are important landmarks in the decision making process. 
They can be difficult to understand, and they do not lead to direct conclusions 
about voluntariness, but nevertheless their relevance in the decision should 
be assessed. 
CONCLUSION 
Parents presented with the option of LRLT must make a decision which can 
have dramatic consequences for themselves, their child and their family. 
Because their child is seriously sick, parents often do not see donation as a 
choice for they want to and must be ready to do this for their child. Yet some 
parents struggle with their emotions about living donation which make it diffi­
cult for them to be completely convinced of the decision. We have attempted 
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to outline how the experience of 1. having no choice and 2. those emotions 
that seem to dispose against living donation, can be interpreted in relation to 
questions about voluntary consent. 
When interpreting voluntariness in cases of parent-child liver donation, it is 
important to come to a proper understanding of the family engagement. In tra­
ditional interpretations of informed consent a strong commitment seems to be 
at odds with the requirement of voluntariness. However, when voluntariness is 
linked with independence we can do no justice to parents' decision-making. 
By contrast, when we interpret voluntary consent from the perspective of a 
relational view on moral agency, justice can be done to the strong bonds 
between donor, recipient and other closely involved persons. The experience 
of many parents of not having a choice should guide the attention of profes­
sionals to the family commitments and relations that are central in the process 
of caring for their child. Relations can open as well as restrict ways for parents 
to redefine themselves and their responsibilities in response to the illness of 
their child. Whether relations are supportive of autonomy in the decision about 
donation depends on the quality of these relations. 
In addition to the feeling of having no choice, the emotions of donors about 
the prospect of donation can also raise questions about voluntariness. Some 
parents who consent to the donor screening have emotions like fear or anger 
about donation. Such emotions can disrupt decision-making. These emotions 
seem to contradict what parents do and want when they agree to be screened 
for liver donation. 
Emotions are relevant to questions about voluntariness, but they are not 
unequivocal. The emotion of fear can put conversations with professionals on 
different tracks in the decision making process. 
Margaret's interview made clear that her fear of donating was bound up 
with concern for herself and her family. If parents, professionals and others 
concerned make space for these emotions and if they interpret them, they can 
clarify what living organ donation means to the donor candidate. Although not 
all emotions back up the decision to donate, they do point out what is impor­
tant and of value to a donor candidate. The interpretation of emotions creates 
an understanding of the decision making process with which questions about 
voluntary consent can be addressed. 
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IN FA M ILIES CONSIDER IN G  




A B S T RACT 
In the process of decision making about LRLT, the donor-risks are regarded 
differently by different participants; family members and professionals. This 
paper explores communication about the donor-risks in family-processes. 
Risk-communication is commonly framed as an informed consent issue; how­
ever, some of the problems or qualities of risk-communication in families are 
difficult to grasp in the terms of informed consent. Risk-communication plays 
an important role in the transitions a family is going through, and in giving sig­
nificance to changes. We propose that besides adhering to informed consent 
norms, good donor-risk communication should also be supportive of the 




When healthy individuals consent to undergo an operation solely to benefit 
another, the communication of the risks of that operation bears a special 
weight and significance. Risk communication can change processes of deci­
sion making and shape the moral significance of decisions to donate or not to 
donate, supporting but also disturbing the complex collaborative endeavors of 
care and decision-making within which this communication takes place. It can 
be difficult to tell what constitutes good risk communication. This paper 
addresses the question of what good risk communication, in the family context 
of living related liver transplantation with pediatric recipients, might be. 
In the bioethics literature, risk communication has been most discussed as 
part of informed consent procedures. Without denying the importance of 
informed consent, we direct attention to other interactions and processes in 
which risk communication gives and gains significance. To address our ques­
tion we explore the significance of risk communication in the processes of 
change going on when a family is considering the option of living related liver 
transplantation (LRLT). 
Risk-communication gains and gives significance in family-processes that 
overlap with decision making. Good risk communication, we argue, should be 
understood in the context of giving significance to transitions in the family, not 
only as an unhampered exchange of information between potential donor and 
professionals. Because families in which LRLT is considered are going 
through a time of great turbulence, we believe good risk communication must 
be supportive of the transitions that families are going through. 
This discussion of donor-risk communication is based on a study that is 
part of the research project entitled "Living Related Donation: A Qualitative 
Ethical Study," carried out at the University Medical Centre Groningen. For 
this study we conducted semi-structured interviews with 22 parents, two 
uncles, and one aunt of 12 families who had considered liver donation for an 
infant transplant patient. A short conversation was held with a second aunt in 
the course of the interview with her husband. This conversation is also used in 
this paper. In four families LRLT had been done, in the other eight families 
LRL T had been postponed or abandoned for various medical or psychosocial 
reasons. If LRLT was postponed it was often kept as a safety net; the family 
would wait for a post-mortem donor liver, but before waiting became too dan­
gerous for the patient, they would do LRLT. In these eight families the patient 
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had been transplanted with a post-mortem graft. In addition, we observed the 
weekly meetings of the liver transplant team and in the outpatient pediatric 
clinic. 
The views in this paper are developed on the basis of observations and 
interviews in one liver transplant center with its own ways of handling donor 
risks. Yet, we think that our proposed ways of framing and evaluating risk 
communication can be of broader use to other centers and ethicists as well. 
We first sketch the processes in two families considering LAL T. When 
framed by informed consent norms as they are commonly understood, it is dif­
ficult to make sense of some of the problems with risk communication in the 
two families. To make sense of familial attitudes toward risk and to identify rel­
evant criteria for assessing good risk communication, we situate our discus­
sion within the collaborative family processes we observed in our study. 
We write about risk communication as different forms of verbal and nonver­
bal communication, not only between professionals and potential donors but 
also between parents or among other family members. In our view, good risk 
communication does not only depend on the professionals who disclose risk 
information; it also depends on family interactions that are beyond the control 
of professionals. However, professionals can play an important role in what 
goes on in the family. Although professionals cannot lay down the terms for 
risk communication in the family, they can adjust their own 'share' in these 
conversations to family processes. 
COMPLICATIONS IN F AMILY PROCESSES 
We first sketch two complicated family processes. In our study they are excep­
tions rather than exemplary cases, but they can help us draw attention to 
aspects of risk communication in families that often go unnoticed when they 
go well. 
When Baber needed a liver graft from his uncle Jamal, his transplantation 
became a contentious event. This uncle had a special bond with his nephew, 
since he had always joined Saber's family, of Asian origin, in the hospital as an 
interpreter. He was the best Dutch-speaking member in the family. When both 
parents were deemed medically unsuitable as donors, Jamal volunteered to 
donate. Jamal's wife reports that she had been very scared: '/ was very 
scared when he was going to donate; I didn't know what would happen. I tried 
to stop him, . .. but he didn't listen to anybody, he only saw the baby [Baber] . . . .  
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He told me there was a small risk only, but even then I was scared.' In this 
short account of fear about what could happen, she recalls her husband's 
disregard of risk: he thought the risks were small and he listened to nobody : 
'he only saw the baby.' Professionals seemed to have a more remote and 
mediated presence in her account. When her husband told her that there was 
a small risk only, he summarized the general message he had picked up from 
professional risk communication. However she was neither impressed nor 
reassured by this communication. Jamal indicates that she and other family 
members had heard other, more frightening stories about living donation. 
Jamal found the risks small and acceptable, but the rest of his family had very 
different ideas about the magnitude of the donor risks. 
Since nobody could stop Jamal, Saber's parents were pressured by other 
family members to refuse the offer to donate. Saber's mother reported, 'We 
didn't want him to donate, (me and my husband) because if something would 
happen to him, we would feel very guilty and ashamed before the family; we 
were very scared.' However, they were also pressured by Saber's uncle to 
accept his offer. He first tried to persuade the whole family by explaining how 
thorough the screening procedures for donor candidates were. When the par­
ents, fearing the reproach of other family-members, later continued to oppose 
LAL T, Jamal put them under more pressure. Uncle: 'I told them; you heard 
what the professor said; he has no more than four weeks to live if we do not 
operate him now. What do you want? . . .  If you give up on your child, please 
give him to me.' This way of framing their decision put Saber's parents in an 
even more difficult position. They kept wavering, agreeing one moment, with­
drawing their consent in the next moment. Finally, after the mediation of a gen­
eral ly respected great-uncle, Jamal managed to get their consent to his giving 
Baber a piece of his liver. After the transplantation, both Baber and Jamal 
recovered. Jamal was a family hero; however, Saber's parents still had a diffi­
cult relationship with the rest of the family. 
In another family, Elske, mother of a liver transplant patient and one of the 
potential donors, was overwhelmed by the information about donor risks: she 
kept fretting about them, unable to make up her mind. The aunt of the patient 
connected doubts about Elske's possible donor status to specific expectations 
she had of mothers: 'because I thought, being a woman, she is the one who 
keeps the family rolling, what happens if she is in the hospital?' In the inter­
view with Elske and her husband, the differences in the way they discuss liv­
ing donation and its risk is striking. To Elske it was a practical and religious 
issue, brought home to her by other family members: 
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' I  was also more sensitive to comments of others . . .  l ike how wi l l  things go 
with the family if you have medical complications, such th ings .. . or are we 
not going too far? [from a spiritual viewpoint] . . .  I 've never faced such difficult 
things' 
To Elske's husband, who was also screened, living donation and its risk had 
been a more intellectual and religious issue. In the interview he never men­
tioned practical concerns about family care and positioned himself as a more 
independent thinker, less sensitive to comments of family members. He had 
studied Bible fragments that could have a bearing on the question, and he had 
thoroughly considered all the risk information given by professionals. Moved 
by the suffering of his son, he became convinced that he should pursue living 
donation. Elske's concerns did not seem to have any salience to her husband; 
according to him, she was under the influence of the more traditional side of 
the family, where such things were difficult to discuss. Elske herself, keeping 
the family rolling, seemed to lack space and peace of mind to determine her 
position about living donation or to consider its risks. She felt very frightened, 
but she also felt unable to refuse to donate. 'You don't know what you're at . . .  , 
what will happen to the family if something happens to me, these things. They 
were the most difficult things I ever encountered.' This made it difficult to give 
the risks and risk-related fears a place in the decision-making process. She 
entered the donor trajectory, although thoughts about worst-case scenarios 
kept haunting her. Risk awareness seemed to be paralyzing to the degree that 
refusal as well as consent to donation was extremely difficult. 
D O N O R- R I S K  C O M M U N I C A T I O N ;  
G I V I N G  S I G N I F I C A N C E  T O  C H A N G E S  
Elske's fretting response to considerations of risk and the familial tensions in 
Saber 's family point to problems with donor-risk communication that have 
rarely been discussed. These problems can only be understood if we pay 
closer attention to the family setting in which living liver donation is consid­
ered. Up till now the communication of donor risks has been discussed mainly 
as an issue of informed consent. Those discussions are primarily concerned 
with donors' frequent disregard of the risk to themselves. Such disregard of 
risk has been observed in other studies and was also reported by different 
respondents in our study (Fellner & Marshall 1 968; Fellner & Marshall 1 970; 
Crowly-Matoka et al. 2004; Knibbe & Verkerk 2008). Several ethicists point 
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out that these donor attitudes call for a rethinking of common models of 
informed consent and autonomous agency (Sauder & Parker 2001 ; Spital 
2004; Crouch & Elliot 1999). The fretting response to risk communication 
poses fewer problems in view of informed consent norms as they are com­
monly understood, because this response seems to testify of awareness of 
the donor risks involved: the information about the possibility of death or of 
compromised recovery after donation has clearly been picked up by those 
fretting about risks. Yet this risk awareness can be disturbing or troublesome 
in the experience of parents as potential donors. 
The problems we sketched above can be viewed as problems of adjusting 
and giving significance to the turbulent changes in family life brought about by 
the infant's life-threatening illness. We propose to see informed consent - and 
the medical accountability for harm and risks that depends on a valid informed 
consent - as only one of the normative contexts for risk communication. The 
communication of donor risks also serves another goal: to be supportive of the 
changes a family is going through. Jody Halpern and Margaret Little point out 
that risk communication should take into account that people can only do 
something with the information given if they are able to maintain a sense of 
themselves and a sense of meaningful connections to a world that is relatively 
safe and familiar (Halpern & Little 2008). In the context of living related liver 
transplantation this task of maintaining or finding a new sense of self and 
(life-) world is a collaborative family process. Risk communication has an 
important place in this family process; however, its role should not be overesti­
mated. It cannot solve all problems that may arise in the stressful time leading 
up to transplantation. It can make adjustments in a family go better or worse; 
however risk communication itself also depends on these processes. This 
two-way connection makes good risk communication in family settings a com­
plex issue. To understand what went wrong in the above described cases, and 
how such things can go better, we use other examples from our study. With 
these examples we explore how risk communication was situated in different 
family practices. 
FA M I LY P R A CT I C E S  
We here discuss two related practices in which the donor-risks were placed. 
The first is the practice of family-care, which involved responding to changes 
and needs of the sick child as well as providing continuity in spite of the child's 
life-threatening disease. The second practice concerns the maintenance or 
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re-articulation of family relations that were sometimes challenged by different 
attitudes toward LRLT and the risks it involved. By how they attended to risk, 
respondents positioned themselves differently in relation to the potential 
recipient, other family members, and professionals. In our exploration of the 
ways risks were communicated in these processes, we also propose an 
understanding of what went wrong in Saber's and Elske's families. 
Family care: change and continuity 
When a child needs a liver transplant, its parents can consider living liver 
donation (and its risk), but they also must find a way of living with their child's 
disease, the extra burdens of care and uncertainty about their child's future. 
The family life they had lived before can not continue in the same way; their 
world changed when their child fell ill. However, for the sake of their other chil­
dren and work, parents often try to retain continuity in some respects: they try 
to maintain a presence, pay attention, engage in caring activities, or cultivate 
a stable state of mind. The threats to the child and the sometimes extraordi­
narily high demands of extra medical care can make it difficult to provide this 
continuity. To cope with this highly demanding situation, parents regulate 
activities, attention, and emotions in specific ways. Role divisions between 
parents and professionals help to distribute burdens of care, including emo­
tional burdens. In families with more children, it is often mothers who stay in 
the hospital during hospitalization of the sick child, while fathers stay more at 
home with the other children. To some fathers this has been reason to prefer 
themselves as liver donor, above their partner; it would be fair because she 
already has so much to deal with. Attention to the risks of donation can also 
become one of the 'burdens' that are distributed. 
If we follow how attention to donor risks is distributed among family-mem­
bers and professionals, good risk communication can be viewed with the kind 
of critical perspective on gender or other inequalities with which divisions of 
labor or distributions of burdens in care are often viewed. Gendered divisions 
in care for the sick child and family can make things easier; however, as is 
often the case with role divisions, they are not always well balanced. In some 
families, it seems that mothers carried the heaviest burdens of care. Elske's 
fretting responses to risk communication can be placed in this context. It is dif­
ficult to sketch role divisions on the basis of interviews. The frayed edges of 
role divisions often become more visible in what people do than in what peo­
ple say about them. Yet, some differences in the stories of Elske and her hus­
band can help to lay out the precarious position Elske found herself in. In the 
interviews in Elske's family, it seemed that the continuity of family care was 
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particularly dependent on her. In this precarious role she could not find the 
peace of mind to give attention to donor risk a place in her decision; she did 
not consider the risks; instead, she was haunted by worst-case scenarios. 
Rather than making up her mind, she postponed the decision and hoped that 
the doctors would decide she was not a suitable donor. 
Although Elske did not become donor in the end, her reception of donor­
risk communication seems similar to donor experiences described by Fors­
berg et al. They write: "Decisions were arrived at and preparations were 
made, often with the donor in a state of mental stress and traumatized by the 
whole situation" (Forsberg et al. 2004). Instead of enabling potential donors to 
decide and prepare, risk awareness undermined their capacity to respond to 
the problems of their situation. 
For a further exploration of role divisions in attending to donor risks, we 
draw two other examples, in which risk communication seemed to be more 
supportive of the changes families were going through. In these examples 
respondents make clear that their attitudes to donor risks were responsive to 
the attitudes of others. 
Hans, a donor candidate, indicates that although the risks didn't matter to 
him personally, he knew that his wife, Barbara, was worried that something 
would happen to him, and he cared about how she felt: 'For myself I wasn't 
bothered by the risks, but for my wife I was. She would have to bring two to the 
operating room, and for her that was very difficult.' Barbara confirms that she 
had been more worried about risks, although she tried to focus on positive 
expectations. The risks had a place in their decisions through Hans's consid­
erations of his wife's worries. 
Parents also adjusted their attitudes toward risk to the impression they had 
of professional ways of handling risks to donors. Mella's parents for example 
said that they had paid little attention to these risks. His mother asserted: 'The 
risks didn't play a role,' and the father reported: 'We knew there were risks, but 
we did it for our child, end of discussion. We did not consider the risks.' How­
ever, they also reported that they knew that the transplant team was very con­
cerned about donor risks. The parents didn't try to get a thorough understand­
ing of the risks, but they understood that the professionals had this thorough 
understanding and concern, and the professionals' concern was meaningful 
in their own considerations. 
These examples show that parents had diverse ways of lending salience to 
the attitudes of others in their own thoughts and feelings about donor risks. By 
their consideration or disregard of risks to themselves, they positioned them­
selves differently with regard to family care as well as decision making. When 
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a potential donor had seemed very determined to pursue donation, her part­
ner often gave more attention to the possible drawbacks of living donation. 
The example of Hans and Barbara shows that in these collaborative 
processes, the risks could sometimes be weighed without potential donors' 
themselves giving direct and explicit attention to risks. Attitudes of potential 
donors and others around them complemented each other; disregarding risks 
enabled potential donors to be strong and positive, while they could rely on 
others to consider and prepare for possible bad outcomes. In such cases, the 
attitudes of partners supported each others significance like interlocking 
pieces of a puzzle. 
When the attitudes of family-members toward LAL T and its risk are not 
mutually attuned and responsive, it is difficult to manoeuvre through the 
changes that a family is going through, and make sense of them. Elske found 
less space to negotiate her position in family care. She was placed in a social 
scheme that was difficult to revise. In this scheme, role divisions were less 
flexible, making mutual attuning of attitudes toward risk difficult. With five chil­
dren, one of whom had a life-threatening disease, Elske had great difficulties 
meeting all the demands of care made on her. In this position she could hardly 
think about the additional problems posed by living donation and its risks. She 
found herself alone with concerns that had no salience to her husband and 
with too heavy a burden of care. Meanwhile, her husband interpreted her atti­
tude toward living donation and its risk as susceptibility to traditional religious 
arguments, paying less attention to her practical worries nor to her lack of 
space in which to make up her mind. 
Maintenance of relations 
The measure of readiness to donate or to accept an offer to donate can poten­
tially be seen as an expression of one's commitments to the recipient or oth­
ers. Different risk attitudes and reactions to the option of living donation can 
confirm as well as challenge relations in the family. In Saber's family, Jamal 
saw living liver donation as an affirmation of the special bond he had with his 
nephew. Many other family members had made it clear that they would blame 
Saber's parents for any resulting harm to Jamal if they gave their consent to 
LAL T. Jamal on the other hand tried to convince his family that donation was 
his own decision and responsibility, and that any harm to him could not be 
blamed on Saber's parents. He did, however, reproach Saber's parents for 
withholding their consent to LAL T and thereby endangering the life of their 
child. Saber's parents had very little room to articulate their own position. They 
didn't manage to position themselves with regard to the donor risks. Instead, 
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the risks and the family's opposing understandings of risks positioned them, 
either as blameworthy or as careless parents. 
In contrast to Saber's family, other families often tried to give differences in 
attitudes toward risk a less challenging place in their relationships. Because 
living donation can damage these relationships, the attitudes toward living 
donation and its risk often needed active interpretation in order to reduce 
pressure and create space for potential donors to determine their own posi­
tion. These efforts to maintain or rearticulate relations that were challenged by 
the option of living donation could be more or less successful. 
Parents often showed their acceptance of different attitudes toward LRL T 
and its risk by giving explanations that had no connection to the relation with 
the child. Different attitudes could for example be ascribed to a different rela­
tion with medical practice. About Caspar's father, Caspar's mother explains: 
"He is actually not really a hospital person, even the smallest needle horrifies 
him, so he could not picture this [becoming a donor] for himself, but he said 
this with tears in his eyes, he found it horrible." Margaret had been terribly 
afraid to donate, but her husband indicates that he tried to do justice to their 
differences in attitude by accepting her limits and respecting them: 'You can 
_ never reproach each other, for example, by saying, "You could have donated" 
if our son were to die - that would be very unfair. Margaret does everything 
that is in her power and I do what is in my power.' 
Potential conflicts or tension came closer to the surface in Jonathan's fam­
ily. Jonathan's parents represented their different attitudes toward risk as dif­
ferences in character. His mother explains that she had been very enthusias­
tic when she first read about LAL T, while his father had mainly remembered 
the part about risks. 'We always picked up different things when we read 
something. I was more impulsive, he was more cautious or deliberate.' She 
thought that risks to her were not relevant if she could save her son's life. 
Jonathan's father, on the other hand, explained that he would donate if neces­
sary, but that for the sake of his wife and children he took a course with the 
least possible risks to himself: he was screened and kept living donation as a 
last resort (as proposed by professionals), and would only donate if his son 
could wait no longer. Jonathan's mother indicated that their differences in atti­
tude held a potential for conflict: 'If the waiting time had lasted much longer, . . . 
this could have become a thorny issue, because we had these different views.' 
However, she also pointed out how this potential conflict had so far been 
avoided: 'But I have always said to myself, "I respect that he wants to donate 
[under certain conditions], and I have an opinion about it but not a voice in the 
decision."' 
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When parents were unable to become donors and the option of donation 
was introduced in the wider family circle, the relations between nuclear fami­
lies became an issue. In John's family, John's uncle had been screened as a 
liver donor for his nephew. Both John's family and his uncle's lived in the same 
street and supported each other in many ways. Being so close, it seemed logi­
cal for the uncle to see himself as the next candidate after the parents were 
refused. He and his wife gave a lot of thought to the risk involved. The risks 
were also a relational issue. The aunt said: '/ thought; what if you become 
handicapped or even die, can we still look them [John's parents] in the eye, or 
will it start agonizing, like "was it worth it?111But on the other hand, the uncle 
indicated; 
'My decision is about two sides, [my family and my brother's family] there is 
also the other side, ... my decision could also bring it about that John dies . . . .  
Of course my brother said, "If you refuse I will not reproach you." He said that, 
but of course you can say something like that ten times, but it feels different, as 
if I decide about John, and that is quite something, in fact, you decide about life 
and death.' 
Both uncle and aunt became more convinced when they saw John in his 
heartbreaking condition in the hospital. They also felt more positive about liv­
ing donation after conversations about risks with the surgeon and the internist 
who did the donor screening. 
With their efforts to protect relations from reproaches or tensions that could 
be raised by different attitudes toward the risks of living donation, family mem­
bers tried to create space for potential donors and others in the family to nego­
tiate their own position. Respecting differences or interpreting them as part of 
someone's makeup or personal limits could help to take pressures away in the 
course of decision making. However, John's uncle and Jonathan's mother 
indicated that tensions or pressures could arise in spite of these efforts. When 
the condition of the sick child became more urgent it could become increas­
ingly difficult for family members to nurture their relationships and repress ten­
sions or pressures. 
GOOD R I S K  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  
When LRL T is seen as a family matter and risk communication as  a collabora­
tive process that gains and gives significance in changing family circum-
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stances, good risk communication must adhere to norms that go beyond 
those commonly posed by informed consent. The soundness of an informed 
consent procedure depends on the reliability and intelligibility of the informa­
tion given, and on the capacity of potential donors to understand the informa­
tion. In the family contexts that we explored, however, other insights and val­
ues attach to risk communication. As the cases of Elske and Baber show, 
risk-communication here is partly governed by the normative expectations 
that govern family-relationships. Such normative expectations are often gen­
dered, class bound and formed in specific religious or cultural communities*. 
We propose that good risk-communication needs to be critical of inherited 
normative expectations toward parents or other family-members involved. 
The cases described above about how challenges to relations were 
addressed can be seen as an example of how family members push back 
against normative expectations. Good risk-communication in families 
depends on whether family members, facing changes, manage to push back 
against the inherited normative expectations, in order to really explore future 
changes. Here, the capacity to completely understand information about risks 
seems less important than forming good interpretations about the significance 
of the donor risks in the family and good responding to the attitudes of others 
toward these risks. In the stories of our respondents, it is difficult to isolate risk 
communication from other issues; it is strongly interwoven with other family 
processes. Good risk communication is dependent on the space that family 
members manage to create for each other through interpretations of attitudes 
and their significance for familial relations. 
T H E  ROLES O F  P RO F ESS I O N A LS I N  GOOD 
R I S K-COM M U N I C A T I O N  
I f  family processes and risk communication are so closely connected, it is diffi­
cult to understand what professionals can do to support good risk-communi­
cation. Before we discuss how good professional risk-communication might 
be understood, we explore what respondents tell about professionals and 
their communication of risks. In the stories of parents, the roles of profession­
als in family processes, and the significance of professionals risk communica­
tion is diverse. 
* For reasons of anonimity we do not analyse the religious and cultural background in the 
cases of Elske and Baber. 
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The transplant team plays a double role in the changes a family is going 
through. The team helps families interpret and adapt to changes, but it is also 
a part of the changes : professionals represent the new medical practice in 
which a family must participate. These roles of guiding changes in family life 
that result from treating the child's disease and of representing an unfamiliar 
medical practice can be seen as the two roles in which professional risk com­
munication gains significance for parents or other potential donors in the fam­
ily. When professionals communicate donor risks, they do not merely sketch 
possible outcomes and their probabilities; with their style of talking about risk 
they also show something to potential donors and partners about the kind of 
medical practice they have entered. 
Respondents registered and responded to the attitudes of professionals 
toward donor risks in different ways. In interviews, respondents remembered 
very little about the details of the risks that were communicated - the mortality 
and morbidity statistics or the specific complications that can occur after liver 
donation. What they remember is the serious tone and emphasis with which 
risks were communicated and the concerns in the transplant team about 
these risks. Respondents had collected a general message from this profes­
sional communication; in the interviews they speak about small, big, consider­
able or acceptable risks. As one mother reported: 'They were very clear about 
the risks, with percentages and so forth, I don't remember exactly, only that 
there was a big risk.' As the previously given examples indicate, some respon­
dents felt impelled to give the risks a great deal of thought, whereas others 
entrusted risk considerations to professionals. When recalling encounters 
with professionals in which risks were communicated, the two aforementioned 
roles of professionals alternated. Sometimes respondents took the general 
message about donor-risk as guidance in their own orientation on questions 
about living donation, sometimes they took their observations about profes­
sionals and professional thoughts and feelings to represent the character of 
the medical practice they had entered. 
Depending on the roles as guides or representatives that professionals 
receive or manage to play, they have different entrances for supporting risk 
communication in the family. In a family like Saber's, where stories from differ­
ent origins circulated about the dangers of living donation, the role of doctors 
as representative of this unfamiliar medical practice could be an important 
one. As matters stood, the family (with the exception of Jamal and Saber's 
parents) had only second- or third-hand stories about living donation and its 
risk. If Jamal's wife and other opposing family members were invited for a 
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direct conversation, professionals could try to situate the diverse messages 
and frightening stories about living donors, to try to come to shared under­
standings about the donor risks and the ways they are handled in this trans­
plant center. When risk information is explicitly communicated as a kind of 
knowledge that is embedded in a medical subcommunity with certain values, 
worries, and interests of its own, family members can relate in their own ways 
to this new and unfamiliar community. 
In Elske's family the guiding role of the transplant team, in helping this fam­
ily handle the changes in family life could maybe be enlarged, to help her 
make up her mind. The guiding role of professionals in the transplant team 
(doctors, psychologists or social workers) could be understood in a way simi­
lar to that of the "gift-exchange gatekeeper," as Fox and Swazey describe the 
role played by medical teams in family-processes. They write that since the 
gift of an organ puts strains on family-relations, gift-exchange gate keeping 
implies negotiating, mediating and interpreting what happens between family 
members (Fox & Swazey 1974). In the cases they describe, the involvement 
of social workers or psychiatrists sometimes brought about significant 
changes in family-relations, before everyone agreed with the living donor kid­
ney transplantation. It is however the question how far such interference in 
family-dynamics should go. In Elske's case, the usual conversation that the 
social worker has with donor-candidates about donation did not help her to 
make up her mind. As we suggested above, the problem could be that she 
lacked space and peace of mind to think about living donation and its risk 
because the whole family was dependent on her, or at least so it was thought. 
Perhaps good risk-communication in this family would have to be accompa­
nied by an examination and revision of the gendered social schemes. If pro­
fessionals are hesitant about such far-going interference, the conclusion 
could also be that the psycho-social conditions in this family are a contra-indi­
cation for Elske's donor candidacy. 
C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R KS 
The significance of donating or not donating in a family cannot be defined by 
the potential donor alone; it is carried by different family-members. Attitudes 
towards donor risks in the time leading up to transplantation account for a 
great part of the moral meanings. Family attitudes toward the risks to donors 
and the negotiations and interpretations of risk attitudes in the decision-mak­
ing process make living donation morally acceptable or unacceptable to family 
115 
and professionals. At least as important as individual donor considerations are 
the connections between considerations of risk of the different participants in 
this practice. 
The different attitudes were connected and adjusted in processes of famil­
ial care and redefining of familial relations - processes that also interfered 
with decision-making. Giving attention to risk was often one of the many bur­
dens that were divided in these processes among parents and professionals. 
With their diverse forms of attention to donor risk, respondents placed them­
selves, including their fears and concerns, in different positions in the collabo­
rative endeavor of family care and in relations to the patient, donor, or other 
family members. When different attitudes toward living donation and its risk 
seemed to challenge family relations, family members often tried to interpret 
and accept each others' attitudes in more harmless ways, in order to reduce 
pressures. 
In some families, family members took, or allowed each other, less space to 
negotiate their position in care or in family relations. Respondents did not 
place themselves; they were placed in a social scheme that was difficult to 
revise. Respondents' positions in social schemes of family care and family 
relations could also dispose them to attend to donor risks in certain ways. It 
seems that a certain fluidity in role divisions and relations enabled families to 
give donor risks a place in decision making, whereas rigidity of roles or rela­
tions could make it very difficult to place the donor risks in the course of deci­
sion making. 
Although good risk communication depended to a great extent on family 
processes and relations that are out of the control of professionals in the 
transplant team, it also depended on the relations between family and team 
and the roles that the team and its professionals played for a family. In addition 
to giving intelligible and reliable information, this is something that profession­
als can take into account as they attempt to practice good risk communication. 
They can try to get a picture of their own role in family processes, and if neces­
sary adjust the roles they play for a family. 
Professionals received different roles in the processes of change a family 
was going through; they could be seen as guides, or as representatives of an 
unfamiliar medical practice. In some family's, professionals - as representa­
tives of an unfamiliar practice - can best support risk-communication by 
expressing the team's concerns about the donor-risks and the ways they are 
handled. In other families professionals may need to examine how gendered 
role-divisions have a bearing on the significance of living donation and its risk. 
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G E N E R A L  C O N C L U S I O N S  
The introduction of LRL T brought new forms of involvement between the liver 
transplant team and the family of a patient. The background of moral under­
standings about parenthood, about what it means to be a good doctor, about 
good patient-doctor relationships orients the course of decision making about 
LRLT. The aim of this thesis was threefold: First, I offered a reflective analysis 
of moral understandings in decision making about LRL T. Reflective analysis 
involved mapping how participants in the practice of LRLT understood what 
they were doing. Second, I offered critical reflection on the moral understand­
ings that guide decision making. In critical reflection the authority and ade­
quacy of moral understandings are examined. Most of the reflection offered in 
this thesis consisted of critical reflection. The third aim was to offer normative 
reflection on moral understandings about LRL T. Here the question was 
whether moral understandings about LRL T practice were really good or 
whether better understandings could be imagined. 
In this concluding chapter I will summarize the different forms of analysis 
and reflection offered in the previous chapters. Furthermore, I will point out 
how critical reflection offered in the chapters two three and five together can 
be taken as groundwork for normative reflection on autonomy in decisions 
about living liver donation. The concluding chapter consists of two parts: first 
I summarize the reflective and critical analysis of team processes on the one 
hand and processes of potential donors on the other hand. Second, I offer 
some normative reflection on moral understandings about decision making 
and I point out how the critical analysis of these processes may foster further 
normative reflection. 
MORAL UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT LRLT 
Team processes: Changing the moral landscape 
The team processes in which responsibilities with regard to living liver dona­
tion were negotiated can only be understood in the context of problems of 
organ shortage and measures that were taken or that failed to be taken to 
address them. It must be remembered that the liver transplant center in 
Groningen started offering LRL T as one strategy among several others, all 
of which formed an important background for the team's views on the moral 
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acceptability of living liver donation. According to the maxim of primum non 
nocere, the use of healthy persons as liver donors would only be found 
acceptable when other ways of solving the organ shortage problems had 
been exhausted. These other ways depended on steps taken in this trans­
plant center, but also on national policies. 
In the transplant center, steps included the use of split-liver transplantation; 
domino transplantation; the use of non-heart-beating donors and loosening 
the criteria for donors. Another approach to waiting list problems, restricting 
indications for liver transplantation, was often discussed but never adopted. 
Not only was it difficult to decide at the team level that some patients would 
not get a chance of a life-saving treatment, such a restriction in indications for 
liver transplantation also required a change of policy on a national level if it 
was to be effective. Finally, it was thought that the donor pool could be 
expanded if the government changed the current opt-in system into an opt-out 
system for organ donation. In sum, while the team itself had adopted a set of 
measures to expand the donor pool, some potential ways of addressing organ 
shortage problems at the national level were not realized. It was in this context 
that LRLT was introduced, even though there were still moral reservations in 
the team about the acceptability of operating on living liver donors. 
The process in which team responsibilities with regard to LAL T crystallized 
can be characterized as a process of careful change. The pressures on pro­
fessionals and parents to pursue the option of LRL T were carefully managed 
as far as possible: first the child would be put on the waiting list for postmortem 
liver transplantation, and only if waiting would lead to an unacceptable deteri­
oration of the child's condition would the team opt for LRL T. In the communica­
tion about living liver donation the risks of donation were given particular 
emphasis. The advantages were discussed more cautiously, with an accent 
on the time frame: LRLT offered the possibility of choosing a good moment for 
transplantation. What such a good moment would be was not clear in 
advance, but would become clear in the course of frequent contacts with the 
child and family during which the stage of liver disease and condition of the 
child were assessed. 
This cautious approach was a variation on the approach used by many 
transplant centers and recommended by the Health Council, namely, that a 
living-donor trajectory should always be paralleled by registration on the wait­
ing list: 
'These patients should always be put on the waiting list for transplantation with 
a postmortem donor, also when living donation is chosen. If a postmortem 
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donor offer is made during the preparations for living donation, the 
postmortem offer should be given preference. '  (Gezondheidsraad, 2003) 
(p. 1 71 ,  translation MK) .  
As opposed to the more tentative decision making in this center, the Health 
Council pictured an early choice about the strategy to be followed for a partic­
ular child, even though this choice could be overruled by the offer of a 
deceased donor liver. In its recommendation to start offering LRL T for children 
the council argued that although no significant difference in survival rates had 
yet been demonstrated between LRLT and DOLT, it was plausible that pedi­
atric patients had a better chance of survival if they did not have to wait for a 
postmortem liver donor (Gezondheidsraad, 2003). Choosing and preparing a 
LRL T trajectory while enrolling the patient on the waiting list for a postmortem 
donor liver would probably be the best way of optimizing patient health out­
comes in a strictly medical sense. However, because of moral reservations 
and because the transplant team was aware that many parents would not con­
sider living donation as a matter of choice, they structured decision making in 
another, more tentative way. Also, as will be explained below, the understand­
ing about good outcomes of LRL T was broader than the patient and graft sur­
vival. 
Starting with their first explanations to parents, pediatricians played an 
important role as architects of the moral space in which LRL T was considered 
by different parties. By their cautious tone in discussing advantages, pediatri­
cians tried to avoid two kinds of pressures: those placed on the team by enthu­
siastic parents urging them to pursue the living donor option, and those placed 
on parents by a team who presents LRL T as the best option per se. The safety 
net approach created a sense of time that encouraged parents and profes­
sionals to explore their own thoughts and feelings about LRLT in response to 
changing circumstances of the sick child and family. This approach to LRL T 
created space for reflection and collaborative decision making in situations in 
which reflective space was difficult to find. 
A disadvantage of the approach to LRL T as a safety net was mentioned 
before: it was not oriented at obtaining optimal outcomes. This is true from a 
strictly medical viewpoint confined to transplant recipients: the chances of 
patient and graft survival, and the recovery of recipients after the transplanta­
tion would probably benefit more from LRL T if it were planned in an early 
stage of the disease. However, good outcomes of LRL T, according to views in 
the transplant team, encompass more than medical outcomes in a narrow 
sense. LRLT is a family event that can affect different family members besides 
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donor and recipient, and different psychosocial and economic dimensions of 
family life. As was explained in chapters four and six, parents and their fami­
lies go through a turbulent period involving many changes. Practices of 
parental care have to change when a child needs a liver transplant, and often 
role divisions and relations between family members also change. Such 
changes can cause tensions or even conflict if family members do not manage 
to come to shared understandings of their altered relations and roles. Good 
outcomes of LRL T therefore encompass more than good medical outcomes 
n a narrow sense, it also involves a good transition to new practices of family 
care. The efforts of professionals and parents to explore the significance of 
LRLT in a family, in spite of pressing medical needs of the child support the 
transitions that families are going through. Below the reflection on family 
processes is summarized. 
Processes of potential donors and family: Transitional period 
To parents, the team's approach to LRLT formed an important part of the 
moral landscape in which they oriented themselves on questions about living 
donation. Although the parent-team relationship may look like an obvious one, 
it is easily forgotten in reflections on whether parents really want to donate. 
Professionals often discussed the strength of parents' willingness to donate 
as something that developed independently of the interactions between team 
and family. If it is recognized that professionals partly define the situation for 
parents, the will to donate and doubts about donation are put in a different 
light. This is not to say that parents were completely steered by professionals; 
they oriented themselves in different ways in this moral landscape. To under­
stand how they oriented themselves, I explored the ways they lived through 
the time leading up to transplantation. 
The time in which parents considered their responsibilities with regard to 
the option of living donation was a period of transition. The life-threatening dis­
ease of their child was often recalled in interviews as a complete disruption of 
the life they had led before. Parents lived with the knowledge that their child 
would not be able to live for long with its existing liver but that it would have a 
good chance of recovery if it managed to survive the waiting time before trans­
plantation. How long the child could wait, and what the chances were of 
receiving a DOLT in time, was uncertain. The child's condition was constantly 
viewed as betwixt and between; it could be getting better or it could be getting 
worse. The option of living donation was often gratefully welcomed, but it also 
met with mixed feelings. It was a relief to know that their child's life might not 
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be completely dependent on this waiting list with unknown waiting times; how­
ever, living donation and its risk brought new uncertainties in the family. 
In the interviews parents told about different ways of dealing with this 
uncertainty and of entrusting to professionals aspects of care for their child 
and for themselves as potential donors. In chapter three, which was one of the 
early papers of this research, I suggested that trust should be one of the topics 
on the ethical agenda of LAL T. However, while trying to understand more 
about different forms of trust in parents' stories, my attention was drawn to 
seemingly related but diverse ways of attending to possible future scenarios 
and all the available information. Parents' understandings about relations with 
professionals seemed to be part of their specific ways of inviting a future for 
their child. Instead of zooming in on trust, I tried to set parents' trust in profes­
sionals into a larger pattern of their different ways of hoping. In chapter four 
I described a variety of information-seeking or -avoiding attitudes and diverse 
roles taken by parents and ascribed to professionals in "economies of hope." 
The parts that parents took or could take upon themselves to play in care giv­
ing and decision making were diverse. Some tried to keep as much control as 
possible over the steps taken in the transplant trajectory. Others found it more 
important to be emotionally strong and keep a stable state of mind in the pres­
ence of their child and family. These parents preferred to rely more on the 
imagination and judgments of the team about what should happen next than 
to confront the disconcerting scenarios involved in exploring their own per­
spectives and sources of information about their child's disease and trans­
plant options. 
Places of donor-risks in family decision making 
Professionals considered the quality of their communication about the donor 
risks to be very important. Surgeons in particular wanted to be sure that 
donors knew exactly what they were consenting to. The risks of donation were 
given particular emphasis in conversations between professionals and poten­
tial donors. However, professionals had only limited control over risk commu­
nication; as argued in chapter six, the risks to the donor were also a topic of 
intrafamilial concern. Some of the problems with risk communication can only 
be understood and addressed in these family contexts. 
Attitudes toward the risks of living donation positioned donors and partners or 
other family members differentially in the changing practices of family care. 
Furthermore, attitudes toward living donation and its risks had the potential of 
confirming or disrupting family relations. This potential disruption could make 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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it difficult to really think about LRL T and its risks. And so, to create space for 
each other, family members often gave socially acceptable interpretations of 
each others' attitudes. In some families however, with more rigidly gendered 
social and interpretive schemes, there was less space for family members to 
make up their mind about living donation and its risk. In the normative reflec­
tion paragraph I discuss what good risk communication in view of such family 
processes may be. 
N O R M A T I V E  R E F L E CT I O N  
Economies of Hope 
In chapter four, economies of hope were described as the investment and 
engagement of energy, thought, attention, feeling, and activity made in hop­
ing. Economies of hope can be evaluated as a complement to the informed 
consent perspective: they connect the dots of what happens in interactions 
between parents and professionals in other ways. In the informed consent 
process, potential donors were expected to do specific things; they had to lis­
ten to information - especially risk-information - and they were expected to 
express their wishes. The exploration of different hoping patterns in chapter 
four gives insight into what other important things parents were doing when 
they were asked to consider and reflect on information about the risks and 
benefits of living donation. It was also in these economies of hope that inter­
pretations were formed about the child's condition, the chances of receiving a 
DOLT in time, the family circumstances, and the need to opt for living dona­
tion; in other words, it was within these economies of hope that responsibilities 
with regard to living donation were negotiated. 
When economies of hope are evaluated, questions that go beyond matters 
of informed consent are asked about the processes of care and decision mak­
ing. To reflect on the wisdom of specific economies of hope, one can explore 
whether the exercises of thought, imagination and attention are good invest­
ments of energy. One can ask if the hope of a parent elicits a good kind of 
activity and state of mind, and if it does not lead to neglect of things that 
deserve attention. Good hope and its "divisions of hoping labor" are also 
dependent on relations with professionals. Although professionals cannot 
control the hopes of parents, they can critically examine their own share in 
these hopes. They can consider whether they can live up to the roles ascribed 
to them by hoping parents: can they be depended on in the diverse ways par­
ents expect? 
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Good risk communication 
The exploration of significances that living donation and its risks received in 
family processes invited specific normative questions about risk communica­
tion. In this context, a good comprehension of the risks to donors in general, 
which is considered important in informed consent procedures, is less impor­
tant than forming good interpretations of living donation and its risks in one's 
own situation and family. The question here is if risk communication helps the 
family to make sense of the changes they are going through, and whether the 
family members involved can find their own position in this process. It is 
important to pay attention to the social schemes that formed the background 
for interpretations about living donation and its risk in ones own situation, and 
to attend as well to whether family members manage to create interpretive 
space for each other or whether rigid social schemes make it difficult to find 
this space. 
Professionals played different roles in these family processes. Sometimes 
they were seen as guides in the turbulent time of disease and treatment, 
sometimes they were seen instead as representatives of an unfamiliar med­
ical practice. Depending on the roles they played for a family, professionals 
had different opportunities to support risk communication in families. As 
guides they could support families in handling the changes they were going 
through. In some cases this could involve questioning the gendered social 
schemes in a family and exploring possible changes. Where such schemes 
make risk communication in a family difficult, good risk communication may 
require a "gift-exchange gatekeeper," a role that was described by Fox and 
Swazey. As gift-exchange gatekeepers, transplant teams negotiate, mediate, 
and interpret what happens among family members considering living dona­
tion. (Fox et al. 1974) 
In Saber's family some family members would not accept professional 
guidance in their thoughts about living donation and its risk. Part of this family 
felt that that living liver donation was a strange and dangerous medical prac­
tice. Professional support of good risk-communication in this family would 
require a different approach because professionals had no authority as guides. 
Here they could take on the role of representatives of the medical practice 
under discussion, to help family members understand the medical practice in 
which they were participating, with its values and concerns. If family members 
would feel more familiar with this practice, it could also become easier to inter­
pret the risks of living donation and their significance for the family. 
Good risk communication from the side of professionals can thus require 
different approaches. Good risk communication requires sensitivity to the 
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social significance of living donation and its risk in a family. Furthermore to 
support good risk communication between family members, professionals 
have to explore the roles they can play for a specific family. 
Autonomy in decision making about living liver donation 
The explorations of team and family processes in which responsibilities crys­
tallize shed a new light on autonomy in decisions about parental liver dona­
tion, decisions that often involve a lot of pressure. The teams approach to 
LRLT was guided by specific understandings about the pressure to donate 
and conditions for autonomous decision making. Earlier I indicated that the 
approach to LRLT as a safety net was not directed at obtaining optimal med­
ical results for the patient. This may be a reason to consider offering LRL T in a 
different way, as a choice that can be recommended from a medical point of 
view. However if the team would consider such changes it is important to take 
the understandings about donor autonomy that guide the safety-net 
approach, into account as well. 
The value of the team's manner of creating conditions for autonomous 
decision making has to be considered in connection with understandings of 
parents about living donation. Parents frequently said that liver donation is not 
a matter of choice. As explained in chapter five this experience should be 
understood in the context of family commitments in which the option of living 
donation is considered. I will argue that in this context, autonomous decision 
making calls for specific conditions in which potential donors and family mem­
bers can explore the significance that LRLT may have for them. 
Seeing no choice should not be understood as expressing something 
essential about parental donors, as was suggested by Forsberg et al., nor 
does it point to coercion (Forsberg et al. 2004). Instead I propose that the 
phrase should be understood as indicating that previous choices or pre-exist­
ing commitments to the child are seen as more decisive than any of the 
choices that are made in the course of the transplant trajectory. The phrase 
sometimes also seemed to be a reaction to the common practice of framing a 
medical decision as an unfettered choice. 
If choice is not an adequate characterisation of autonomous decision mak­
ing about living parental liver donation, transplant teams need an alternative 
understanding of the potential donor's autonomy. Annemarie Mol argues that 
the alternative to choice does not have to be coercion; interactions can be 
ordered in other ways. (Mol 1997) In the context of family relations and com­
mitments, living donation can come to be seen as something that may 
become a necessity, depending on changes in the child's condition, the wait-
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ing list, and the interpretations that parents develop together with doctors of 
these circumstances. Decision making about liver donation should not be 
seen as a matter of choosing, but of interpreting and responding to circum­
stances in the light of ones ongoing commitments. In itself, this understanding 
about donor decision making does not have to raise suspicion about the 
autonomy of a potential donor. The expression "having no choice" indicates 
that decisions cannot be aptly characterized by choice, even if it involves 
choices in different moments. Overall, decision making is patterned in other 
ways by the interpretive space created in interactions with professionals. 
Within this picture of decision making as interpretive processes, autonomy 
is not at issue in a single act of voluntary and informed choice, it is rather 
something that concerns the transitional period that potential donors and their 
families go through. One of the challenges of this transitional period that were 
described in chapter four, becoming accustomed to an unfamiliar medical 
practice, also has implications for notions of autonomy. The notion of 'consci­
entious autonomy' put forward by Rebecca Kukla can be useful in this context 
(Kukla 2005). Kukla describes conscientious action as 'responsible commit­
ment to the norms that govern it' (p38) . In this view actions are not 
autonomous because they were self chosen, actions are autonomous when 
they are in keeping with someone's commitments. Kukla further argues that 
conscientiousness or responsible commitment to certain norms or practices 
require that one is capable of stepping backward and questioning commit­
ments. To become autonomous in this sense, after "tumbling" into an unfamil­
iar medical practice with its own particular norms and habits, parents have to 
reorient themselves. They have to learn how to interpret their child's condition, 
the opportunities and limits of waiting for a post-mortem donor liver, and the 
risks and benefits of living donation. 
Professional concerns about the autonomy of potential donors are there­
fore best addressed by creating conditions for this process of reorienting, 
interpreting and responding, not by offering living donation as a matter of 
choice. The moral landscape formed by the team in Groningen, with its spe­
cific ways of discussing risks and advantages of LRLT and creating time and 
space, offers one example of how such conditions can be created. The cau­
tious approach had impact on the decision making patterns and dynamics. In 
Chicago, donors have reported that agreeing to donate was an automatic 
response or a spontaneous, split-second decision. (Crowly-Matoka et al. 
2004) In this study in Groningen some parents also reported that they 
instantly resolved to donate when they first heard about this option. However, 
as explained in chapter three, this first spontaneous resolve was not yet seen 
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in this center as a decision made by parents ; it was merely a first step in the 
donor trajectory, in which living donation could be considered from moment to 
moment. In this process, potential donors could explore what living donation 
and its risks would mean to them and their family. 
The analysis and reflection on moral understandings about LRL T generated a 
broad perspective on good decision making about LRLT: Good outcomes of 
LRLT involve more than strictly medical outcomes. It also involves good tran­
sitions in a family and its care practices. Good donor decision making involves 
more than autonomy and informed consent, it also involves good hope. Good 
risk communication involves more than comprehensible and truthful explana­
tions about donor risks, it also involves sensitivity to the family processes in 
which donor risks gain significance. And finally, a valid informed consent is not 
a sufficient condition for a potential donor's autonomy, autonomy is also con­
ditioned by time and space for moral reflection in the practice of LAL T. 
The insights about good decision making were developed in a study of a 
LRLT practice in which there was time for mutual fine tuning, reflection, and 
downplaying pressures. But this very fact also gives a limitation to this study. 
The results of this research might not be applied to situations in which deci­
sions have to be made under time pressure. Here I have underscored the 
value of the outlined approach to LRL T. However, one would need to know 
more about other forms of decision making about LRL T, in order to judge if this 
is really the best approach to LRLT, and to recognize situations in which quick 
decisions may be appropriate. Further research is needed to investigate the 
moral understandings in these kind of situations. It is important though, that 
these investigations must start with a reflective and critical analysis of that 
very concrete practice before any normative results can be given. 
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S U M M AR Y  
Since 2004 children waiting for a liver transplant can also receive a partial 
liver graft from a living donor, usually a parent. The introduction of parent to 
child LAL T changed the character of the involvement between the transplant 
team and the family of a patient. When this option of living liver donation was 
introduced, professionals and relatives around a patient faced new responsi­
bilities. Parents of young patients or other relatives had to consider whether 
to donate or wait for a deceased donor liver graft, whether their family could 
cope with an extra patient, and if they were willing to accept the risk. Profes­
sionals also had to reconsider their responsibilities. Under which circum­
stances could they account for the involvement in risking the life and health of 
a healthy donor? How should they handle different views of colleagues on the 
subject? How could they inform and talk with parents or other relatives about 
the option of living donation without pressuring them? In the views that par­
ents and professionals developed on such questions, understandings about 
professional and family relations formed an important background. This back­
ground of moral understandings about parenthood, about what it means to be 
a good doctor, about good patient-doctor relationships surround the course of 
decision about LRLT. 
The aim of this thesis is threefold. 1. To undertake a reflective analysis of 
moral understandings in decision making about LRL T. Reflective analysis 
involves mapping how participants in the practice of LAL T understand what 
they are doing. 2. To offer a critical reflection on the moral understandings 
that guide decision making. In critical reflection the authority and adequacy 
of moral understandings are examined. 3. To offer a normative reflection on 
questions about good moral understandings. Are the moral understandings 
good or better than others that might be imagined? These different forms of 
analysis and reflection are intertwined, and they are based on qualitative ethi­
cal research. 
Chapter two explores how processes of considering living parental liver dona­
tion were structured by the Groningen liver transplant team in the first years of 
its LRLT program. LAL T was introduced in this center in spite of moral reser­
vations about this procedure that still existed in the team. Team members held 
different views on the acceptability on donor-risks and on the political context 
in which LRLT was introduced. In interactions with parents, pediatricians pro-
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pose specific understandings about LRLT as a safety-net. With this under­
standing about LRL T they created room for synchronization and collaborative 
decision making in spite of different views. 
Chapter three offers a discussion of the complex roles of the family of a 
patient. The family of a child in need of a transplant has a double role. It has a 
role of patient on the one hand, receiving professional care, and of caregiver 
on the other hand, sharing responsibility with the medical caregivers. In order 
to reflect on the complex intertwining of responsibilities connected to this dou­
ble-role, chapter three proposes a change of the agenda of moral questiot1s 
about living parental organ donation. The moral discussions about living 
donation usually focus on informed consent, risk-benefit ratio and voluntary 
choice. Although these issues are important, this chapter shifts the attention 
to three other, related moral concerns: process, trust, and emotions. These 
issues were derived from a qualitative study consisting of observations in a 
liver transplantation team and semi-structured interviews with parents who 
donated or considered liver-donation to their child. 
Chapter four explains the significance of hope in decision making processes. 
In which ways can the future that parents of liver transplant patient's hope for 
be present in hoping? And how are professionals involved in the hopes of par­
ents? In this empirical-ethical study about liver transplantation of children and 
living parental liver donation, the various answers to these questions were 
mutually related: Ways of attending to the future were geared to the way par­
ents entered relations with professional caregivers and vice versa; relations 
were geared to specific patterns of hope and inviting a future. 
In interviews with parents about the liver transplantation of their child, the 
time leading up to transplantation is depicted as a period of transition. The ill­
ness of their child and the uncertain prospects of transplantation had abruptly 
interrupted their lives. In this period they had to learn how to live with the child' 
disease and threats to its future and they had to find their way in a complex 
medical practice that was new to them. Parents testified to different ways of 
carving a route through this period of transition. In this process, hope seems 
to be a central quality. 
A focus on the futurity and social character of hoping in this study sheds 
light on some interesting variations in 'economies of hope'; the investments 
of thought, attention, imagination and feeling, and in divisions of 'hoping labor' 
between patients, parents, professionals, or other caregivers. Respondents 
had different ways of involving others in their hopes. Recognition of these vari-
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ations in economies of hope is important if we want to estimate the value and 
vulnerabilities of specific hoping patterns. 
Chapter five examines experiences of parents with decision making about liv­
ing liver donation that raise questions about voluntariness. Parents' percep­
tion of having no choice and strong emotions like fear about the prospect of 
living liver donation can lead professionals to question the voluntariness of 
their decision. This chapter offers a discussion of the relation of these experi­
ences (no choice and emotions), as they are communicated by parents in our 
study, to the requirement of voluntariness. The perceived lack of choice, and 
emotions are two themes that were found in the interviews conducted within 
the "Living Related Donation; a Qualitative-Ethical Study" research program. 
As a framework for the interpretation of these themes views of moral agency 
are discussed. We adopt a view in which relations are seen as constitutive of 
moral agency. Judging from this view, the perceived lack of choice can best be 
understood as a sign of commitment. This chapter argues that neither seeing 
no choice, nor emotions in themselves should be seen as compromises of a 
voluntary consent. However both experiences draw attention to aspects that 
are important to come to an evaluation of consent to donation. The story of 
one mother is discussed as an exemplary case to show how both themes can 
intertwine. 
Chapter six is about good risk communication. In the process of decision 
making about LRL T, the donor-risks are regarded differently by different par­
ticipants; family members and professionals. This paper explores communi­
cation about the donor-risks in family-processes. Risk-communication is com­
monly framed as an informed consent issue; however, some of the problems 
or qualities of risk-communication in families are difficult to grasp in the terms 
of informed consent. Risk-communication plays an important role in the transi­
tions a family is going through, and in giving significance to changes. We pro­
pose that besides adhering to informed consent norms, good donor-risk com­
munication should also be supportive of the changes that a family is going 
through when LAL T is considered. 
Chapter seven offers a summary of the different levels of analysis and reflec­
tion in the previous chapters. The concluding chapter consists of two parts: 
first a summary is offered of the reflective and critical analysis of team 
processes on the one hand and processes of potential donors on the other 
hand. Second, it offers normative reflection on good outcomes of LRL T, 
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good hope, good risk communication and potential donor's autonomy. Finally, 




Sinds 2004 kunnen in Nederland patienten met een indicatie voor levertrans­
plantatie ook in aanmerking komen voor transplantatie met een deel-lever 
van een levende donor uit de familie (LRLT). Vanaf dat moment biedt het 
transplantatieteam in Groningen de mogelijkheid van een ouder-kind levende 
donor levertransplantatie. Wanneer een kind op de wachtlijst wordt geplaatst 
voor een levertransplantatie, worden ouders ook ge"informeerd over de 
mogelijkheid van levende leverdonatie. De introductie van de mogelijkheid 
van levende leverdonatie is niet zonder gevolgen. De omgang tussen het 
transplantatieteam en de families van patientjes verandert, en ook de samen­
werking tussen individuele professionals en familieleden onderling verandert. 
Professionals en ouders van levertransplantatie patientjes zien zich gesteld 
voor nieuwe verantwoordelijkheden en vragen. Ouders vragen zich at of ze 
zelf donor willen worden of dat ze beter kunnen wachten op een postmortale 
donorlever. Kan het gezin wel een extra patient aan en zijn de risico's van 
levende donatie acceptabel? Professionals zien zich voor de vraag gesteld 
onder welke omstandigheden zij het toelaatbaar achten schade toe te bren­
gen aan een gezonde leverdonor. Daarbij moeten ze zien om te gaan met 
verschillende visies en perspectieven binnen het team op levende leverdo­
natie. 
In de orientatie op deze vragen over levende lever donatie spelen morele 
vooronderstellingen en opvattingen over goed ouderschap, goede medische 
zorg, arts patient relaties en familierelaties een belangrijke rol. De 
Amerikaans filosofe Margaret Urban Walker vat deze opvattingen samen met 
de term 'moral understandings'. Deze 'moral understanings' kunnen op drie 
niveaus geanalyseerd worden. Op het eerste niveau van reflectieve analyse 
wordt in kaart gebracht hoe mensen hun eigen handelen in een specifieke 
praktijk begrijpen. Op het tweede niveau van kritische reflectie wordt onder­
zocht in hoeverre bepaalde 'moral understandings' gedeeld warden, waar ze 
hun autoriteit vandaan halen, en of ze een goed begrip van interacties in een 
praktijk ondersteunen. Een derde niveau van reflectie is normatieve reflectie. 
Hierbij is de vraag of 'moral understandings' in een praktijk goede 'moral 
understandings' zijn, of dat er betere denkbaar zijn. In dit proefschrift worden 
deze 'moral understandings' over LRL T onderzocht. 
De doelstelling van dit proefschrift is daarom drieledig 1) Een reflectieve 
analyse bieden van 'moral understandings' die besluitvorming over LRL T 
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omgeven. 2) Kritische reflectie bieden op 'moral understandings' die de 
besluitvorming over LRLT omgeven. 3) Normatieve reflectie bieden op 'moral 
understandings' die de besluitvorming over LRLT omgeven. Voor deze ver­
schillende niveaus van analyse en reflectie is gebruikt gemaakt van de resul­
taten van kwalitatief empirisch onderzoek. De hoofdstukken zijn opgebouwd 
rand thema's die in het kwalitatieve onderzoek naar voren komen, daarbij wis­
selen verschillende vormen van analyse en reflectie elkaar af. 
In hoofdstuk twee wordt ingegaan op de wijze waarop het transplantatieteam 
in Groningen is omgegaan met de mogelijkheid van levende donor levertrans­
plantatie. Binnen het team vond men het gebruik van levende leverdonoren 
pas dan gerechtvaardigd als eerst alles geprobeerd was om de problemen ten 
gevolge van de schaarste van donorlevers op andere wijze op te lessen. Toen 
het LRLT-programma in 2004 van start ging bestonden binnen het team nog 
verschillende visies op de vraag of dit aanbod gerechtvaardigd was. Vandaar 
dat er voor een voorzichtige aanpak van LRL T werd gekozen. De optie van 
levende donatie wordt in gesprekken met ouders als vangnet voorgesteld: 
als wachten een probleem wordt, kunnen ze eventueel overgaan op levende 
donatie. De voorzichtige benadering van LRLT als een vangnet vormt een 
antwoord op de onderling verschillende morale overwegingen over LRLT 
binnen het team. Het opvatten van LRLT als vangnet stelt de betrokkenen in 
staat om deze optie in de loop van de tijd te verkennen. Met deze benadering 
creeeren ze ruimte voor reflectie en afstemming. Deze tijd en ruimte kan 
echter begrensd warden door de voortschrijdende ziekte van de patient. 
Soms komt het voor dat de beslising over LRL T alsnog snel genomen moet 
warden. Dat laatste is het geval wanneer de patient ernstig achteruit gaat en 
er dus een urgente situatie ontstaat. 
In hoofdstuk drie wordt stilgestaan bij de complexe rollen die de ouders van 
levertransplantatiepatientjes vervullen gedurende het traject. Ouders hebben 
vaak een dubbelrol. Enerzijds ontvangen ze net als hun kind professionele 
zorg, in die zin zijn ze zelf oak patient. Anderzijds geven ouders ook zorg aan 
hun kind en zijn zij daarmee ook zorggever net als professionals. Er is sprake 
van een complexe praktijk van gedeelde verantwoordelijkheden die soms 
kunnen botsen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt ingegaan op het proces van afstem­
ming van verantwoordelijkheid. Om tot goede beluitvorming te komen is het 
van belang aandacht te hebben voor dit proces en de betekenis van emoties 
en vertrouwen daarin. 
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In hoofdstuk vier gaat het over verschillende "patronen van hoop" die naar 
voren komen in de verhalen van ouders over de transplantatie van hun kind. 
In interviews met ouders wordt de periode voorafgaand aan de transplantatie 
van hun kind afgeschilderd als een overgangsperiode. Het leven dat ze tot 
dan toe leefden lijkt ineens stil te staan. Ouders leven plotseling in de weten­
schap dat hun kind met haar of zijn oude lever nog maar een beperkte tijd te 
leven heeft. Het wachten en hopen is op een nieuwe lever die op tijd komt. 
Ouders gaan uiteenlopende routes: zij doorleven als het ware verschillende 
patronen van hoop. Die vormen van hoop vragen hun eigen betrokkenheid en 
zorg. In dit hoofdstuk warden verschillende noties van hoop verkend. Daarbij 
warden interviews gebruikt om vragen over goede hoop te verkennen. 
In hoofdstuk vijf gaat het over het vrijwillige karakter van de besluitvorming 
over levende leverdonatie. Veel ouders zien LRLT voor hun kind niet als een 
kwestie van kiezen. Deze ervaring, en de soms heftige emoties bij het 
vooruitzicht van donorschap, kan bij professionals in het transplantatieteam 
vragen oproepen over de vrijwilligheid van besluiten over donatie. Daar komt 
bij dat het binnen de kaders van informed consent, die vooral zijn toegesne­
den op individuele toestemming, lastig is om de nauwe betrokkenheid van 
familieleden te beoordelen. Door de neiging in het hedendaagse westerse 
denken om vrijheid en onafhankelijkheid als synoniemen te beschouwen, 
warden onderlinge verplichtingen en afhankelijkheden in de besluitvorming 
vaak gezien als teken van dwang. In dit hoofdstuk wordt betoogd dat de erva­
ring geen keuze te hebben en angst voor donorschap, op zichzelf genomen 
niet als teken van dwang of onvrijwilligheid gezien moeten warden. Nadere 
interpretatie van "geen keuze" en van emoties, kan wel helpen om de beteke­
nis die donatie heeft voor een donorkandidaat te verhelderen. 
In hoofdstuk zes staat de communicatie over donor risico's centraal. Risico­
communicatie wordt gewoonlijk gezien en geevalueerd als onderdeel van 
een informed consent procedure. Bij LRLT vindt echter een deel van de risico­
communicatie plaats in familieverband, buiten de controle van professionals 
om. Sommige problemen met risicocommunicatie, die samenhangen met 
onevenwichtige rolverdelingen of relaties in een gezin, vragen daarom om 
een aanpak die meer inhoudt dan het volgen van de voorgeschreven 
informed consent procedures. LAL T is een familieaangelegenheid waarbij 
niet alleen de potentiele donor maar ook anderen betrokken zijn. In de periode 
van ziekte en lever transplantatie van een kind verandert er veel in een gezin. 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt daarom betoogd dat goede risicocommunicatie het 
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omgaan met die veranderingen in het gezin ondersteunt. Professionals 
moeten zich niet alleen richten op het begrijpelijk overbrengen van de risico's, 
maar ook op de betekenis die die risico's hebben voor familiale verhoudingen. 
In hoofdstuk zeven, de conclusies, warden de verschillende lijnen uit de voor­
gaande hoofdstukken samengenomen. De conclusies zijn opgebouwd uit 
twee delen. Het eerste deel biedt een samenvatting van de reflectieve en kri­
tische analyse van processen van besluitvorming in het transplantatie team 
en in familieverband. Het tweede deel biedt normatieve reflectie op goede 
hoop, goede risicocommunicatie en op de voorwaarden voor autonomie van 
potentiele donoren. Ten slotte worden op basis van dit proefschrift vragen 
voor toekomstig ethisch onderzoek naar LRLT geformuleerd. 
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Toen ik na mijn afstuderen plannen aan het maken was voor een verblijf van 
enkele maanden op een biologische kaasboerderij in Zuid-Frankrijk, hoorde 
ik van Marian Verkerk over het LRLT program ma dat in Groningen van start 
zou gaan. Vanuit het Expertise centrum Ethiek in de Zorg (EEZ), maakten 
Marian Verkerk en Els Maeckelberghe, in samenwerking met de chirurg 
Maarten Slooff, plannen voor een onderzoek naar de ethische aspecten van 
LRLT. Tussen de koeien in Frankrijk las ik at en toe bericht over de vordering 
van deze plannen en probeerde ik me een voorstelling te maken van het 
onderzoek. Na een studie waarin vooral veel nadruk lag op theorievorming 
zag ik dit praktijk-gebonden onderzoek als een mooie nieuwe uitdaging. Die 
uitdaging bleek groter te zijn dan ik me van te voren had voorgesteld. De over­
gang van godsdienstwetenschap naar de medische context was lastig, maar 
daardoor ook spannend en interessant. Met toenemend plezier heb ik dit 
onderzoek uitgevoerd. lk wil hier graag de mensen bedanken die me daarbij 
geholpen hebben. 
Allereerst wil ik mijn promoter Marian Verkerk bedanken voor de inspirerende 
begeleiding. In onze gesprekken hielp je me om van alle ideeen over het 
lopende onderzoek de beste uit te kiezen en te ontwikkelen. Daarnaast 
ondersteunde je me bij veel andere grote en kleine vragen die ik over mijn rol 
als onderzoeker en ethica had. Maarten Slooff, mijn tweede promoter, wil ik 
bedanken voor de enthousiaste begeleiding op beslissende momenten in het 
onderzoek. lk heb veel gehad aan de gesprekken met jou en aan jouw uitge­
breide commentaar op concept-teksten. Els Maeckelberghe, mijn co-promo­
ter: bedankt voor de begeleiding in het onderzoek, je deur stand altijd voor 
me open. Tevens wil ik je bedanken voor jouw betrokkenheid bij ethische dis­
cussies in het lever transplantatie team. Wanneer er ethische vragen 
speelden die verheldering nodig hadden, gaf je leiding aan de gesprekken 
hierover. Hierdoor onstond er een goede samenwerking tussen het EEZ en 
het transplantatie team, een samenwerking waar ik veel baat bij heb gehad. 
lk dank het college van zorgverzekeringen (CVZ) voor de financiering van dit 
onderzoek. 
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lk ben in mijn onderzoek geholpen door veel mensen die als professional 
of donor(kandidaat) persoonlijke ervaringen hebben met levende donor lever 
transplantatie. Mijn respondenten, de ouders, en enkele ooms en tantes van 
lever transplantatie patientjes, wil ik bedanken voor de openhartige inter­
views. Anneke de Bruin en Greetje Sekema wil ik bedanken voor het leggen 
van contact met respondenten. Het transplantatie team wil ik bedanken voor 
de gelegenheid die ik kreeg om aanwezig te zijn bij de wekelijkse besprekin­
gen en de refereeravonden . Ook de artsen en leverconsulenten van de 
kinderpoli waar ik mocht observeren wil ik bedanken. Danielle Nijkamp, trans­
plantatie coordinator, bedankt voor je hulp bij het opstellen van de verklarende 
woordenlijst. 
Hilde Lindemann, zal ik je in het Nederlands bedanken, or should I thank 
you in English? I am sure you would understand both. Thank you very much 
for the great help with articulating my thoughts in proper English. It was 
always a pleasure to read the smooth alternatives you proposed to some of 
my stumbling formulations. Apart from the linguistic support I also enjoyed the 
times we met in Groningen or Rijeka, and it is an honour to be a member of 
"the gang". 
Voor het plezier in en om het onderzoek ben ik veel dank verschuldigd aan 
collega's en ex-collega's: Menno de Bree, Annemieke Brouwers, Sara Epen­
huysen, Enne Feenstra, Pier Jaarsma, Amelia Kloppenburg, Esther Koning, 
Jose Pennings (in herinnering), Catarina Rodrigues, Tjeerd Tijmstra, Donald 
van Toi en Wenda van Veen. Het is leuk om deel uit te maken van zo'n kleine 
maar wel veelzijdige groep waar voor vele onderwerpen een goede gespreks­
partner te vinden is. Annemieke, dank voor alle praktische hulp: vanaf het 
begin van mijn werk bij het EEZ was je een onmisbare vraagbaak, en in de 
afrondingsfase van mijn proefschrift dacht je met me mee over organisatie en 
planning. 
Graag wil ik ook de leden van de leescommissie bedanken voor het lezen en 
beoordelen van dit proefschrift : Inez de Beaufort, Margaret Walker en Dick 
Willems. I want to give special thanks to Margaret Walker. Your work has 
given me guidance in this research, and your questions about my work have 
been very helpful. 
Voordat het manuscript naar de drukker ging kreeg ik hulp van Marie-Jose 
Coenen die de omslag van dit proefschrift heeft ontworpen en haar collega 
Hannie Pijnappels die het binnenwerk ontwierp. Bedankt voor het meedenken 
en de mooie ontwerpen ! 
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Bij mijn ouders en zussen kon ik altijd terecht. Mijn ouders, Ronald en 
Annemie wonen aan de andere kant van dit land, en mijn zussen, Kim, 
Robin en Bonne wonen in drie verschillende steden, maar samen vormen 
ze nog steeds een dierbare thuisbasis. 
Arjen, Jantsje, Bouke, Jelske en Trynke, het is een feest om zo'n schoon­
familie te krijgen. Bedankt voor de warme ontvangst in jullie familie en ook 
voor alle steun die Emke en ik kregen bij grate en kleine gebeurtenissen de 
afgelopen jaren. Emke, mijn man, ik weet niet goed welke dank ik voor jou op 
papier moet zetten. Je hebt me op vele manieren gesteund tijd.ens het onder­
zoek, als enthousiaste luisteraar en als collega promovendus. Het was leuk 
om zo samen op te lopen met twee verschillende onderzoeken. Maar ik ben 
vooral dankbaar voor alles wat ik met je kan delen buiten ons onderzoek: 
muziek, bergen, rotsen, boeken, detectives, lekker eten, en vrienden. 
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C U R RICU LU M VITAE 
Mare Knibbe, geboren 1978, groeide op in Borgharen (Limburg) aan de Maas. 
Na het afronden van de Vrije School in Maastricht haalde ze haar VWO 
eind-examen in Amsterdam. In 1997 verhuisde ze naar Groningen om de 
studie Godsdienstwetenschap te volgen. In de doctoraalfase koos ze als 
hoofdvak ethiek en als bijvakken Godsdienstpsychologie, Vraagstukken 
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